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Abstract 
Toward the end of the millennium social class became subject to increasingly 
sustained and forceful claims that it had been wiped from the social landscape. 
Within this outpouring of anti-class sentiment, however, three writers 
highlighting similar processes spelling the end of class have been particularly 
influential yet, surprisingly, only cursorily or inadequately examined by 
faithful defenders of the much-maligned concept hitherto. These are Anthony 
Giddens, Ulrich Beck and Zygmunt Bauman, all of whom argue class to have 
been eroded from social life on the basis of an individualization and increased 
reflexivity of identities, lifestyles and life paths in the contemporary epoch. This 
thesis, then, aims to fill the void left by class analysts by subjecting these 
theories to detailed theoretical and empirical scrutiny in the same spirit as the 
Affluent Worker team confronting embourgeoisement forty years earlier. It 
proceeds first of all by interrogating the internal contradictions and 
theoretical weaknesses of each theory of individualization and reflexivity 
before moving on to outline, defend and, where necessary, critique and extend 
the Bourdieusian position on class guiding the study. The latter then, 
importantly, serves as a platform from which to launch not only a fresh round 
of critique but also a reformulation of individualization and reflexivity in a new 
conceptual vocabulary so that they can be put to consistent empirical test. The 
theoretical part of the thesis complete, the empirical component then consists 
of qualitative interviews with twenty-six individuals drawn from across the 
socio-economic spectrum. The overall conclusion is that, contrary to what the 
individualization theorists hold, class clearly continues to exert its influence 
over identities, life courses and lifestyle pursuits in the way a Bourdieusian 
might expect, but that this is specified by a new social context not dissimilar to 
that described by Beck and the others. 
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1. Introduction: From Affluence to Individualization 
Forty years ago, the spectre of embourgeoisement haunted the sociology of class. 
Ever-increasing societal affluence, relative parity of incomes and living conditions 
and the expanded availability of consumer goods had all, so proponents of the 
famous thesis asserted (e. g. Zweig, 1961), ensured the cultural and political 
assimilation of the working class into the middle rungs of society and, as a 
consequence, effectively rendered the concept of class redundant. Lifestyles and 
social values had converged, the argument went, with the erstwhile working class 
eagerly appropriating the tastes and leisure pursuits of the growing middle class, 
unapologetically jettisoning their once unbreakable commitment to collectivism 
and trade unionism in favour of bourgeois privatism, individualism and status- 
obsession and turning to Conservatism in the political arena as the only force 
capable of ensuring the maintenance of their new-found principles. In sum, no 
distinguishable difference warranting sociological attention existed between 
occupational groups, it was claimed, and despite its scant empirical backing this 
idea soon accrued considerable popular purchase. 
Enter John Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, Frank Bechhofer and Jennifer 
Platt, probably the most celebrated research team in the history of British sociology. 
Having promptly taken to task representatives of the embourgeoisement thesis for 
their conceptual inadequacies and attempted to reformulate their propositions as 
sound hypotheses (Goldthorpe and Lockwood, 1964), Goldthorpe et al. produced 
three slim volumes of empirical research that systematically demolished their 
claims (Goldthorpe et al., 1968a,, 1968b, 1969). Interviewing 229 manual workers 
in three separate industrial plants in Luton, the Affluent Worker team, as they came 
to be known,, concluded that there had indeed been profound changes in the 
working class in the post-war period, but that they could hardly be characterised as 
embourgeoisement. Instead, whilst they did identify a degree of 'normative 
convergence' between sections of the working class and white-collar workers, they 
heralded the emergence of a new, privatised working class characterised by an 
instrumental approach to work, a 'family centredness' and a pecuniary image of 
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societal stratification (see also Lockwood, 1966). They may have been transfon-ned, 
but distinct class divisions and experiences remained. 
Four decades on, however, the social world has changed, and whilst the 
vanquished apparition of embourgeoisement may have been buried in the sands of 
time, once again the concept of class is under threat. Though the current epoch is 
not short of perspectives critical of the veteran sociological tool, a new challenge 
has emerged on the horizon - one with consequences just as stark as 
embourgeoisement but anchored in the global socio-political climate of the last 
quarter century, one that has theorised recent transformations in the social 
landscape without capitulating to the excesses of postmodern proclamations, and 
one that commands wide influence and discussion within the academy whilst also 
existing in simplified form in the political arena. This challenge is the theory of 
individualization, advanced in slightly different versions by German sociologist 
Ulrich Beck and Polish 6migr6 Zygmunt Bauman, and the kindred ideas on 
increasing reflexivity forwarded by British social theorist and now New Labour 
Lord Anthony Giddens. All three thinkers, in differing ways and with different 
degrees of directness, posit the steady erosion of class from objective social 
structures and subjective consciousness in the wake of a withering of tradition or 
the onset of disembedding forces prising individuals from their old collective 
modes of existence and ensuring that they no longer have any choice but to choose 
how to live, what to value and what to become. To give new meaning to the 
Sartrian dictum, people are now forced to be free whether they like it or not. 
So once more the ability of class to explain patterns of difference and 
inequality has been put into question, its position in the sociological armoury 
queried and its utility for understanding the key political issues of our time thrown 
into doubt. Yet, surprisingly, no substantial appraisal of individualization or 
Giddens' work on reflexivity as they relate to class has yet been produced. Sure 
enough those who stay faithful to the concept of class have rebuked them, 
dismissed them or undertaken partial examinations of them whilst continuing to 
produce theoretical and empirical contributions to their topic, but no sustained 
head-on assessment has ever emerged. The result is a perturbing and indefensible 
void, with scholars content to nibble at its edges rather than rekindle the spirit of 
the Affluent Worker research, step into its epicentre and effectively adjudicate the 
intellectual wellbeing of class. Thus the present study is conceived. Over the 
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following pages, the ideas of Beck, Bauman and Giddens will be subject to a direct 
examination to determine with some degree of certainty whether they have the 
credibility to match their pervasive influence. Proceeding in a similar fashion to the 
famous study of embourgeoisement, the two building blocks of scientific 
knowledge, logic and empirical evidence, are employed to arbitrate the fate of 
individualization. Thus, to begin with, the assessment will entail a double-pronged 
theoretical critique of the ideas under inspection. On the one hand, there will be an 
evaluation of the logical consistency of each position abstracted from particular 
conceptual prejudices - what Giddens (1984) himself, in an earlier incarnation, 
would call an appraisal of 'internal validity'. On the other hand, the claims of Beck 
and the others will be exposed to further critique based on the theoretical stance on 
class employed in this study and, subsequently, some of their core postulations will 
be reformulated in a more agreeable conceptual idiom. In this latter task, the study 
is guided by the influential theoretical understanding of class put forward by the 
late French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, though in a modified form. 
Theoretical criticism is an important task in the quest to advance knowledge, 
but it is not enough on its own to fully discern the worth of the theories of Beck 
and the others. Hence, the second aspect of the study is an empirical assessment of 
the themes of individualization and reflexivity, as reformulated accordingly, to see 
if they can, as Popper (1959/2002: 10 etpassim) would say, 'prove their mettle'. In 
this much it is primarily 'deductive' in its approach - it is, in other words, 'testing' 
a set of hypothesised theoretical themes - though as with any research act of this 
kind there are always inductive moments too - that is, the formulation of new 
themes and theoretical propositions out of empirical material. Epistemologically, 
this enterprise is guided not by positivism, Hempelian hypothetico-deductivism or 
Popper's critical rationalism - all of which are often construed as firm foundations 
for deductivist research - but by Bourdieu's post-positivist maxim, inspired by 
Gaston Bachelard's 'applied rationalism', that the social fact is won (it breaks with 
lay experience), constructed (it is built into a formalised model) and confirmed (or, 
it may be added, confuted) by empirical research (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and 
Passeron, 1991: 11). Just as in the Affluent Worker research, the central method of 
investigation in the endeavour to confirm or confute individualization will be one- 
to-one interviews. However, where the Luton team's interviews were almost 
survey-like in construction, execution and reportage, the 
interviews here must 
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explore in considerable depth the life histories and subjectivities of individuals to a 
degree missed by Goldthorpe et al. if it is to produce satisfactory conclusions on 
the theories under scrutiny (cf, Devine, 1992: 5-6). Partly for that reason, and 
partly in owing to practical factors such as significant differences in resources and 
number of researchers (as well as continued difficulties of access), the total number 
of interviews - twenty-six - is considerably less than the hundreds collected by 
Goldthorpe and his team, meaning that, at this stage, the research can only claim to 
be a suggestive starting point upon which future inquiry can be built. Furthermore, 
because embourgeoisement essentially theorised mutations in the working class 
alone, Goldthorpe et al. understandably conducted their interviews primarily with 
manual workers. Individualization and reflexivity, however, are argued to have 
brought changes in life paths, values, perceptions and preferences across the board, 
and hence the sample here can not be restricted to any one section of society but 
must reach across the occupational spectrum. 
As with the theoretical critique, the empirical component of the study 
proceeds on two fronts, separating out for analytical purposes elements of the 
social cosmos that are, in reality, enmeshed. First it will investigate the structural 
dimension of social life, discerning whether the relational constraints or 
opportunities of class have, as Beck and the others claim, ceased to play a role in 
the formation of life paths and been supplanted by reflexive decision making or 
whether their pernicious existence continues to dictate trajectories. Secondly, it will 
examine whether class has been erased from the symbolic realm of lifestyle 
practices, a theme which Giddens in particular is associated with, and schemes of 
perception - either as an explicit, meaningful reference point 
for individuals in 
describing the world or as an implicit factor undergirding their perception of 
themselves, their lives, their relation to and judgement of others, political views 
and so on. If the individualization theorists are correct, then consciousness and 
discourse will hinge only upon individualistic notions of uniqueness, self- 
responsibility and self-blame, with class banished from perception altogether or, if 
anything, recognised as nothing more than a relic from the distant past. 
4 
An Overview 
The structure of the thesis is bisected according to its twin aims, with the 
first section laying the theoretical groundwork upon which the second section, the 
empirical investigation, rests. The next chapter opens the conceptual component by 
setting the theories of individualization in their historical and intellectual context 
and assessing the three varieties of critical response they have garnered from class 
analysts, showing in each case that whilst important points have been ventured, 
enough has not yet been done to fully confute or confirm the thoughts of Beck and 
the others as they bear on class. After that, chapter 3 provides the detailed 
exposition of each position that has been regrettably absent in recent scholarship on 
class, extracting the core themes and processes of theoretical and empirical 
significance, before then questioning the logic and cohesion of the three 
perspectives. The conclusion is, ultimately, that individualization as conceptualised 
so far is deeply flawed and should not be accepted, yet that many of the broad 
themes and processes they address may still, when adequately re-thought, have 
empirical salience and require examination. Chapter 4 therefore attempts to 
reformulate the ideas of Beck and the others into a more agreeable framework. To 
do this, it outlines the theoretical position on class - that is, what constitutes the 
historically troublesome concept - adopted in this thesis. Though wary of 
intellectual fashions and misapplication, the sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu 
- grounded in a relational (or 'topological', as Wacquant [2008] recently put 
it) 
ontology and consisting of the concepts of social space, fields, capital and habitus - 
is logically and empirically compelling and forms the baseline of the investigation. 
This is not to say, however, that it is without its limitations, particularly in 
adequately grasping the complexities of social life revealed by in-depth qualitative, 
life-history research. Individual experiential idiosyncrasy and variation, as well as 
biographical completeness, escape between the gaps of Bourdieu's concepts, whilst 
conscious cogitation and agency remain inadequately theorised. To plug these 
niggling cracks, the link between the French thinker's thought and the 
phenomenology of Alfred Schutz is exploited. To be more precise, Schutz's notion 
of the lifeworld, read in a particular way, and his understanding of the individual 
stock of knowledge are forwarded as useful additions and adjustments to 
Bourdieu's set of 'thinking tools'. From this position of 'modified' or 
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'phenomenologised Bourdieusianism' 1 the theory of individualization can be 
critiqued anew but its plausible aspects preserved as testable propositions. 
Chapter 5 concludes the theoretical section of the thesis by detailing the 
methodological considerations and choices flowing from the specifics of the 
processes under investigation and the framework advanced in chapter 4, justifying 
and outlining the powers of qualitative interviewing in this regard. A description of 
the parameters and acquisition of the sample is also included, along with attendant 
reflections on the persistent and disquieting difficulties of access experienced. With 
this task complete, the empirical segment of the thesis, consisting of two 
complementary chapters, can begin. Chapter 6 traces the objective life paths of the 
interviewees, examining the extent to which capital and habitus continue to shape 
trajectories through social space via educational and occupational pathways, even 
where upwards mobility has occurred. Chapter 7 then explores the subjective 
salience of class by unpacking the symbolic practices, sense of social difference 
and use of class discourse amongst the research participants. In both cases, the 
continued significance of relational class processes - the powers of capital and 
habitus - is upheld, but not without recognition of real social change. The 
conclusion then rounds out the study by reiterating the themes revealed within a 
coherent framework,, considering the limitations and future directions of the 
research and contemplating its consequences for the landscape of social theory and 
political practice. 
' These are awkward phrases which I nevertheless feel are necessary to distinguish my thought from 
unadulterated Bourdieusianism and to keep it clear and rigorous - something which can not be said 
for other users of Bourdieu, such as Skeggs (2004), who seem to almost haphazardly throw in 
multiple additions or ideas and appear unclear about their foundational vision of social ontology. I 
refrain from using the rather more arrogant term 'neo-Bourdieusianism', however, for fear of being 
misread as overly critical of or distant from Bourdieu in a sociological field which is currently 
witnessing a split in France between faithful Bourdieusians and those, such as Latour, Lahire and 
Boltanski, who see his work as overly structuralist or determinist and have, to greater and lesser 
degrees, swung too far in the direction of subjectivism or its ontological bedfellows (see Frýre, 
2004). 
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2. Roots and Rejoinders: the Context of Emergence 
and the Response of Class Analysis 
In order to set the scene for the present investigation this chapter will 
pursue two tasks. To begin with, it will sketch in broad brush strokes the socio- 
historical and intellectual context within which the ideas of Giddens, Beck and 
Bauman are rooted. This will entail a clarification of the trajectory of class analysis, 
the manifold social changes in the last quarter-century or so and the upsurge of 
anti-class sentiment they have induced. After that, the critical literature pertaining 
to Giddens and the others will be considered and categorised according to the main 
lines of attack pursued and the traditions of thought they are primarily aligned with, 
the principle purpose being to reveal the necessity of intervention by exposing a 
lack of sustained, comprehensive and adequate appraisal and exploration whilst 
also acknowledging the worthwhile contributions and advances made by others. 
Class Analysis into the Nineties 
Initially characterised in the immediate post-war period by the opposition 
between 'stratification theorists' conceiving inequality to be measurable with a 
multiplicity of gradational scales (of prestige, income and so on) and conflict 
theorists positing the existence of determinate social groups engaged in conflict, 
the field 2 of class analysis had, by the end of the eighties, become dominated by 
two perspectives which, whilst diverging along one axis of differentiation, 
nevertheless shared a constellation of methodological and conceptual tenets that set 
them apart from others. These were, on the one hand, the 'analytical Marxism' of 
American sociologist Erik Olin Wright (1978,1979,1985,1997) and, on the other, 
the Weber-inspired Nuffield programme of social mobility research associated 
above all with John Goldthorpe (1980,1987,2000; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). 
2 The term 'field' is used only loosely here and throughout in describing class analysis, rather than 
in the specific, technical sense given to it by Bourdieu. There is, no doubt, much to suggest that 
class analysis, or the study of 'class and stratification', should indeed be conceived and analysed as 
a field in the latter sense. but such an analysis would require more space than is available. 
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Both owed a great deal of their influence to the fact that they broke with the 
prevailing approaches to class - theoretical cogitation or historical or qualitative 
research - and offered for the first time, in different forms, the possibility of 
conducting large-scale, national and comparative quantitative analysis based on 
rigorously constructed and theoretically grounded class categories rather than 
gradational scales operating with a simplistic conception of 'classes' ultimately 
reducible to the division between manual and non-manual workers. 
Wright's perspective emerged out of the confluence of two intentions. The 
first of these was to surmount the so-called 'embarrassment of the middle classes' 
then plaguing Marxism (Wright, 1985: 13), that is, the proliferation of the middle 
sections of the occupational structure, particularly technical, managerial, 
professional and scientific positions, through the seventies and the contraction of 
industrial manual labour as a result of automation and the increasing exportation of 
manufacture to developing countries. Contradicting the broad thrust of Marx's 
prognosis and prompting some commentators to herald a turning point in the 
structure of classes in Western society based on the movement from an industrial to 
a ýpost-industrial' service- or knowledge-based economy (Bell, 1973), this 
compelled Marxists, who had begun to make significant inroads into the academy 
since the radical sixties, to account for the new positions by mapping their place in 
relation to the cardinal classes (see e. g. Poulantzas, 1975; Ehrenreich and 
Ehrenreich, 1979). Wright's response, initially formulated in dialogue with 
structuralist Marxism and quickly hailed as amongst the most conceptually 
rigorous of contributions, was to produce a class map incorporating 'contradictory 
class locations', later revised in light of criticism and operationalization difficulties 
to differentiate classes on the basis of a variety of assets other than property that 
individuals may possess (skills and authority) and in regard to which they may be 
exploited. At the same time, Wright, along with others flying the flag of 'analytical 
Marxism'. was driven by a second desire to overcome the marginalisation of 
Marxism in the sociological field by asserting it to be an analytically rigorous, non- 
dogmatic and scientifically credible body of thought capable of being put to fruitful 
use in empirical research and, as a result, endeavoured to demonstrate the utility of 
his own framework by undertaking original investigations and pioneering a 
multinational research project nourishing several prominent monographs in class 
analysis (e. g. Marshall et al., 1988, see further Wacquant, 1989). 
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Goldthorpe's position, in contrast, was formed as a part of a wider 
programme of research on social mobility initiated at Nuffield College in the 
seventies (see e. g. Halsey et al., 1980). Originally employing Lockwood's (1958) 
Weber-inspired differentiation of 'market situations' and 'work situations' of 
occupations (their 'degree of economic security and chances of economic 
advancement' and their 'location within the systems of authority and control 
governing the process of production in which they are engaged, and hence in their 
degree of autonomy in performing their work-tasks and roles' respectively - 
Goldthorpe, 1980: 40) to define classes, his specific mission was to gather evidence 
on occupational mobility in Britain with the aim of explicitly and implicitly 
countering both Marxist prophecies of proletarianisation and the claims of 'liberal 
class theorists of industrial society' (e. g. Kerr et al., 1962; Blau and Duncan, 1967) 
that achievement had trumped ascription, equality of opportunity prevailed and, 
consequently, other forms of stratification come to the fore (see Gallie, 1991; 
Marshall, 1991; also Goldthorpe, 1988,1992; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: chap. 
1). In later work, however, Goldthorpe dropped the Lockwood criteria - now 
grounding his class schema in the relations of employment (employer, self- 
employed and employed) and, in the case of the employed, the regulation of their 
employment (i. e. a labour contract or a service relationship) - and downplayed 
earlier interests in the prospect of class formation, concentrating his attention 
instead on the Weberian task of demonstrating the efficacy of class categories in 
unveiling the objective distribution of life chances across numerous domains (see 
especially Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992). 
The division between the two perspectives, then, followed the fundamental 
principle of conceptual opposition within class analysis, consolidated through the 
seventies, between those marching under the banner of Marxism and those taking 
inspiration from the writings of Weber. Yet Goldthorpe's and Wright's positions 
had (and have) more crucial features in common than some critical overviews and 
comparisons suggest and, as a result, between them succeeded in establishing a 
dominant and, unfortunately, partial and problematic way of viewing and studying 
class. Both (though Goldthorpe more so), for example, tended to prioritise 
empirical research over theory building, conducting the latter - often in the form 
of trying to establish the 'correct' boundaries between classes or to explain 
concrete findings - only to serve the former or when provoked by criticism, and 
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both pursued exclusively quantitative analysis of large-scale datasets employing 
often complex statistical techniques. These facets, key in securing their influence, 
are by no means, in themselves, detractions, but their one-sidedness and sometimes 
extreme manifestation attracted repeated accusations of theoretical attenuation or 
empiricism (in Goldthorpe's case at least - Pahl, 1993; Morris and Scott, 1996) and, 
so some claimed, ultimately threatened to isolate class analysis from broader 
themes in social theory and, indeed, from any sociologist unfamiliar with the 
arcane language of advanced statistical procedures (Crompton and Scott, 2000; 
Savage, 2000). Furthermore, both Wright and Goldthorpe focused on the 
refinement of objective, static class structures as matrices of independent variables 
and the examination of their consequences (for income, mobility and such like) and, 
in following through on this, both, like their classical progenitors, restricted classes 
to the economic domain by conceiving them as aggregates of occupations 
differentiated by certain production- or market-based characteristics. The two have 
therefore not only wrestled repeatedly, and for many unsatisfactorily, with how 
best to account for those not actually in employment but, coupled with their 
substantive interests in the numbers in each class position or with the patterning of 
differential life chances, marginalised issues of history, culture, subjectivity and 
identity from the conceptualisation of class beyond the study of voting patterns or 
quantifiable indicators of class identification or consciousness (criticised at length 
in Marshall, 1988; Wright et al., 1989; Emmison and Western, 1990; Fantasia, 
1995). Finally, both, as a complement to their large-scale, quantitative and 
economistic orientation, coquetted with a utilitarian model of human agency. In 
Wright's (1985) case, sitting uncomfortably with his lapses into determinism or his 
lip service to the importance of the 'lived experience' of class in other places (see 
contributions to Wright et al., 1989) and absent in more recent works, this was 
through an appreciation of Roemer's (1982) Marxist reworking of game theory. 
For Goldthorpe (1991), who had once vaunted the Parsonsian 'action frame of 
reference' but left unelaborated his theoretical position on agency for some time, it 
was a variety of rational action theory he was to develop and defend at greater 
length in later years. 
There were, of course, dissenting voices even at the zenith of Wright and 
Goldthorpe's hegemony, some of which, whilst still being split by the Marx-Weber 
fissure,, emphasised either theoretical elaboration (e. g. Parkin, 1979; Murphy, 1988) 
10 
or historical, qualitative and culture-laden approaches to class and human agency 
(e. g. Burawoy, 1979; Clarke et al., 1979; see Fantasia, 1995) and some of which, 
whilst close to Wright and Goldthorpe in many ways, attempted to subvert the 
dualistic division between forefathers by appealing to more marginal traditions of 
thought (such as faithful advocates of stratification theory or the Cambridge school, 
whose 'interaction distance' or 'differential association' approach, identifying 
strata on the basis of the frequency of interaction between individuals within 
occupational groups, drew from the 'social distance' method associated with 
Laumann, himself tied to the Warner school, and Bogardus; see Stewart et al., 1980; 
Bottero and Prandy, 2003). Nonetheless, vis-a-vis the quantitative, economistic and 
utilitarian positions of the 'multivariate Marxist' and the Nuffield don, against 
whose methodological and meta-theoretical assumptions they struggled (see e. g. 
the debate between Wright and Burawoy in, tellingly, the collection devoted to one 
of Wright's books - Wright et al., 1989; see also Fantasia, 1995), all of these 
occupied subordinate locations (manifest in numbers of advocates, levels of critical 
discussion of their ideas,, citations,, space in textbooks and such like). 
Changes and Challenges at a Century's End 
Such was the state of class analysis by the mid-nineties. However, whilst 
Wright's and Goldthorpe's programmes were progressing and the field rigidifying 
around their partial opposition, the same period was marked by an abundance of 
intertwined social processes in Western societies that prompted a tide of 
declarations that class was an irrelevant and anachronistic item in the sociological 
toolbox. Such claims are, of course, by no means peculiar to this epoch. Indeed, 
every decade of the post-war era seems to have had its own collection of 
challengers. In the forties and fifties it was proponents of stratification theory 
controversially asserting that America was a 'classless society' on the premise that 
not only was the distribution of status, prestige, income and so on just too 
continuous to identify clear-cut boundaries or social groupings but an individual 
could occupy starkly contrasting positions in each of the different hierarchies 
(Lenski, 1952; Nisbet, 1959). In the sixties it was either the 'liberal class theorists' 
forever targeted by Goldthorpe (which overlapped with the 'academic sociology' 
identified by Giddens, 1981: 269ff. 295-, cf. 1982: 56-7), the ascendant New Left 
II 
(e. g. Marcuse, 1964) or - most famously - the theorists of embourgeoisement 
encountered in the Introduction. In the seventies, finally, once the preceding 
challenges had waned in influence, it was the post-industrial challenge that once 
again threw into question the sociological and political purchase of the much- 
maligned concept. Nevertheless, the claims accompanying the social changes of the 
last twenty-five years that supply the intellectual backcloth and bedfellows of ideas 
of individualization and reflexivity have been more sustained, multifaceted, 
forceful and explicit than ever before, often constituting component parts of 
declarations that a novel period of social history necessitating a clearout of the 
conceptual cupboards has been set in motion. For the sake of expositional clarity 
the social processes and their attendant arguments can be categorised into three 
general realms - the economic, the cultural and the political - and relayed in turn. 
Starting first with the economic sphere, the continued shrinkage of the 
manufacturing and extractive sectors and the concomitant burgeoning of the 
service sector amid the economic restructuring of the eighties have, some argue, 
begun to erase from the occupational landscape the archetypal industrial proletariat 
and replace it with a heterogeneous batch of service workers on the one hand and 
an un(der)employed and dispossessed mass on the other (Gorz, 1982; Lash and 
Urry, 1987,1994; Pahl, 1989; Pakulski and Waters, 1996: 57-8; Gray, 1998). Not 
only that, numerous commentators claim, but, alongside this post-industrial turn, 
'advanced' Western economies today no longer operate principally with the 
production system popularised by Henry Ford or the scientific management of 
Frederick Taylor but instead, in adapting to heightened global competition and 
technological developments, exhibit new features that can only be described as 
'post-Fordist' (see Hall and Jacques, 1989; Harvey, 1989; Kumar, 1995). The key 
notion here isflexibility: in terms of production, mass production is exchanged for 
pliable niche production; in terms of organisational structure, hierarchies are 
flattened and managerial functions streamlined; and in terms of the workforce, 
'jobs for life' are dissolved as contracts from top to bottom of the occupational 
ladder become temporary and insecure in a drive to improve efficiency. All this, 
the argument goes, demolishes working-class collectivism and the strength of the 
trade unions (Harvey, 1989) whilst working to ensure that unemployment and 
poverty - and hence life chances a 
la Max Weber and Goldthorpe - are no longer 
distributed according to the class mould (see Leisering and Leibfried, 1999). In fact, 
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critics of class claim, coupled with the vast differentiation of occupations, 
extensive state services and increased affluence and spare time of today the sphere 
of work or production as a whole - the domain of classes as traditionally conceived 
- is simply of less relevance in maintaining domination or determining attitudes, 
identities, lifestyles and life chances than other social divisions or the realm of 
leisure and consumption (Alt, 1976; Bell, 1976; Offe, 1985; Saunders, 1987-, Pahl, 
1989; Pakulski and Waters, 1996; Baudrillard, 2001). 
But is the realm of leisure,, consumption and, more broadly, culture not 
simply home to class differences translated into consumer goods and lifestyles? 
Not, say critics, given that the improved income of manual workers has opened up 
access to goods and lifestyle pursuits previously unattainable; that with the advent 
of postmodernism the distinction between the high culture associated with the 
upper classes and the mass culture of the working class is breaking down, thus 
blurring the boundaries between the classes themselves in perception; and that, 
finally, the expanding media and advertising industries bring a profusion of 
information and images not only exposing and indeed propagating different ways 
of life but which cannot themselves be assimilated to any hierarchy or social 
division (see inter alia Lash and Urry, 1987,1994; Harvey, 1989; Clark and Lipset, 
1991; Featherstone, 1991; Crook et al., 1992; Baudrillard, 200 1). 3 Taken together 
with the changes in the economy, it is claimed, all these processes have effaced the 
old class cultures embedded in occupational communities and famously 
documented by Hoggart (1957), Dennis et al. (1969) and Jackson (1972) and 
established choice, variety and ambiguity across the board, with tastes and 
lifestyles being cast as expressions of individuality rather than as signs of 
membership of any distinct group. If there are any distinguishable collectivities to 
speak of in this mass of individuals, detractors add, then these are status groups 
based on, for example, subcultural (or 'neo-tribal') symbols (e. g. of punk or goth), 
religion or ethnicity - the last two of which are seen as of increasing 
importance 
given global migration and the emergence of multiculturalism as a theoretical and 
political issue - rather than economic 
divisions (Pakulski and Waters, 1996; 
Bennett, 1999). 
3 It is interesting to note, however, that some of the most influential explanatory accounts of the 
emergence of postmodem culture are either 
Marxist in orientation (Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1991) 
or inspired by Bourdieu's class theory 
(of which more later) (Lash and Urry, 1987; Lash, 1990; 
Featherstone, 1991). 
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Finally, the changes in the economic and cultural spheres have, some claim, 
undergirded and dovetailed with a decline of class politics in the last two decades 
of the twentieth century, evidenced in the UK by the incessantly contested 
psephological fact that manual workers no longer tend to vote predominantly for 
Labour or white-collar workers and the self-employed for the Conservatives 
(Sdrlvik and Crewe, 1983; cf. Clark and Lipset, 1991). Rising levels of prosperity, 
occupational shifts and, crucially, the emergence of 'post-materialist' issues and 
dilemmas through the eighties - the threat of nuclear disaster, increasing 
environmental damage, equality for women, ethnic minorities and homosexuals - 
have, it is argued, ensured that the material issues that once propelled traditional 
class politics - taxation levels, working conditions and nationalisation versus 
privatisation - no longer play a significant part in shaping individuals' political 
attitudes, activism or ballot box decisions (Inglehart, 1977,1990; Clark, 2001; see 
also Mercer, 1990). As a result, the 'forward march of labour' has, in the words of 
Eric Hobsbawm (1981), been halted and superseded by a flood of 'new social 
movements' addressed to the post-materialist issues. In reaction, theoreticians of 
the left 'retreated from class', as Wood (1986) puts it, and championed the social 
movements as sites of struggle capable of inaugurating the better society the 
working class failed to achieve - shifting from Marxism to post-Marxism (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985; cf. Gorz, 1982; Hall and Jacques, 1989) or at least to a heavily 
reconstructed version (Habermas, 1987) - whilst the Labour Party, along with other 
left-leaning European political parties, reinvented itself by jettisoning its 
commitment to the working class and socialism. In the process, and aided by the 
individualist rhetoric (and the policies) of Thatcher and later New Labour and the 
changing concerns of social and political scientists on the left and right, the idea of 
class ceased to frame political debates over socio-economic inequality and instead 
discourse on 'social exclusion' or the 'underclass', said to consist of the long-term 
un(der)employed and other marginalised groups, took centre stage (see 
Westergaard, 1992; on New Labour see Fairclough, 2000; Levitas, 2005; cf. 
Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 296-314, and Wacquant, 2004a: 108ff, on similar 
processes in France and the US respectively). 
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From Heterodoxy to Cultural Class Analysis 
All of these changes and challenges could be, and indeed have been, 
countered by class analysts and others on the grounds of their empirical existence, 
the nature and extent of their consequences for class and the conceptual i sation of 
class held to be in decline - to give just one example, the apparent arrival of post- 
industrialism and consequent diminution of the traditional proletariat has hardly 
troubled non-Marxists willing to adjust their class schemes to the new scenario and 
identify a new working class, or new part of the working class, located in lower 
level service occupations such as cleaning, fast food service and the like (Esping- 
Anderson, 1993). Nevertheless, the close of the twentieth century was a turbulent 
period for class analysis, with a whole array of critics, some of whom once 
researched and theorised the concept themselves, proclaiming class redundant, 
dead or dying on the one hand whilst a faithful knot of defenders vociferously 
asserted its continued salience on the other (see the debates in Lee and Turner, 
1996; Clark and Lipset, 2001; and those between Pakulski and Waters and their 
critics in the 1996 volume of Theory and Society; see also Hindess, 1987; Pahl, 
1989,1993; Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992; Adonis and Pollard, 1997; Kingston, 
2000). 
At the same time, faced with the unrelenting calls for class to be abandoned, 
mounting dissatisfaction with the limitations of the dominant approaches and 
broader moves within the sociological field, particularly the increased interest in 
cultural processes (the 'cultural turn'), the field of class analysis began to transform 
and, in many ways, to revitalise itself - reflected in claims from practitioners that 
class analysis was 'fragmenting' (Crompton, 1996,1998) and, later, being 
'renewed' (Crompton et al., 2000). 4 Heterodox conceptualisations of class were 
proffered that challenged the hegemony of the Wright- Goldthorpe couplet by 
taking their lead not just from Marx or Weber but from figures theretofore alien to 
contemporary studies of the concept such as Durkheim and Ricardo, all of which 
claimed to provide a 'sounder base for class analysis' (Sorenson, 2000), to better 
capture empirical processes and to more effectively counter the propositions of 
4 Social conditions also played their part, of course. In particular, it seems that the increased 
penetration of social science by women from self-proclaimed working-class backgrounds keen to 
document and make sense of their own experiences has been of consequence for the developments 
discussed below (see, for instance, Mahony and Zmroczek, 1997). 
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class antagonists (see the showcases in Crompton et al., 2000; Wright, 2005a). 
Many of these continued to share features of Wright's and Goldthorpe's 
perspectives, such as the commitment to primarily quantitative research and 
economism, but one cluster of writers in this plurality has engineered a significant 
departure - sometimes bringing previously marginal themes and approaches into 
the ascendant and sometimes subverting extant divisions altogether - and had a 
profound influence on class theory and research over the past ten years or so, 
especially in the UK: the so-called 'cultural class analysts'. 
The core characteristics of this stream of thought -a heterogeneous 
collection of like-minded researchers rather than a 'school' of any kind who count 
amongst their key exemplars Skeggs (1997,2004), Reay (1998a) and Savage (2000) 
- are twofold. On the one hand, they recognise to a greater degree the kinds of 
social changes and challenges documented above and, rather than simply asserting 
the continued potency of class through advanced statistical tests in the manner of 
Goldthorpe and his colleagues, endeavour to lay bare, usually (though not 
exclusively) through qualitative research, the multitude of ways in which class has 
been reconfigured (Savage, 2003: 536). On the other hand, and in order to follow 
through on the first aim, the cultural class analysts have sought to distance 
themselves from the occupation-based and utilitarian perspective of Goldthorpe. 
5 
This second task has been achieved primarily by detailing the ways in which class 
is reproduced through cultural processes and, even if passed over in silence, 
manifest in identities, consciousness, dispositions and lived experience (see 
especially Reay, 1998b; Devine and Savage, 2000,2005; Savage, Warde and 
Devine, 2005). In pursuing this dual agenda the common theoretical foundation has 
been neither Weber nor Marx, but Bourdieu's vision of class, first formulated (in 
5 For his own part, Goldthorpe responded to the events of the nineties by attempting to distance 
himself from empiricism and deepening both his commitment to a form of Weberianism (testified in 
his defence of the analytical split between class and status in Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007a) and his 
rational-action theory of agency in which individuals optimise given situational constraints and their 
knowledge of them (Goldthorpe, 2000,2007a, 2007b). This vision of action is, however, imposed 
on statistical trends and patterns without any detailed (i. e. qualitative) investigation of decision- 
making processes and, furthermore, victim to a surfeit of ambiguities inherent in the attempt to 
render rational action theory plausible: agents consider, evaluate and take into account 
(e. g. 2000: 
184-5) costs and benefits not in some 'obscure subintentional' way (184) yet decisions are not 
necessarily ratiocinative or explicit (203), class cultures and norms play no part 
in the formulation 
of action as only economic constraints and resources enter 
into the frame (184; cf Devine, 1998) 
yet class cultures act as 'guides' of rational action 
(203) whilst parental encouragement, social 
connections, accents, lifestyles and savoirfaire may 
be important in securing the reproduction of 
the service class (249-50), and so on (for fuller critiques see 
Devine, 1998; Savage, 2000: 85-8). 
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French) long before Goldthorpe's or Wright's positions (see Bourdieu, 1966) but 
generally marginal in influence in the English-speaking world compared to his 
well-known studies of education until the nineties, and in particular his notions of 
capital (in its economic but also, importantly, cultural and symbolic forms), social 
space (a relational space in which agents are positioned dependent on their 
possession of different types of capital) and habitus (the dispositions formed out of 
practical engagement with the materi ally- shaped environment shared by those close 
in social space). 6 
The appeal to Bourdieu has been profitable. Theoretically it has laid bare 
the fallacies of the utilitarian model of agency employed by Goldthorpe and Wright 
by identifying the practical, pre-reflexive and dispositional nature of action flowing 
out of differentiated past social experiences and the inextricability of cultural 
frameworks and resources in the formation of 'choices' (see especially Devine, 
1998; Savage, 2000), succeeded in reconnecting the analysis of class with broader 
trends in social and cultural theory (see e. g. Skeggs, 2004; Adkins and Skeggs, 
2004) and even facilitated reflection on the moral dimension of class, that is, its 
invidious role in dictating perceptions of self-worth (Sayer, 2002,2005). 
Empirically it has granted a deeper exploration of the relational sense of identity, 
difference and similarity articulated by individuals (Savage, 2000; Savage et al., 
2001), the experiential content of differing positions in the social order and, in 
particular, the denigration and dispossession pervading life in the lower sections 
(Skeggs, 1997; Charlesworth, 2000), the reproduction of inequality through 
differential possession of certain forms of capital and its manifestation in everyday 
life (Reay, 1998a; Devine, 2004; cf. Lareau, 2003) and the underlying dispositions 
and outlooks marking out differences and orienting action in certain locales 
(Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, 2005a). Yet the cultural class analysts have not 
adopted Bourdieu's theoretical apparatus wholesale. Instead, the practice has 
generally been to appropriate those aspects best suited to illuminating the empirical 
processes unearthed, to blend them with insights from other theories and take them 
in original directions (e. g. Skeggs, 2004), and to be critical of them in constructive 
ways when the social world has called for it (e. g. Longhurst and Savage, 1996; 
6 Bourdieu's theory has also come to prominence in the US recently, as evidenced by Weininger's 
(2005) essay in Wright's (2005a) collection of 'approaches to class analysis', but not in the same 
systematic way as amongst the cultural class analysts 
in the UK and, moreover, the emphasis there t: l 
has almost exclusively been on the concept of cultural capital. 
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Sayer, 2005). Undoubtedly this flexibility has yielded constructive consequences. 
but partial and at times superficial application has also resulted In some theoretical 
inconsistency - such as hypostatising classes as real entities with substantial 
properties by labelling them 'working class' and so on, thus contradicting or at 
least failing to acknowledge the fully relational and constructionist aspects of the 
formation of collectivities according to Bourdieu 7_ and occasionally crude 
understanding - for example Devine's (2004: 69) reduction of cultural capital to 
'awareness of how systems work' and high expectations and aspirations (what 
mobility researchers would call social capital) rather than the kinds of familiarity 
and ease with certain forms of valued knowledge, i. e. what might be called 
'intelligence', 'culturedness' and self-confidence, inculcated through socialisation 
that Bourdieu tries to convey with this term. 8 
More substantial concerns about the cultural class analysts' approach have 
been registered by several critics, many of which, in reaction to the move away 
from the one-sided economism of Marxist or Weberian approaches, seem to 
coalesce around the role of the economic dimension in their studies but none of 
which, to be frank, are particularly troublesome. Crompton and Scott (2005), for 
example, warn that Bourdieu-inspired studies of class threaten to underplay the 
economic inequality at the heart of alternative conceptualisations of class; Bottero 
(2004), attempting to reassert the importance of the Cambridge school's 
'interaction distance' approach, declares that the focus on relational difference in 
social space really amounts to 'individualized hierarchical differentiation' and 
stratification rather than class; whilst critics of class more generally reject the 
Bourdieusian approach for its 'definitional inflation' of a term that should be 
restricted to the economic sphere alone (Pakulski and Waters, 1996; Kingston, 
2000). Of course, all of these not only fail to appreciate the centrality of the 
material dimension in Bourdieu's scheme - economic capital plays a crucial role in 
structuring social space and shaping the life chances, experiences and thus habitus 
attached to certain positions, whilst Bourdieu (1 997a: 54) has also stressed that 
7 Bourdieu himself is guilty of this at times, but in more reflective works he uses the fully relational 
terms 'dominated' and 'dominant' to describe the classes instead. These are the terms used in this 
study. 
8 Expectations and aspirations are, however, fair empirical indicators of the dispositions of the 
habitus, as an orientation to present and future action adapted to objective probabilities, which 
is 
itself an indicator of the cultural (and economic) capital marking an agent's situation. Devine's 
misunderstanding, insofar as she neglects the 
habitus, is therefore effectively a short circuit. 
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cultural capital, seeing as it requires distance from necessity to be accrued, 
ultimately has its roots in economic capital - but they also imply something of a 
conservative approach, weighted by the dead hand of tradition, in which the 
concept of class should be reserved for economic processes alone simply because 
by and large it has been hitherto. As for the critics of class, sticking to a narrow 
conceptualisation is necessary if their argument is not to fall to pieces from one 
page to the next, seeing as at least one of them then goes on to document the 
importance of education - the institutionalised form of cultural capital par 
excellence - in shaping attitudes and lifestyles (Kingston, 2000). 
Situating Individualization and Reflexivity 
This, then, is the state of class analysis and theory at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century. So what of the ideas of Giddens, Beck and Bauman on 
individualization and reflexivity? How do they fit in with all that has been said 
hitherto? Briefly put, all three thinkers recognise many of the societal shifts 
recounted above and put their own distinctive spin on them to contend that 
contemporary Western societies have entered a new phase of social history distinct 
from, though ultimately still rooted in, the period of modernity theorised by the 
classics. For Giddens this epoch is one of 'late' or 'high' modernity; for Beck it 
constitutes a 'second' or 'reflexive' modernity; for Bauman, who spent an 
influential period in the postmodernist stable and only recently restyled his position, 
today's societies are best described as 'liquid' modem. All three, to greater and 
lesser degrees, put risk, globalisation and the waning of tradition at the core of their 
conceptualisations of the current global order and trace their multiplex effects on a 
variety of dimensions of social life, including familial relations, politics and, of 
course, class. On the last of these they converge on a common theme which, 
nevertheless, is conceptualised in idiosyncratic ways (cf. Warde, 1994; Howard, 
2007): the evermore reflexively self-constructed nature of identities, lifestyles and 
life paths with the retreat of traditional modes of existence and the proliferation of 
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choice - Beck and Bauman dub this 'individualization', Giddens prefers to talk of 
the 'reflexive project of the self .9 
Unsurprisingly, whilst figuring more generally in today's textbooks on 
sociology and social theory as key interpreters of our times, Giddens and the others 
have been hailed by anti-class theorists as significant influences and allies in their 
assault on class (e. g. Pakulski and Waters, 1996), cited ceaselessly by class 
analysts as paradigmatic of the sort of position they are battling against (see, for 
example, the 2005 special issue of Sociology dedicated to class in which Giddens 
and Beck appear repeatedly) and pivotal to the rethinking of class amongst some of 
the cultural class analysts (e. g. Savage, 2000). It is hard to deny, therefore, the 
considerable bearing of these thinkers on the present and the future (and in some 
cases, ironically enough, the past) of the concept of class. What is not so hard to 
deny, however, is that despite the implications of their ideas and their pervasive 
influence on anti-class sentiment, the response by class analysts, and others for that 
matter, has, to date, been wanting. For whilst three types of extended reaction can 
be identified, it remains that, despite the significant contributions made in each 
case, all have failed to provide an adequate or comprehensive assessment - or even 
a thorough clarification - of the exact theses under scrutiny. The first of these, 
whilst forwarded by class analysts across the conceptual divides, is associated 
primarily with Goldthorpe and his colleagues; another two can be attributed 
principally to the cultural class analysts. 
Response 1: Falsifying Foundationless Flights of Fancy 
Having doggedly defended class from previous detractors in a controversial 
paper that confirmed his predilection for empirical rigour (Goldthorpe and 
Marshall, 1992) and ignored the ideas of individualization and reflexivity for some 
time, Goldthorpe (2002; also 2007a: 91-116) has recently dished out what amounts 
to a two-pronged criticism of Giddens and the others. On the one hand, he claims, 
the theories of individualization and reflexivity are devoid of empirical content and 
9 Such ideas, as Beck himself has acknowledged more than the others, are not necessarily new. Peter 
Berger, for example, anticipated much of what Giddens and the others would claim when he wrote 
in the seventies of the 'Individuation' and proliferation of choice brought by modernity (Berger, 
1977: 75ff) and the fact that biographies and identities have become 'design projects' to be worked 
upon (Berger et al., 1974: 71 
ff; cf. also Luckmann, 1983: Part 2). 
rýl 
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thus credibility, whilst on the other, when empirical studies around the topic are 
examined or research designed specifically to test their claims their speciousness is 
swiftly demonstrated. On the first charge, whilst many have accused Giddens, 
Bauman and Beck of propounding a 'data free' brand of grand theory hopelessly 
detached from the world of empirical reality and relying on the force of argument 
and their appeal to 'commonsense' to hammer home their view rather than on 
concrete findings of others or their own research (Marshall, 1997: 16; Savage, 2000: 
105; cf. Bradley et al., 2000; Skeggs, 2004: 53; Brannen and Nilsen, 2005; Mythen, 
2005a; Fevre, 2007), Goldthorpe, a dedicated empirical researcher long critical of 
what he calls 'socio-cultural punditry' (1991: 419), has undoubtedly been the most 
systematic and scathing participant in this line of attack. Denouncing the claims of 
Beck, Giddens and similar theorists as 'without foundation' (2002: 11), 'fanciful' 
(12), ýmore a matter of assertion than demonstration' (14) and ignorant of 
countervailing evidence (17), he reprimands their use of social scientific evidence 
for being 'at best patchy and selective and at worst non-existent' (22), consisting 
largely of deferential references to the abstract concepts of like-minded theorists or 
a few select empirical studies, and claims that, as a result, they can 'scarcely be 
taken seriously' (11). 
Goldthorpe and the others certainly have a point. Bauman, as perceptive as 
he may seem to some, forwards his claims on the basis of virtually no empirical 
evidence and sticks instead to the writings of others and, at best, anecdotes, whilst 
Giddens rests his theory of reflexive self-formation almost exclusively on the 
content of contemporary self-help books -a source which can only ever furnish a 
very particular perspective on the contours of everyday life under 'late modernity'. 
Beck, on the other hand,, is a slightly more complex case. Whilst he might not sully 
his hands in the research process to the same extent as Goldthorpe he does 
occasionally use statistics to buttress some of his points (see especially Beck, 
2000a), he has made reference to qualitative research (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002: 32) and, in places, he displays a sensitivity to the translation of his ideas into 
viable research programmes (see e. g. Beck et al., 2003: 19ff and see also 29nl; 
Beck and Willms, 2004: 185-7; Beck and Lau, 2005). But than again, the 
references to statistics and qualitative research are few and far between, 
rudimentary to say the least and often superficially deployed, whilst, perhaps most 
surprisingly of all, in one focal essay 
he mobilises fictional characters in novels as 
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his primary font of evidence (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 1-21). An 
imposing edifice of bold assertions has, it seems, been built on flimsy foundations. 
But this is not all, Goldthorpe (2002: 20) contends, for when the relevant 
literature is surveyed it quickly becomes clear that the kind of processes Giddens 
and the others posit as widespread, "insofar as they are in evidence at all, turn out 
to be far less dramatic, far more limited and also far more cross-nationally variable 
than the authors in question would suppose ...... It is therefore no surprise that they 
cite little in the way of evidence, Goldthorpe (2002: 13) quips, seeing as little can 
be found. A similar conclusion is reached by Breen and Rottman (1995: 154-5), 
colleagues of Goldthorpe who claim allegiance to his definition of classes and its 
attached rational action theory, in their brief review of the literature around life 
chances: educational attainment, social mobility and a myriad of other areas - and 
here they appeal to Ivan Reid's well-known compendium of class inequalities 
(latest edition 1998) - remain,, contrary to what Beck (who they take as their target) 
claims, decisively structured by class. Not content with merely reviewing the 
findings of others, however, Goldthorpe has also conducted his own analyses to 
test some of the claims of Beck and others as they relate specifically to economic 
security, stability and prospects, ultimately, in the falsificationist spirit 
characterising much of his work, refuting their conjectures and asserting the 
continued significance of class (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2006). 
This undoubtedly deals a considerable blow to the theories of 
individualization and reflexivity, but not a fateful one. For one thing, in line with 
their general research orientation the counter-evidence marshalled by Goldthorpe 
and his affiliates has almost exclusively been quantitative in nature, and there is a 
sense in which undertaking or reviewing investigations of that ilk, whilst useful, 
offers only a partial and, in many respects, problematic reply to the theorists of 
individualization and reflexivity. Statistics cannot, for instance, actually reveal in 
any definitive or meaningful way whether or not biographies are steered by 
increasingly reflexive decision-making within the unequal patterns revealed. After 
all, Beck (at times at least, e. g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 30-1), Bauman 
and others (e. g. Furlong and Cartmel, 2007) state explicitly that individualization 
need not necessarily evidence itself in a comprehensive reorientation of patterns of 
inequality, but only an alteration of the processes through which that inequality is 
reproduced and the social meaning attached to 
it. This is not helped by 
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Goldthorpe's volunteered explanation for some of the patterns - that agents are 
acting rationally given the situations they are in and the information available - 
which is at one and the same time not actually incompatible with the general idea 
of reflexivity - explicit decision making based on an increased level and variety of 
available information and awareness of situations - but incapable of exploring the 
possibility of a differential distribution of the propensity toward or abilityfor such 
ýrationality' or reflexivity (see below). 10 With his mode of analysis, then, it is 
difficult to fully assess whether some of the claims of Giddens and the others have 
any merit or not. 11 
Furthermore, the whole issue of identities (or 'subjectivity' more generally) 
and lifestyles, vital to the claims of Giddens and the others, exposes the limits of 
Goldthorpe's method of defending class. As regards identities, for example - an 
area generally sidelined by Goldthorpe himself or reduced to political proclivities - 
not only has quantitative research addressed to the claims of Giddens, Beck and 
Bauman on the salience of class identities, solidarities and perceptions produced 
rather more ambiguous results than other facets of Goldthorpe's defence - 
purportedly revealing at least some support for individualization (Roberts et al., 
1994; Phillips and Western, 2005; Heath et al., 2007; Nollmann and Strasser, 2007) 
- but of course there is the question of how adequately quantitative research of the 
kind favoured by Goldthorpe captures identities as they are formed, lived, 
experienced and articulated in their full complexity anyway. Any possibility of, for 
example, tapping the analytically important ambivalence and anguish of 
individuals who may be caught between individualized modes of existence and 
class-based understandings, demonstrated by qualitative research (Savage, 2000; 
Savage et al., 2001; cf. Brannen and Nilsen, 2005), is lost, as is, more generally, 
the prospect of grasping the deep-seated subjective experiences of difference and 
10 Witness, for example, Goldthorpe's (2007b: 285nl4) claim that it is irrelevant (or 'of no 
consequence') whether choices take the form of explicit decision-making procedures or are implicit, 
piecemeal and emergent over time (cf. also his bold assertion that instrumental rationality is a 
human universal and therefore not, as some studies have claimed, differentially distributed - 2007a: 
177-83; 2007b: 84). 
11 To be fair to Goldthorpe, it should be noted that he does allow room for other explanations of 
regularities so long as they can prove themselves empirically (which he claims they can not) and 
admits that qualitative methods, specifically ethnography, are 
better equipped to clarify causal 
processes Con the ground' and should thus 
be used as a complement to survey research (2007a: 81 ff) 
- though neither 
he nor any of his associates actually use such methods. 
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similarity rendered in an idiom alien to fixed-choice survey questions that may, 
contra Beck and the others, continue to pervade quotidian life. 
As to lifestyles, it should be noted that Goldthorpe, finally addressing the 
issue of culture with Tak Wing Chan after many years of declaring it irrelevant to 
his interests, has recently asserted that lifestyle patterns (readership of newspapers 
and omnivorous or univorous musical tastes and attendance at the theatre, dance 
events and the cinema) 12 are, according to his explicitly Weberian 
conceptualisation of stratification, more in line with status divisions - constructed 
through patterns of differential association - than class (Chan and Goldthorpe, 
2004,2005,2007a, 2007b, 2007c; cf. Scott, 2002). This does not invalidate the 
salience of class in Chan and Goldthorpe's eyes, seeing as class and status are 
separable, nor does it imply that lifestyles are reflexively constructed - though their 
rejection of individualization is less forthright and unambiguous than their 
confutation of Bourdieu's perspective and, furthermore, based on a weak 
understanding of Giddens, Beck and Bauman, who are hastily reviewed indeed, 
and a conflation of their perspective with postmodernism - but it does admit that 
class has a rather feeble bearing on cultural consumption. 
Yet this kind of empirical claim rests entirely on the conceptual definition 
of 'class' in play, and in Goldthorpe's case it is a narrowl one-dimensional, 
economistic one that severs class from culture and consciousness by definition 
rather than seeing them as inextricably interconnected. For Bourdieusians, for 
whom culture and lifestyles are core to the conceptualisation of class, this result is, 
therefore, hardly satisfactory. Neither is Chan and Goldthorpe's supposed rebuttal 
of Bourdieu's theory, seeing as it is rooted in a poor reading that misunderstands 
and downplays the role of cultural capital in structuring social space - such that 
Chan and Goldthorpe, like the critics of class mentioned above, can demonstrate 
the significance of education on cultural consumption but fail to recognise this as 
cultural capital and thus proof of class a la Bourdieu in action - as well as an 
unsatisfactory definition of cultural practice that explicitly excludes cultural 
knowledge and 'private' tastes from consideration and the imposition of a class 
12 Cultural ornnivorousness is a term coined by Richard Peterson and his colleagues in the US, their 
basic argument being that the distinction between 'high' and 'low' culture has given way to a 
distinction between 'omnivores' from high-status positions who display a taste for a wide and 
eclectic range of practices and goods - 
from polo to pool, Mozart to Madonna - and low-status 
univores who stick to one practice or genre 
in the different cultural spheres (see Peterson and Kem, 
1996; Peterson, 1997). 
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schema and linear methods of statistical analysis at odds with the assumptions of 
the Bourdieusian approach. Indeed, recent quantitative analysis carried out by 
researchers sympathetic and sensitive to Bourdieu's framework has uncovered 
patterns of cultural differentiation broadly consistent with it (see the 
June/September 2006 special issue of Cultural Trends, especially Gayo-Cal et al., 
2006), though even here there are instances of unfaithfulness and a scant causal 
logic that still fails to grapple in any depth with the possible existence of some 
form of reflexivity. Overall, then, Chan and Goldthorpe's evidence, like 
Goldthorpe's more generally, remains far from conclusive or incontrovertible. 
Response 2: Mediated Reflexivity/Individualization 
The second response to Giddens, Beck and Bauman is rather more 
reconciliatory than Goldthorpe's reaction insofar as it begins by accepting the force 
of their argument but puts forward a particular and fairly heavy qualification: the 
reflexive construction of lifestyles and biographies may indeed be a feature of 
contemporary Western societies, but it is unequally distributed. In other words, 
those taking this line claim, individualization and reflexivity, far from obliterating 
class differences once and for all, may be mediated by class and, in fact, constitute 
the central criterion of a new class divide. The first to offer such a view was Scott 
Lash (1994) in his contribution to a book co-authored with Beck and Giddens, his 
contention being that the new reflexivity infusing social processes is refracted 
through relations to the 'mode of information' such that whilst the working class 
and middle class emerge, to differing degrees, as 'reflexivity winners', the 
underclass that has splintered off from the lower sections of the working class and 
descended into a jobless anomie is excluded from reflexivity and therefore 
rendered 'reflexivity losers'. More recently Elliott (2002: 303-4), drawing 
inspiration from Lash, has blasted Beck (the target of his critique) for disregarding 
the fact that "vast gaps in the socio-cultural conditions of the wealthy and the poor 
drastically affect the ways in which individuals are drawn into the project of 
reflexive modernization" and that "individualization (while undoubtedly 
facilitating unprecedented forms of personal and social experimentation) may 
directly contribute to, and advance the proliferation of, class inequalities and 
economic exclusions". Mythen (2005a: 138; cf. 
2005b), furthermore, avers that 
25 
whilst 'everyone seems destined to share a similarly individualized experience' 
according to Beck, the enduring reality is that "[d]ifferent social groups are 
destined to encounter contrasting employment and life experiences, with insecurity 
and risk being concentrated amongst the lowest paid, least educated tranches". In 
sum, he proposes, Jr1ather than supplanting social structures, individualization 
nestles into existing hierarchies and bleeds into multi-source biographies'. 
However, whilst these interventions undoubtedly broach a conceivable possibility - 
though one explicitly rejected by Beck (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim, 2002: 206) - 
they remain generally unsubstantiated, sketchy and incomplete. Elliott and Mythen 
both, for example, focus solely on Beck's perspective and all three, not being class 
theorists, make their points as relatively brief asides or components of broader 
conceptual arguments - Elliott on the inadequacies of Beck's sociology of risk, 
Mythen on the deficiencies of the individualization thesis as it relates primarily to 
employment, and Lash in the context of outlining his own distinctive approach to 
reflexivity. 
There are others within this general line of attack though, some of whom, 
most notably the cultural class analysts, take the argument a step further. Taking 
heed of Bourdieu's assertion that denials of class are integral to the struggle to 
represent symbolically the social space of differences (Bourdieu, 1987: 2; 1991b: 
133; 1993a: 57; on Giddens in particular see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001), in 
their version the basic proposition that individualization and reflexivity resonate 
with the experiences and style of life of the middle classes or a cosmopolitan elite 
is granted, but added to this is the assertion that the theories of Beck and Giddens 
(though not Bauman, who is actually mobilised as a counter to the other two on the 
basis of his depiction of intellectuals in Legislators and Interpreters - Savage, 
2000: 151; Skeggs, 2004: 54) are little more than grandiose attempts to generalise 
this experience - free of constraint and inscription by others - to the populace at 
large, serving the interests of the privileged and reproducing inequality by 
legitimising, or even directly influencing, the prevalent neo-liberal climate 
emphasising unbridled individualism, 'choice' and responsibility (Skeggs, 2004: 
52-4; see also Reay, 1998b; Savage, 2000: 108; cf. Anthias, 1999). Yet as 
interesting as they are these accusations remain based on a perfunctory and 
sometimes polemical assessment of Giddens and Beck and a 
lack of engagement 
with their actual concepts in the 
detail that their influence suggests they deserve - 
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or with Bauman at all. What is more, the cultural class analysts assume without any 
real evidence or theoretical elaboration that individualization and reflexivity do 
indeed characterise the middle classes or the elite in some way. This allows, 
probably against their intentions, at least a partial vindication of Giddens and the 
others, but it also leaves several significant conceptual questions unanswered. Is the 
reflexivity of the middle classes, for example, really due to the specific causal 
processes theorised by Giddens, Beck or Bauman, or merely of the distance from 
necessity they have long enjoyed? How would the former, and the idea of 
reflexivity more generally, fit with the notion of habitus? 
Answers to these questions do, however, surface in the related, though 
hitherto unconnected, debate over the idea of the 'reflexive habitus'. For Bourdieu 
the habitus, as a set of durable dispositions and schemes of perception etched into 
individuals through practical engagement in the world and functioning 'below the 
level of consciousness and language' (Bourdieu, 1984: 466), is generally seen as 
inimical to the constant reflexive refashioning by individuals envisaged by Giddens 
and the others, though reflexivity is possible as a methodological precept of social 
science - in which the researcher traces their own position in their disciplinary field, 
their trajectory and their resultant habitus in an attempt to 'grasp and fight the 
social and historical determinants of scientific practice' (Bourdieu, 1988a: 784) - 
under certain conditions, namely a 'socio-analysis' granted by distance from 
practical immersion in the world and knowledge of the tools of social scientific 
practice (see especially Bourdieu, 2003,2004). Recently, however, a stream of 
scholars have steadily begun to dismantle this bar between the habitus and 
reflexivity to argue that the latter - as the drive to question and alter aspects of 
one's life and lifestyle - may itseýf be a durable, unreflexive disposition inscribed 
into agents by the transfigured practicalities of their late/reflexive/liquid modem 
social milieu (McNay, 1999; Adkins, 2003; Sweetman, 2003; for an overview see 
Adams, 2006). The most relevant effort in this movement to bridge Giddens, Beck 
and Bauman (and others) with Bourdieu - that is, the only one not concerned with 
reflexivity and the habitus as they relate primarily to gender - is undoubtedly that 
of Paul Sweetman (2003), who contends that if the habitus is the product of the 
practical adaptation to the basic experiences of the individual's situation, and, as 
Giddens and the others state, that basic experience is, under conditions of late 
modernity, one of chronic occupational insecurity and flexibility, evaporation of 
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tradition, endless pressure towards individuality and self- reali sation promoted by 
consumer culture and diversification of informational input and choice with 
globalisation and the expansion of the media, then it follows that an ability or 
propensity to reflexively transform oneself will become an integral feature of the 
habitus or, as Sweetman likes to put it, 'second nature'. 
This is not necessarily a blanket process, he notes, but may affect different 
groups to varying degrees depending on their differential exposure to the 
fundamental experiences of late modernity. This, then, could be the point of 
integration with the cultural class analysts - perhaps, it might be hypothesised, the 
middle classes are, despite Giddens' and Beck's urge to generalise, 
disproportionately subject to the pressures and processes productive of the 
reflexive habitus and thus clearly demarcated from unreflexive others. Yet this is 
certainly not Sweetman's argument. His emphasis is on the increasing 
preponderance of the reflexive habitus amongst all sections of society and his 
consideration of differences within this pattern is glancing, and of class in 
particular slight. The tenor of his treatment of Giddens and the others makes it 
obvious that, far from seeing them as myopic promulgators of minority modes of 
life complicit with the iniquitous status quo, he considers them to be accurate 
diagnosticians of today's social context in need only of fine-tuning. However, what 
Sweetman's position does have in common with that of the cultural class analysts 
is that it collapses the theories of individualization and reflexivity together as if 
they were one thesis, obfuscating the detail and specific causal logics of each in the 
process, and remains firmly stuck at the conceptual level, drawing only on scraps 
of others' research. This means that gelling the two positions to form a 
comprehensive response to Giddens and the others would require considerable 
specification and elaboration, but also that whether this would be desirable or even 
necessary remains very much to be seen. 
Response 3: The Individualization of Class 
So far we have dissected Goldthorpe's rejection of the theories of Giddens, 
Beck and Bauman on the basis of empirical weakness and examined the argument 
that individualization and reflexivity may be restricted to the more gilded, noting 
along the way the manifold deficiencies of both contentions. There is, however, a 
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third approach to reflexivity and individualization within class theory that, whilst 
also contributing to the first two lines of reasoning, has brokered more of a 
rapprochement, even if, at bottom, it asserts the continued salience of class like the 
other two responses. This is the oft-cited idea of the 'individualization of class' 
which, in its most basic form, asserts that objective class structures persist but 
subjective identities and perceptions mask this by fixing on individual traits (e. g. 
Roberts et al., 1994; Brannen and Nilsen, 2005; Nollmann and Strasser, 2007). 13 
The most elaborate version of this argument, however, is presented by Mike 
Savage (2000), a central figure in the cultural class analysis movement. The 
starting point for him is the explicit claim that if class analysis is to be revivified 
given its numerous challengers and attenuation in the hands of Goldthorpe and 
company then it must not only make space for the cultural and organisational 
dimensions of social life - two areas generally absent or deficient in Nuffield-style 
studies - but also assimilate individualization as theorised by Beck and Giddens 
(Savage, 2000: x-xi). There are, it seems, three interlaced ways in which class and 
individualization mesh in Savage's account. 
The first of these takes place on the plane of objective inequalities and 
social mobility. Here, Savage (2000: chap. 4) argues, class operates not through 
macro-level constraints and opportunities bearing down on collectives, as 
Goldthorpe's mobility studies would have it, but through individual biographical 
trajectories. By this he means that education, ability and work-life career 
movements are the primary factors in shaping social mobility, and that whilst these 
seem to the lay population to nullify class differences by prioritising the 
achievements of individuals over their ascribed (class) position, as celebrated by 
the liberal class theorists, in fact these three processes remain infused by class - 
educational attainment and 'ability', for example, are unevenly distributed between 
classes - and thus smuggle it back in unrecognised. Class 
is, in other words, 
dissolved into the actions and accomplishments of individual biographies until it is 
no longer seen as such. The second way class is individualized - and this is perhaps 
the best-known aspect of Savage's argument - is through identities (Savage, 2000: 
chap. 5; cf. Savage et al., 2001). Drawing on qualitative interviews with two- 
" Two of the studies cited here focus only on youth transitions, an apt but not comprehensive frame 
for assessing individualization, whilst Nollmann and Strasser use quantitative methods to study the 




hundred denizens of the Manchester region, Savage outlines several features of 
contemporary class identities. Firstly, he notes, most people are utterly ambiguous 
and ambivalent about their class identity and fail to supply an unequivocal self- 
placement, even though they routinely use class as a 'benchmark' to place and 
evaluate people and see it as a salient social and political issue. Furthermore, and 
here we proceed to the real heart of the 'individualization of class identities', 
Savage claims that people use class labels to make sense of their life paths by 
marking out their relational differencesftom others rather than membership of any 
collectivity. More specifically, people employ class labels to differentiate 
themselves from people 'higher up' or 'lower down' and place themselves in the 
middle as 'ordinary' or 'normal' - either using the label 'working class' because of 
its assumption of working for a living and its anti-elitist connotations or 'middle 
class' because this designates somehow being in the middle. Class identity thus 
invokes not solidarity and commonality with one's peers but difference and 
individuality - something Savage has more recently shown, in his re-analysis of the 
Affluent Worker transcripts, to be far from a novel phenomenon (Savage, 2005). 
The final nexus between class and individualization occurs in the realm of 
culture,, and Savage's (2000: chap. 6) argument on this front is, in a nutshell, that 
there has been a shift from a working-class culture of individualization, in which 
manual labour epitomised individuality through its autonomy and independence 
from the employer whilst the middle class represented servitude, responsibility and 
accountability to the company or organisation, towards the hegemony of a middle- 
class culture of individualization in which careerism and occupational progress 
have become central to work life and viewed as 'life projects' of self-development 
through individual enterprise and performance. Once again, Savage emphasises, 
class becomes invisible but, because the habitus of the different classes shapes the 
perception of a 'good' career and the embodied dispositions necessary to succeed 
(Savage, 2000: 142,146), it continues to exert its potent effects. 
Savage's overall argument is complex, insightful and, in many ways, 
persuasive. Yet as a comprehensive response to the theories of individualization 
and reflexivity - which, of course, it never claimed to be - it falls short for several 
reasons. First of all, whilst the proposals on social mobility appear to tackle some 
of the causal processes of individualization as laid out particularly by Beck - thus 
recognising the thrust of his argument whilst re-reading 
it through a lens sensitive 
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to the persistence of class in a transformed state - it does not engage with, and the 
evidence he surveys would not supply an effective response to, a fundamental 
constituent of Beck and Giddens' perspectives: the issue of whether biographies are 
characterised in some way by increasingly reflexive decision-making processes. 
Instead individualization is taken to mean that class works through individual 
instantiations rather than collective mechanisms, a definition that sometimes 
wavers between an account of how class processes operate today and an 
ontological prescription for the study of class per se (see especially Savage, 2000: 
150). This second conception problematises the link with Beck and the others' 
claims that individualization is an ongoing process characteristic of the current 
epoch and thus puts a question mark over the extent to which class can be said to 
be individualized at all. 
Similar problems taint the otherwise compelling theses on the 
individualization of class identities: no consideration is given to whether identities 
are reflexively constructed or not; 14 whether other identities, practices or lifestyle 
activities hold more significance for people and whether they morph over time with 
the vagaries of identity-construction; or whether individuals are exposed to 
amplified choice and variety in terms of how to lead their lives and how to see 
themselves. Instead, individuals are simply asked whether they think class is 
important and whether they identify themselves with a class. This is exacerbated by 
Savage's concentration on classed work cultures - autonomous manual workers 
versus careerist middle classes - which excludes any assessment of changes or 
continuities in the domain of lifestyles or consumption despite the latter's centrality 
to not only the theories of individualization and the reflexive project of the self but 
the Bourdieusian framework upon which Savage draws. 15 Moreover, and especially 
in light of his re-analysis of the Affluent Worker study, once again it is unclear 
whether class identities have become individualized due to the circumstances of 
late modernity or whether this is the way class identity has long - or always - 
14 Savage et al. (2001: 885-7) do distinguish those who, they claim, can 'reflexively' play with class 
labels given their possession of ample cultural capital from those who are more defensive - but here 
6reflexivity' is shorn of its connections with Giddens and Beck and reduced to simply displaying 
more familiarity with the discourse of class. 
15 Though cf. Savage et al. (1992), Sava,. -,, e (2006) and Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst (2005b: chap 
7). None of these is addressed specifically at Giddens and the others though, and the last of them 
displays an ambiguous position by describing some sections of the sample as 'unreflexive' vis, i-vis 
other, omnivorous sections, without explicitly labelling the omnivores reflexive or exploring in any 
detail the theoretical implications of the term (p. 170). 
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worked. Finally, Savage's work on identities is also marred by partialities and 
problems at the methodological level. Concerns over the adequacy of the questions, 
their ordering and the interpretation of responses, for example, have been raised in 
Payne and Grew's (2005) scrupulous comb-through of Savage et al. 's (2001) paper, 
but more important is the fact that, despite claiming that this is how class 
identification seems to work in general, Savage's sample consists primarily of 
middle-class (by his definition) individuals, albeit ones of varying standing, and 
thus precludes extensive illumination of possible differences or similarities across 
the full range of the occupational continuum. 16 His re-interpretation of the Affluent 
Worker interviews, conducted with those famous Luton car-assembly workers, 
does not remedy this either, given that the time difference between the two samples 
undercuts any real claim to comparability. 
Many of the above problems are reflected - or perhaps rooted - in Savage's 
incomplete explication of Beck and Giddens' theories. His discussion of Beck, for 
instance, sticks firmly to Risk Society, an early and comparatively moderate 
statement of individualization, and hangs on a few well-known phrases - the 
individual is the 'reproduction unit of the social' and must seek 'biographical 
solutions to systemic contradictions' (Beck, 1992: 130,137) - in tune with the 
individualization of class as he conceives it, whilst his treatment of Giddens 
focuses almost exclusively on the issue of life politics rather than reflexively 
constructed lifestyles. In both cases, the specific causal dynamics, the precise 
nature of reflexivity and the theses on lifestyles are overlooked, and in fact for the 
most part he rolls both theories together and discusses them as one position - 
dubbed individualization, even though Giddens does not use that term at all. And of 
course Bauman, who does deploy the term individualization, is probably closer to 
Beck theoretically and chimes more with the way Savage uses the term, escapes 
consideration altogether - not, to be fair, because of any egregious oversight on 
Savage's behalf, but because Bauman's position did not solidify until his 
disquisitions on liquid modernity contemporaneous with and subsequent to 
Savage's work. 
16 To be more precise, the sample is drawn from four residential areas illustrative of differing 
middle-class fractions, some of which are deemed to include the 'upper', colder' or 'affluent' 
working class in their midst (Savage, 2000: 119nl4; Savage et al., 2001: 878-9), and if one looks to 
the details given by Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst (2005b: 209-14) it can be seen that though 
occasionally cleaners, builders, shop assistants and more do 
find their way into the sample there is 
an overwhelming predominance of professional and managerial occupations. 
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Conclusion 
All this leaves us with a myriad of partial engagements with Beck, Giddens 
and Bauman. Theorists and researchers of diverse persuasions have, along with 
some not Primarily positioned within the field of class analysis, tackled the three 
thinkers from a number of angles, noted their limitations and added some credible 
qualifications. Yet, as has hopefully been made clear, within all these responses 
there still remains a lack of both a systematic, concentrated theoretical dissection 
and critical interrogation of individualization and the reflexive project of the self as 
they relate to class and an adequate empirical evaluation. The existing 
contributions cannot be somehow patched together to form a definitive solution 
either, for too many contradictions abound and gaps through which 
individualization and reflexivity may escape are left open. What is needed, rather, 
is a head-on reply that can approximate that offered by the Affluent Worker team 
against the proponents of embourgeoisement in the sixties; one that, combining 
conceptual critique and original research, can begin to ascertain with some degree 
of authority the crucial quandary of whether biographical paths and subjective 
identifications, tastes and affects are, in some way, individualized and subject to 
processes of reflexive consideration at all levels or whether, alternatively, 
reflexivity is a province of a privileged few; whether actively constructed 
'lifestyles' are the principle font of action or whether, in actual fact, class somehow 
continues to exert its pernicious effects; and, ultimately, whether the subjective and 
objective elements of class have retreated from social life and the enterprise of 
class analysis finally become, to use Imre Lakatos' (1970) famous phrase, a 
'degenerative research programme'. Such a reply will be pursued over the 
following pages, starting first in the next chapter with an elaboration and critical 
excavation of the three theorists' conceptual architecture. 
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I The Properties and Problems of Individualization 
and Reflexivity 
The three theories of individualization and reflexivity may be united by 
common themes and consequences for class analysis, but nevertheless they vary 
markedly in their emphasis, explicitness and causal reasoning. In order to pull out 
as many themes amenable to empirical investigation as possible and to lay out the 
sources of error that shed doubt on their credibility in their required detail, 
therefore, each theorist's take on the demise of class in 'late% 'second' or 'liquid' 
modernity will be outlined and evaluated in turn. Giddens' theory of the reflexive 
project of the self, with all its logical consequences and implicit assumptions, will 
be the first under the microscope, followed by the ideas of probably the most 
forthright critic of class of the three, Beck. Bauman will be considered last because 
his intellectual proximity to Beck means that his theory of individualization is best 
understood and its particularities made clear once the position of the German 
thinker from which he borrows has first been elaborated. 
Anthony Giddens: The Reflexive Project of the Self 
Despite being formulated over fifteen years ago and then left behind for the 
world of politics, Giddens' views on late modernity and the place of social class 
within it remain highly influential. The core concept at the heart of his position is 
the so-called 'reflexive project of the self, and the starting point here is what he 
calls, following Laing (1965), 'ontological security'. This is not a new concept for 
Giddens - ontological security was first introduced in his structuration 
days as a 
principle explanans for the orderly, routine nature of social life, the essential 
premise being that individuals have a basic psychological need to quell anxiety and 
maintain trust in the continuity of events (i. e. feel ontologically secure) and that 
this is achieved through the 'routinisation' of social conduct (Giddens, 1979: 120ff, 
cf. 1984: 50ff). In Modernity and Self Identity (1991), however, Giddens fleshes 
out the processes through which ontological security 
is generated in infancy and, in 
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doing so, links it directly to self-identity and thence late modernity. The argument 
runs as follows: the 'basic trust' that an infant invests in their caretaker as a result 
of early routine serves as an 'emotional inoculation' against a number of existential 
dilemmas and questions raised by human existence - such as finitude and relations 
with others - which, if contemplated continuously, would lead to an emotional 
paralysis. By providing tacit 'answers' to these dilemmas the inoculation produces 
a ýprotective cocoon' around the individual, screening off potentially debilitating 
risks and threats emanating from daily life, and allows a sense of continuity and 
order in events - that is, a sense of ontological security. Importantly, one such 
existential dilemma is that of self-identity, and, in this case, the protective cocoon 
enables a sense of integrity and temporal continuity in the individual's biography 
which can then be reflexively grasped and communicated to others. A person's 
self-identity is, therefore, not to be found in any aspect of their behaviour or in the 
reactions of others but, following the foundational analyses of MacIntyre (1981) 
and Taylor (1989; cf. also Habermas, 1987: 136), consists instead of the seýf as 
reflexively understood by the individual themselves in terms of a particular 
biographical narrative linking the past (how one has become) and future (where 
one is going) (Giddens, 1991: 53-4). Self-identity, in other words, takes the form 
of an "ongoing 'story' of the self' (Giddens, 1991: 54). 
In late modernity, Giddens (1991: 80) continues, the nature of the self 
'undergoes massive change'. The traditions, cultures and communal ties - 
including those pertaining to class - upon which it once relied for its narrative have, 
as a result of globalisation and the chronic institutional reflexivity of the social 
order, been 'evacuated' from social life and supplanted by 'a context of multiple 
choice' (Giddens, 1991: 5; see also 1990,1994a). As a result, the self has become a 
reflexive project in which individuals must actively choose, sustain and 
continuously revise their narrative of identity themselves. Each of us, he argues, 
now lives out 
... a 
biography reflexively organised in terms of flows of social and psychological 
information about possible ways of life. Modernity is a post-tradItIonal order, in which the 
question, 'How shall I liveT has to be answered in day-to-day decisions about how to 
behave, what to wear and what to eat - and many other things - as ell as interpreted 
within the temporal unfolding of self-identity (Giddens, 1991: 14). 
Self-identity thus becomes, like Luhmann's systems, 'internally referential', that is, 
severed from 'external' determinants of old such as 
kinship and place and driven 
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only with reference to itself. This is generally seen by Giddens, particularly in the 
context of the new forins of intimacy and trust it injects into relationships, in a 
positive light as a process of self-actualisation, self-realisation, self-exploration and 
self-mastery, enabling a new level of autonomy, 'freedom of action' (Giddens, 
2002: 47) and 'control [over] one's own life circumstances' (Giddens, 1991: 
202). 17 But it has its pathologies too, namely the burdensome nature of having to 
constantly reconstruct an 'inherently fragile' narrative of self-identity (Giddens, 
1991: 185-6), the increased prominence of shame over the adequacy of one's 
identity and the inability to match up to one's 'ideal self, and the fact that the 
reflexive project of the self takes place in an ethical vacuum given modemity's 
institutional sequestration of moral issues such as death and sexuality. 
One particularly significant consequence of the new reflexivity of self- 
identity is, according to Giddens, the increased emphasis on lifestyle. The 
proliferation of alternatives as to how to lead one's life, he argues, coupled with the 
removal of any authoritative guidelines on the matter, means that "we not only 
follow lifestyles, but in an important sense we are forced to do so - we have no 
choice but to choose" (Giddens, 1991: 81). A lifestyle, he goes on to argue, is "a 
more or less integrated set of practices which an individual embraces [to] give 
material fon-n to a particular narrative of self-identity" (Giddens, 1991: 81). It is 
'adopted' rather than 'handed down', chosen from a 'plurality of possible options' 
rather than inherited from the past (Giddený, 1991: 81), and forms a constellation 
of routines, habits and orientations with an overall unity - important for the 
sustaining of ontological security - which 'connects options in a more or less 
ordered fashion' and removes some courses of action from contemplation as 'out of 
character' (Giddens, 1991: 81-2). Once chosen, however, lifestyles are not 
immutable but "reflexively open to change in light of the mobile nature of self- 
identity" (Giddens, 1991: 81). A second consequence, complementary to the 
burgeoning of lifestyle options, is an enhanced proclivity for life-planning. With 
the retreat of tradition and the sense of fate it imparted, individuals, in a similar 
way to the institutions of modemity, 'colonise the future' by integrating projected 
future actions, events and projects with their past narrative of self-identity in a 
coherent unity. However, not least because of the multifarious risks produced by 
17 Hence Giddens has described the reflexive project of the self as a 'healthy thing' (Giddens, 2003: 
3 1). 389), a 'fundamental benefit' of the post-traditional world (Giddens, 1991: 2-) 
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modernity which threaten to puncture the protective cocoon with a barrage of 
existential dilemmas and shatter the integrity of identity, this plan is often disturbed 
as individuals are called upon to make high-consequence decisions for the direction 
of their lives. These occasions Giddens dubs 'fateful moments'l and include, for 
example, the decision to change jobs or shift career altogether. 18 Both lifestyles and 
life-planning extend to the body, conceived in a non-Cartesian, Wittgensteinian 
mode as unified with the self in daily praxis: bodily appearance, including dress 
and other adornments, and demeanour become essential vehicles of self-identity, 
whilst the various 'regimes' of diet and exercise that individuals subject their 
bodies to form key components of their life-plans (Giddens, 1991: 99-102). 
So what, then, are the consequences of all this for social class? After all, so 
long as contemporary society remains capitalist it also remains, by Giddens' own 
definition established in A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, a 
class society, and even if the underlying class structure is, by his account, marked 
by a sharp decline of blue-collar manual labour and a significant rise of 'wired', 
'symbolic' or 'Apple Mac' workers employed in the info-tech sector or working 
with computers on the one hand and routine service or 'Big Mac' workers on the 
other (Giddens, 1994b, 2000,2001a, 2007), the fact is there still exists a class 
structure. WelL at first Giddens concedes that lifestyle choices are not equally open 
to all strata of society but may in fact be dependent on the life chances and socio- 
economic circumstances of particular groups - including occupational groups 
(Giddens, 1991: 82) and classes (Giddens, 1997). But then again, he adds, even 
work in the post-traditional society "is by no means completely separate from the 
arena of plural choices", for "choice of work and work milieu form a basic element 
of lifestyle orientations" (Giddens, 1991: 82). Furthermore, though the constraints 
and opportunities associated with class still exist they have little bearing on the 
actual social behaviour of individuals (Giddens, 1995: xv; cf 2007: 65), are 
"thoroughly permeated by the influence of 'biographical decision-making"' 
(Giddens, 1994c: 188) and, in any case, retain only a 'refracted' and transitory 
influence on life chances given the upsurge of mobility and unemployment at all 
levels (Giddens, 1994b: 143-4). Lifestyle choice and life-planning are, in other 
18 Fateful moments can be considered essentially a brand of what Giddens earlier referred to as 
&critical situations', that is, situations in which routine is radically disrupted and ontological security 
threatened (see Giddens, 1979: 124-, 1984: 60-1). 
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words, 'more or less universal': even the most deprived sections of society can and 
do, indeed must, make self-identity a reflexive project and indulge in the 'creative 
construction of lifestyle', often "through the resistances of ghetto life as well as 
through the direct elaboration of distinctive cultural styles and modes of activity" 
(Giddens, 1991: 85-6). In fact, Giddens contends, lifestyles are themselves 
increasingly becoming structuring features of stratification and social 
differentiation and can no longer, as is usually the case, be considered merely the 
"'results' of class differences in the realm of production" (Giddens, 1991: 82,228; 
cf. 1994a: 76; 1994b: 143). Ultimately, it is obvious that for Giddens self-identity 
has become firmly detached from any basis in class and, logically, so too has action, 
as it now flows from a reflexive "filtering [ofl all sorts of information relevant to 
[one's] life situations" (Giddens, 1994b: 6) and the lifestyle orientations and life- 
plans built thereon. 
All this has led Giddens to subordinate the emancipatory political agenda 
associated with class in favour of what he calls 'life politics' (Giddens, 1991: 209- 
23 1). If emancipatory politics is a 'politics of life chances', then life politics can be 
considered a 'politics of lifestyle' (Giddens, 1991: 214), or of self- actual i sation,, 
addressed to the existential questions and issues brought to the fore by the 
increasing reflexivity of the social order - such as concerns over ecological risks, 
the advance of techno-economic reason and the rights of the individual over their 
body - that fail to fit within the traditional remit of emancipation or, for that matter, 
the framework of left and right in politics. The emergence of life politics 
presupposes a degree of emancipation from domination, of course, but they cannot 
be considered, says Giddens (1994b: 91), merely a phenomenon of the more 
affluent - to think this would be a 'basic error', for "[s]ome of the poorest groups 
today (and not only in the developed societies) come against problems of 
detraditionalization most sharply". Neither is it the case that emancipatory politics 
has lost its relevance altogether, but, as the feminist movement and the division 
between First and Third World countries illustrate, emancipation often goes hand- 
in-hand with lifestyle changes and, thus, life politics (Giddens, 1991: 228ff). 
Giddens subsequently built on some of these ideas in outlining his well- 
known and much-maligned 'Third Way' political programme (Giddens, 1998, 
2000). something that struck a chord with New Labour and like-minded 
administrations across the globe and earned him a place in the House of Lords. 
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However, since Beyond Left and Right (1994b), by far the most scholarly and 
interesting treatise in this body of work, the original theoretical underpinnings of 
Giddens' programme seem to have been largely substituted for a comparatively 
facile insistence on the importance of globalisation and the 'knowledge society' 
(see McLennan, 2004). Furthermore, in his most recent works - addressed to policy 
makers and a broad political ly-intere sted public rather than sociologists - Giddens 
(e. g. 2007) has started to use the term 'class' more frequently again, but in a 
superficial, nominalist, atheoretical and unsociological way to refer to arbitrary 
divisions of occupations that can scarcely be taken seriously. Nevertheless, through 
all this his emphasis on life politics and its grounding in the prominence of post- 
materialist issues remains and he continues to assert that classes generally have 
little bearing on lifestyle practices. 
Critical Comments 
Giddens' vision of late modernity no doubt contains a whole host of 
conceptual nuggets offering an interesting take on contemporary processes, and 
some of his ontological prescriptions - such as the temporal constitution of self- 
identity - are, on the surface at least, compelling. When it comes specifically to the 
reflexive project of the self, however, there is no shortage of difficulties in need of 
teasing out, some of which spotlight cracks in his wider theoretical projects. The 
first of these is, quite simply, his utter ambivalence on the status of class in late 
modernity. In some places Giddens makes it clear that, unlike Beck (see below), he 
wants to retain the concept as a filter of life chances which, he argues, may then 
impact upon lifestyle options. Hence his assertion, in the preface to the second 
edition of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism written after his 
reflections on modernity reached their apogee in the early nineties, that class 
analysis has not lost its importance (Giddens, 1995: xvi). 
19 As seen above, however, 
Giddens has an unfortunate tendency to override this position completely in his 
effort to establish the reality of choice and reflexivity beyond the bounds of the 
affluent. Furthermore, if life chances really are still shaped by class then it is 
difficult to see how the reflexive project of the self, as 'more or less universal', can 
'9 This is also the impression given in his popular textbook, which has always, even in its latest 
edition, dedicated a chapter to class (Giddens, 
2006). 
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be described as bringing the individual greater 'control over their life 
circumstances', 'autonomy of action' (Giddens, 1994b: 13) and self-actualisation, 
in Abraham Maslow's (1987) sense of that term as fulfilling one's potential. 
The issue is muddied even further by Giddens' inconsistent and somewhat 
tokenistic attempts to pull lifestyle into the definition of class and stratification. 
Sometimes, for example, it is argued, a la Bourdieu, that "the individual relates to 
the class system not just as a producer but as a consumer" and that therefore 
lifestyle choices and taste, as "mobilized in active way by individuals and groups", 
actively feed into social differentiation (Giddens, 1994b: 143; cf. 1991: 82), 
whereas in other places it is simply access to the means of self-actualisation that 
forms the key source of class division and inequality (Giddens, 1991: 6,228). The 
latter conception is particularly problematic, for as Giddens himself has argued the 
reflexive project of the self - the fount of 'programmes of actualization and 
mastery' (1991: 9) - is undertaken even by those populating the bottom echelons of 
society (the black female single parent living in the inner city in his own example) 
(1991: 85-6). This would mean that no one is barred from the means of self- 
actualization, save the most destitute, and that class effectively, and against his 
original intentions, ceases to 'be' at all in this regard. 
The former conception, on the other hand, raises a fundamental question to 
which Giddens has no satisfactory answer: why, exactly, would different 
individuals and groups choose different lifestyles? Whereas for Bourdieu, to whom 
he casually appeals on this, the underlying principle is the particular habitus 
generated out of material conditions of existence, it seems hard to deny that the 
overall tenor of Giddens' position, despite disclaimers, is one of outright 
voluntarism. This is something he has long been accused of by the critical realists, 
particularly Margaret Archer (e. g. 1982), but in his work on high modernity and the 
reflexive self his leanings toward it appear to have become even more apparent. 
Thus action is said to flow from a reflexive 'filtering of information' on ways of 
life and options 'relevant to [one's] life situations' (Giddens, 1994b: 6), whilst 
lifestyles are claimed to be 'freely chosen' (Giddens, 1991: 23 1) and revised by 
6 autonomous' agents on the basis of a self-identity constructed through a process of 
self-mastery and realisation - echoes of Berlin's (1969) conception of 'positive 
liberty' are not too faint here. There is, however, something of a tension in this: if 
lifestyles are to be defined as sets of routines, habits and orientations providing a 
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frame for choice and action, as they were above, then it is hard to see how lifestyle 
choices, including the decision to change lifestyle altogether, could be made 
without being guided by the orientations furnished by the lifestyle already adopted. 
Either the self must somehow, in a way left unexplained by Giddens, be able to 
transcend the orientations of its lifestyle in order to choose or else lifestyle choices 
are not as 'free' as Giddens would like to make out. This difficulty aside, such a 
position fails to illuminate how social differentiation would actually be generated. 
Nowhere does Giddens consider, for example, the possibility that the 'filtering' of 
information or the life situations one is likely to be in may vary with one's position 
in society - the former absence is particularly conspicuous given that he once 
chided mass consumption theorists heralding the dissolution of class distinctions 
for neglecting the fact that information 'formally identical in content' may be 
'interpreted and responded to' in different ways, thus reinforcing extant patterns of 
social differentiation (Giddens, 1981: 222). 
Even if we probe deeper into Giddens' complex theorisation of action in 
structuration and beyond, the inability to adequately elucidate why agents would 
choose to construct the identities and lifestyles they do in late modernity remains. 
He simply fails, as Thompson (1989: 74) has noted, to provide the necessary means 
to explain the differential possession between individuals and groups of particular 
'wants and desires', 'interests and needs', or, in short, motivations (cf. Loyal, 2003: 
61-2; Stones, 2005). In structuration theory motivation plays a key role in the 
constitution of the agent and is conceived as the source of the wants which prompt 
action and furnish individuals with projects (Giddens, 1976: 85; 1984: 6). Rooted 
primarily in the agent's unconscious, the latter understood largely in the sense 
attributed to it by psychoanalysis, that is, as a receptacle of repressed urges bearing 
an 'internal hierarchy' expressing the "'depth' of the life history of the individual 
actor" (Giddens, 1984: 5), it impacts upon action through psychological 
mechanisms of 'recall' to which the agent lacks direct discursive access (Giddens, 
1984: 49; for a critique of Giddens' theory of the unconscious see Thrift, 1993). 
However, rather than provide the tools for an exploration of the differences of 
motivation - and thus wants, projects and lifestyle choices - between 'kinds and 
categories of individual' (Thompson, 1989: 74), Giddens draws on Erikson's ego 
psychology to define motivation and its promptings in terms of a general urge to 
reduce anxiety and sustain routine for the maintenance of ontological security 
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(Giddens, 1984: 57), with the only mention of individual differences being in the 
context of pathologies of psychosocial development (Giddens, 1984: 58). In this 
way, it becomes clear that most day-to-day conduct is not motivated in any direct 
way at all. Rather, as Giddens (1984: 64) puts it, "there is a generalized 
motivational commitment to the integration of habitual practices across time and 
space" - yet precisely why individuals would have different habitual practices is 
never explained. The definition of motivation is updated in Modernity and Seýf- 
Identity to denote "an underlying 'feeling state' of the individual, involving 
unconscious forms of affect as well as more consciously experienced pangs or 
promptings" (Giddens, 1991: 64). Importantly, Giddens now binds motivation to 
feelings of shame over the adequacy of one's narrative of self-identity, developed 
out of the tensions and anxieties generated in handling the emotional involvements 
of social bonds in early life, and the failure to live up to one's 'ideal self (Giddens, 
1991: 64-9). It is impossible, however, to see how this actually provides the 
'wellsprings of action' (Giddens, 1991: 63), and, in any case, it retains the inability 
to convincingly explain behavioural (and thus lifestyle) variations between 
individuals and groups in a way that would be consonant with his comments on 
social differentiation. 
Having broached the issue of ontological security, it is worth pointing out 
that Giddens' reliance on the concept in his theorisation of motivation is also 
problematic. When R. D. Laing (1965) introduced the term ontological security in 
his fascinating existentialist study of schizophrenia it was, essentially, to demarcate 
the boundary between the 'sane' or ontologically secure on the one hand and the 
schizoid and psychotic or ontologically insecure on the other. In Giddens, whilst 
the psychiatric vocabulary is jettisoned, ontological insecurity is used to imply the 
same sense of existential chaos, engulfment and implosion that Laing describes, 
involving, for example, "a loss of a sense of the very reality of things and of other 
persons" (Giddens, 1991: 36). Yet unlike Laing, who saw it as more of a given in 
healthy individuals, Giddens then goes on to depict ontological security as 
exceptionally fragile - being incessantly threatened in social life by even "the 
slightest glance of one person towards another, inflexion of the voice, changing 
facial expression or gestures of the body... " (1991: 52) - and in need of continuous 
maintenance. Held to illustrate this are Garfinkel's infamous 'breaching 
experiments', in which the background assumptions and routines of social life are 
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radically disrupted by the anomalous behaviour of the 'experimenter' (e. g. Giddens, 
1984: xxiii; 1991: 36-9). In fact, however, as both Willmott (1986) and Craib 
(1992) have pointed out, this wholly contradicts Laing's definition of ontological 
security, for it is a fundamental characteristic of the ontologically secure agent 
according to Laing that they will be able to "encounter all the hazards of life, social, 
ethical, spiritual, biological, ftom a centrally firm sense of [their] own and other 
people's reality and identity" (Laing, 1965: 39, emphasis added) and, therefore, 
remain generally unperturbed by dislocations of routine - including, one might 
conjecture, 'fateful moments'. Furthermore,, Giddens' appeal to Garfinkel's 
experiments as demonstrative of the frailty of ontological insecurity in daily life is 
not entirely justified. Garfinkel (1967) himself noted a variety of reactions to the 
disturbances wrought by the experiments other than anxiety, including surprise, 
puzzlement and anger, whilst the level of anxiety that was reported was, for the 
most part, nowhere near as acute as the term ontological insecurity is designed to 
convey. Moreover, as Heritage (1984: 97-101) has explicitly stated, most of the 
subjects of the experiments, far from exhibiting a complete disorganisation or a 
loss of all reality and sense, generally interpreted the actions of the 'experimenter' 
as an intelligible, motivated departure from normal activity demanding moral 
sanction. 
The end result is an unjustified over-exaggeration on Giddens' behalf of the 
extent to which individuals are on the brink of psychological and emotional 
destruction in their daily lives, coupled with a more general overemphasis on the 
need of individuals to constantly sustain routinised ways of life. Indeed some of his 
critics have persuasively argued that the unremitting motivation to uphold routines 
(including by extension those relating to lifestyle), contrary to the voluntaristic 
rendering above, appears to press on action in a rather deterministic way, 
effectively amputating the facility for choice so central to Giddens' take on late 
modernity and self-identity (Loyal and Barnes, 2001; Loyal, 2003). In fact Giddens 
has recognized exactly this, admitting that the need to preserve routine curbs the 
capacity to freely choose 'how to be and how to act' (Giddens, 1994a: 75). 'Daily 
life% he says, 'would be impossible if we didn't establish routines, and even 
routines which are nothing more than habits cannot be wholly optional: they 
wouldn't be routines if we didn't, for longish periods of time, place them 
effectively "beyond question"' (Giddens, 1994a: 75). This is, of course, wildly at 
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odds with his other characterizations of the reflexive project of the self - including 
his assertion that the routines associated with a lifestyle are 'reflexively open to 
change' given the 'mobile nature of self identity' (Giddens, 1991: 81). So where 
lifestyle habits were once freely chosen, it seems, they are now not 'wholly 
optional', where routines were previously embraced and revised in giving material 
form to a narrative of identity self-constructed out of a milieu of choice they are 
now put 'effectively beyond question'. Thomas Kuhn (1977) once said that 
consistency was a vital component of any theory worth adopting; if this were true, 
then Giddens' perspective would hardly be enticing. 
Ulrich Beck: Class as a 'Zombie Category' 
Beck is perhaps the most obviously anti-class theorist amongst those 
considered here, for unlike the others he has been explicitly and persistently 
proclaiming the waning relevance of class for most of his career - at first with 
notable qualifications and exceptions, but more radically as his prominence grew. 
His position on the demise of the concept is embedded in his wider thesis that 
contemporary Western societies are entering a second, 'reflexive' phase of 
modernization in which the basic categories and assumptions of the first phase - 
essentially coterminous with the development of national ly-bounded industrial 
society and the unconstrained implementation of instrumental techno- scientific 
reason - are being torn apart as a result of its own dynamism (Beck, 1992,1994, 
1997; Beck et al., 2003; Beck and Lau, 2005). It is, in other words, the very 
process of modernization itself that is, for him, undermining the foundations of 
industrial society through its cumulative side-effects and bringing into being a 
nascent stage of history characterized by radically new social forms. Two aspects 
of this rather broad development, he claims, are particularly consequential for class: 
the changing logic of distribution ftom wealth to risk as a product of the side- 
effects of technological development (developed in Beck, 1992: 19-50; cf. Beck, 
1995: 128-57) and, more importantly, the dissolution of large-group categories, 
such as class, in the wake of an individualization of social inequality produced by 
the welfare state. 
As regards the first aspect, Beck's contention is that, in the industrial 
societies of the first modernity, the axial principle was the social production and 
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distribution of wealth, though this was necessarily accompanied by a distribution of 
the risks produced by techno- scientific development. Both wealth and risk 
distribution followed essentially the same fault lines and led to the emergence of 
contradictions and conflicts between the 'two great hostile camps', as Marx and 
Engels (1848/1992: 3) put it, of labour and capital, that is, between classes (Beck, 
1995: 137). With the onward march of modernization, however, this process has 
been reversed: the rising affluence and protections of welfare societies and the 
unleashing of hazards and threats on an unprecedented scale as a result of 
expanding production have rendered the logic of wealth distribution subordinate to 
the logic of risk distribution (Beck, 1992: 19). Class position no longer apportions 
the primary problems and conflicts with which one must deal; this has been 
replaced by one's position in relation to the new global risks - chemical poisoning, 
food contamination, nuclear disaster and so on - and the latter, Beck stresses, does 
not follow the logic of classes: 
... in the water supply all the social strata are connected to the same pipe. When one looks at 'forest skeletons' in 'rural idylls' far removed from industry, it becomes clear that the 
class-specific barriers fall before the air we all breath. In these circumstances, only not 
eating, not drinking and not breathing could provide effective protection... Reduced to a 
formula: poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic (Beck, 1992: 36). 
Even the wealthiest and most powerful of society's denizens are "caught in the 
maelstrom of hazards" (Beck, 1992: 37), not least because of the 'boomerang 
effect' - the reacting back of risks on those who produced them - and the 
progressive devaluation of property (Beck, 1992: 37-9). Accordingly, new 
antagonisms, new interests and new political movements cutting across class 
divisions emerge, dissolving the old boundaries and uniting all victims of risk. 
"Risk societies", Beck (1992: 47) concludes, "are not class societies". 
This,, however, is not the only way in which class is being eradicated from 
the social landscape in reflexive modernity, for accompanying the transforming 
logic of distribution is a thoroughgoing erosion of the social forms and large-group 
categories of industrial society as the anchors of identity, life situations and 
inequality with the onset of individualization. At the heart of this phenomenon, 
Beck contends, is the dual process whereby, under conditions of reflexive 
modernity, individuals are disembedded from "historically prescribed social forms 
and commitments" (Beck, 1992: 128), including those related to class, and 
subsequently re-embedded in new ways of life in which they "must produce, stage, 
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and cobble together their biographies themselves" (Beck, 1997: 95). The chief 
mechanisms responsible for this, he continues, are the institutions and welfare state 
regulations of industrial societies themselves, for these, he argues, are not geared to 
group interests but instead "presume the individual as actor, designer, juggler and 
stage director of his or her own biography, identity, social networks, commitments 
and convictions" (Beck, 1997: 95). In particular, he notes the impact of the 
expanding education system, which 'recasts and displaces' traditional lifestyles and 
ways of thinking with 'universalistic' forms of knowledge and language (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 32), furnishes individuals with a capacity for self-reflective 
knowledge and credentializes them on the basis of individual performance; the 
increased demand for and expectation of mobility and competition in the labour 
market which undercuts the formation of community and kinship support networks 
and forces agents to 'take charge of their own life' (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim, 
2002: 32); the "democratization of formerly exclusive types of consumption and 
styles of living, such as private cars, holiday travel and so on" (Beck, 1992: 95, 
emphasis removed) as a result of increased standards of living, coupled with a 
general shift away from a cultural value system in which professional and financial 
well-being, a stable family life and a respectable house and car symbolize success 
to a new focus on 'self-fulfilment' and 'individuality' (Beck, 1998: 39-54); the 
extension of employment insecurity and instability and, as a consequence, potential 
poverty right across the socio-economic spectrum with the gradual disappearance 
and flexibilization of work (Beck, 2000a); the juridification of labour relations; and 
the dynamics of new urban housing projects which serve to shatter 'ascriptively 
organized' neighbourhoods (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 35). The result, 
Beck (1992: 92) asserts, is that class 'now has much less influence on [agents'] 
actions': 
People with the same income level, or put in the old-fashioned way, within the same 'class', 
can or even must choose between different lifestyles, subcultures, social ties and identities. 
From knowing one's 'class' position one can no longer determine one's personal outlook, 
relations, family position, social and political ideas or identity (Beck, 1992: 13 1). 
Not only material constraints and determinations, but - here seemingly targeting 
the more Bourdieu-inspired - the 'practical knowledge', 'guiding norms' and 
4collective habitual izations' furnished by class positions (Beck, 1992: 128; Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 6) have dissipated and given way to individual agency, 
choice and volition in the constitution of life situations (Beck and Willms, 2004: 
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24). People are increasingly forced to construct their own biographies and self- 
identities from the diverse options available and to do so reflexively by engaging in 
'the processing of contradictory information, dialogue, negotiation, compromise' 
and 'active management' in the pursuance of 'self-realisation' and 'self- 
determination' (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 26) . 
20 Distinctive material and 
symbolic class differences thus dissolve "both in terms of their self understanding 
and in relation to other groups" (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 39), effacing the 
identities, collective consciousness and solidarity they engendered, whilst the 
structure of inequality is redefined as an individualization of social risks, political 
action is realised not by class actors but by transient social movements established 
to cope with particular issues, and conflicts arise not over class antagonisms but 
over ascribed characteristics, such as age, gender and ethnicity (Beck, 1992: 100- 
1). 
Beck is at pains to stress, however, that all this does not lead to an 
unfettered 'self-creation of the world' by emancipated individuals, for 
individualization is, according to him, accompanied by a tendency towards "the 
institutionalization and standardization of ways of life" (Beck, 1992: 90). 21 In 
reflexively constructing their biographical trajectories and sense of self agents have 
become wholly dependent on the dictates of the labour market, the education 
system and the consumption of "generically designed housing, furnishings, articles 
of daily use, as well as opinion, habits, attitudes and lifestyles launched and 
adopted through the mass media" (Beck, 1992: 132), whilst the search for self- 
fulfilment and its 'infinite regression of questions' ('am I really happyT, 'am I 
really fulfilledT) 
... leads into one new 'response mode' after another, which can then 
be reforined in a 
variety of ways into markets for experts, industries and religious movements. In the search 
for fulfilment, people thus metamorphose under certain conditions into products of mass 
culture and mass consumption (Beck, 1998: 48). 
It should be clear that individualization is not simply a subjective 
phenomenon concerning self-identities and attitudes alone, as some writers have 
20 Beck's notion of reflexivity often seems to entail some amount of cogitation - agents now have to 
'think, calculate, plan, adjust, negotiate, define, revoke' rather than rely on habitualization or routine 
(Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 6) - but it can also be more 'spontaneous' in form and thus 
differs from Archer's (2007) conception of reflexivity which specifically denotes considerable 
mental deliberation (cf. Lash, 2002). 
2' Thus individualization is not, as Anthony Elliott (2002) supposes, inherently inimical to George 
Ritzer's idea of 'McDonaldization', though Beck has rejected it elsewhere (Beck, 2000b: 42-7). 
r. %Ily 
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argued (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007), but a structural phenomenon transfiguring 
objective life situations and biographies. As Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002: xxii; 
cf. Beck and Willms, 2004: 63) put it: 
Individualization can no longer be understood as a mere subjective reality which has to be 
relativized by and confronted with objective class analysis. Because individualization not 
only effects the Oberbau - ideology, false consciousness - but also the economic Unterbau 
of 'real classes'... [it] is becoming the social structure of second modern society itseýf 
Western societies are still capitalist, and yes, Beck contends, inequality of income 
remains stable. But it is 'capitalism without classes' (Beck, 1992: 88), and 
inequality of income firmly detached from its old moorings in class categories. But 
then how, one might ask, is inequality distributed in a social structure of 
individualization? Well, says Beck, inequality and poverty in reflexive modernity 
should be seen not as differentially distributed between groups, as they were in the 
past, but between phases in the average work life (Beck and Willms, 2004: 102; cf. 
Leisering and Leibfried, 1999). People come and go into economic hardship for a 
variety of (non-class related) reasons at different stages of their lives - as university 
students, as pensioners, after redundancy, following divorce - and this applies to 
the (temporarily) rich and poor, managers and manual workers alike. Consequently, 
individuals can hardly been seen as occupying static positions in a rigid class 
structure 'handed down from one generation to another' (Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim, 2002: 51). Rather, they occupy precarious, ambivalent positions that 
are 'subject to cancellation' in a structure conceived not in terms of locations at all, 
but in terms of movement (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 5 1). 
In sum: "Society can no longer look in the mirror and see social classes. 
The mirror has been smashed and all we have left are the individualized fragments" 
(Beck and Willms, 2004: 107). Yet, Beck notes, the concept of class continues to 
be discussed and debated in mainstream sociology as if it were alive and well. 
Sociologists, it seems, remain,, in their attempts to superimpose classes on a 
classless society, hopelessly attuned to the first modernity and its obsolete large- 
group categories. For this reason he dubs class a 'zombie category': "the idea lives 
on even though the reality to which it corresponds is dead" (Beck and Willms, 
2004: 51-2; see also Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 201-13). Of course class is 
not alone as a zombie category - many other notions of first modernity such as the 
family, full employment and so on, are also concepts from the crypt - and this 
spells further trouble for class analysts, Beck argues, seeing as their flagship 
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concept actually depends on other zombie categories for its definition and 
operationalization. One example is the idea of a household conceptualized as a 
traditional conjugal family supported by the income of a (usually male) 
breadwinner, something that forms the basic unit of class analysis but which has 
also, in the process of 'the normal chaos of love' (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995) 
so characteristic of reflexive modernity, that is, divorce, remarriage, cohabitation, 
and coordinating two careers as women continue to infiltrate the labour market. ) 
become decidedly unclear (see Beck, 1997: 95; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 
207; Beck and Willms, 2004: 20). A second example is the idea of a territorially- 
defined nation state as a 'container' for the class structure and its conflicts (see 
Beck, 2000b, 2002). Class concepts, he argues, are "deeply, intrinsically 
depend[ent] on the ontology of the nation state" (Beck and Willms, 2004: 104). 
This is true,, he notes, even of Pierre Bourdieu's subtle reworking of class in terms 
of the distribution of different forms of capital in a social space: the idea of capital 
and its exchangeability, after all, "functions only in a national framework" (Beck 
and Willms, 2004: 105). Today, however, when individuals on all rungs of the 
socio-economic ladder lead more transnationally mobile, 'cosmopolitan' lives as a 
result of globalization, the idea of a nation state as an impermeable container is also 
becoming a zombie category. People often find themselves simultaneously 
embedded in more than one national framework,, each of which positions them in 
starkly contrasting locations (economic migrants are the obvious example), and this 
throws into considerable doubt the ability of 'class' to reveal anything substantial 
about individuals' lives. In Beck's words: "The categories of class are simply not 
differentiated enough to capture such interlocked relationships of border- spanning, 
multi -perspectival inequality" (Beck and Willms, 2004: 105). When sociology does 
adopt the requisite 'cosmopolitan perspective' (Beck, 2000c), moreover, it 
becomes clear that to focus on national ('small') inequalities, as class analysts have 
been doing for the past century, obscures the analysis of more pressing global 
('large') inequalities between different parts of the world and, to some extent, even 
22 legitimates them (Beck, 2005: 24ff, 2007) . 
22 In fact this latest twist in Beck's thought has recently led him to abandon individualization theory 
on the basis that it too is tied to a 'methodologically nationalist' perspective. Still, given that 
individualization as formulated by Beck remains highly influential and that his censure of 
methodological nationalism is seriously problematic (see Atkinson, 2007b, 2007c), his auto-critique 
is, alas, not enough to safely neutralise its claims on class. 
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Critical Comments 
Ambivalence is a key theme for Beck and, as such, often finds itself 
attached as an adjective to a whole host of familiar sociological categories in his 
writings, including inequality, social structure and even society itself (see Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 42-53). It is perhaps ironic, then, that it abounds in his 
own work, congealing in some places to form blatant contradictions, in terms of, 
firstly, what exactly individualization is and, secondly, its precise consequences for 
class. On the first count, there are numerous instances in which Beck outlines the 
characteristic features of individualization only to completely contradict himself 
elsewhere - sometimes within a matter of pages. So, for example, we are told that 
the end of class society will consist of a steady process of 'individualization and 
atornization' (Beck, 1992: 99; cf. Beck and Willms, 2004: 88), but elsewhere that 
individualization most certainly does not involve atomization (Beck, 1997: 95); 
that individualization spells the end of sociology's 'virtual fixation' with groups 
and collectives (Beck, 1997: 21), but that we can identify and should investigate 
'cultures of individualization' and 'collective life situations' (Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim, 2002: 207); and that individualization does not mean each individual is 
becoming 'more of an "authentic F" (Beck and Willms, 2004: 67) but that the 
'main activity of the self-chosen life is a search for one's true self (Beck and 
Willms, 2004: 73). More centrally, however, we are told in some places that the 
crux of individualization consists of disembedding followed by re-embedding 
(Beck, 1992: 128; Beck, 1997: 95; Beck, 1998: 33; Beck and Beck-Gemsheim, 
2002: 203), in the way described above, but in others that individualization actually 
consists of disembedding without re-embedding (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim, 2002: 
xxii; Beck and Willms, 2004: 63). Now, even if this can be put down to an 
undisclosed change of mind over time - though it should be noted that the 
discrepancy appears within the leaves of one book (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002) - it involves a very different imagery. Re-embedding conjures the idea that 
individuals are being re-rooted in new social forms, new social relations and ties, 
and new modes of 'reintegration and control' (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim, 2002: 
203) involving institutionalization and standardization (Beck, 1992: 90) - hence the 
term 'institutionalized individualism'; whereas permanent disembedding, bringing 
Beck much closer to Bauman's view on individualization in liquid modernity (see 
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below), indicates a more free-floating existence. The point is, such regular 
inconsistency, contradiction and incoherence makes it difficult to comprehend 
exactly what individualization is supposed to consist of and, ultimately, serves to 
undermine its credibility as a description of contemporary processes. 
Secondly, Beck is rather equivocal on exactly how far class is being effaced 
in reflexive modernity. This is especially apparent in his discussion of the altered 
logic of distribution, in which he explicitly concedes that some risks will still be 
distributed along class lines and strengthen class society (Beck, 1992: 35): even in 
the risk society, he maintains, "the rule continues to hold that wealth rises to the top 
while risks sink to the bottom" (Beck, 1995: 137). But surely there are no class 
lines left for risk to be distributed along? What with individuals going in and out of 
poverty so much, surely any risks operating on socio-economic criteria cannot be 
described as being class-based? Why use the term if it has no structural 
manifestation? 23 But then Beck's view on this is hardly unambiguous either, for 
whilst he has energetically argued that patterns of social inequality have shifted out 
of the class paradigm by being distributed according to phases of life rather than 
groups, he has also conceded that 'no major change in the relations of inequality 
between major groups in our society' has taken place (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim, 
2002: 205). More strikingly still, he has argued that, in fact, '[c]lass 
differences 
... are not really annulled in the course of individualization processes' at 
all, but only 'recede into the background relative to the newly emerging "centre" of 
the biographical life plan' (Beck, 1992: 13 1, emphasis added; cf. Beck and Beck- 
Gemsheim, 2002: 3 1). This, alongside the similar admission that the changes 
brought by individualization currently 'exist more in people's consciousness, and 
on paper, than in behaviour and social conditions' (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim, 
2002: 203), contradicts and thus saps the credibility from his bold declaration that 
individualization is no 'mere subjective reality' but a structural phenomenon of 
second modem society. 
It is not, then, particularly clear what is supposedly coming into existence 
or how radical it really is, but neither is it clear what exactly is being eroded. Beck 
expends few words actually describing what class was, and where he does he 
23 This is not the only place Beck uses class to denote a continued reality: throughout his 
conversations with Johannes Willms (2004) he refers to eclecticism at different 'class levels' (p. 37) 
and the extension of work insecurity to the middle class (p. 82). 
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seems to vacillate between definitions to suit his line of argument. Sometimes he is 
fighting against Marx, as in his discussion of the changing logic of distribution and 
statements that classes "have their foundation in the position of a person in the 
industrial production process, in the antagonism of labour and capital" (Beck, 1997: 
23) but that "immiseration, as the condition for the formation of classes predicted 
by Marx, has been overcome" (Beck, 1992: 96). In other places he invokes as the 
image of the past to be shattered by the present the Weberian definition of class, 
holding that whilst the "unity of shared life experiences mediated by the market 
and shaped by status, which Max Weber brought together in the concept of social 
class" applied up until the fifties, it has since begun to 'fall apart': "Its different 
elements (such as material conditions dependent on specific market opportunities, 
the effectiveness of tradition and of pre-capitalist lifestyles, the consciousness of 
communal bonds and barriers to mobility, as well as networks of contact) have 
slowly disintegrated" (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 34). 
Elsewhere class is defined simply as income level (Beck, 1992: 13 1), but 
most often, and somewhat at odds with the actual Weberian (or for that matter 
Bourdieusian) conceptualization of class in which such phenomena are relatively 
contingent, it appears in terms of materially-organized collective solidarity, culture, 
identity, community and political action. 24 This last rendering, however, coupled 
with the question-begging argument that biographies of old were always relayed in 
the language of 'blows of fate', 'objective conditions' and 'outside forces' 
'overwhelming' and 'compelling' individuals compared to contemporary 
individualized biographies speaking only of agents' decisions, capacities and 
compromises (Beck and Beck-Gerrisheim, 2002: 25), amounts to little more than a 
colossal caricature of the past in an attempt to make the theory of individualization 
appear more credible (cf. Savage, 2000). As Marshall et al. (198 8) demonstrate, the 
type of homogeneous and solidary 'proletarian culture' (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim, 
2002: 42) posited by Beck has never really existed except as a construct of 
'dualistic historical thinking' wishing to set up a straw man, for the working class 
has always, to some degree, been perforated by sectionalism, instrumentalism and 
privatism. This inevitably raises the question of how he can claim class is a zombie 
when what it looked like alive and well is either vague or distorted; how, in other 
24 For a flavour see e. g. Beck (1992: 13,48-50,113), Beck (1998: 32-8,17 1 n6), Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim (2002: 37,42-3). 
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words, he can confidently identify class as a walking corpse when he is not sure 
what the living, breathing body looked like. 
The final weakness of Beck's position emanates from his account of the 
causes of individualization. It will be remembered that the central mechanisms 
driving individualization are, for him, the institutions of Western welfare societies 
which disembed individuals from their old collective 'forms of life', to use 
Wittgenstein's phrase, and compel them to shape their own destinies. The problem 
isl however, that Beck fails to acknowledge the ways in which some of the key 
institutions he heralds as the slayers of class may be hindered in their allotted role 
by the fact that they are riddled with class processes themselves, aggravated further 
by the fact that he himself, once again falling victim to his own contradictions, 
indicates that this may be the case. One place in which this is particularly clear is 
his discussion of education, a central 'motor' of individualization equipping 
individuals with universal forms of knowledge and self-reflective capacities. There 
is, embedded in his writings on this, a critical rider passed over, it must be said, 
with some haste: the successful acquisition of universal knowledge and self- 
reflection isl Beck admits, dependent on both the duration and the content of the 
individual's education (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 32). But what is likely to 
influence whether an individual decides to stay on at school or proceeds to 
university, the content or quality of the education they receive and, on top of that, 
their ability or inclination to absorb it? Beck remains silent, no doubt because it is 
hard to deny that, despite educational expansion, middle-class youth, whether 
because their families can mobilise economic, social or cultural resources to their 
advantage (Reay, 1998a; Ball, 2003; Devine, 2004) or because they have the 
requisite 'linguistic code' (Bernstein, 1971) or 'symbolic mastery' (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1990) to succeed as a result of their socialization, continue to undertake 
post-compulsory education, to study more 'abstract' disciplines and to attend 
private schools and prestigious universities at a higher rate than their working-class 
counterparts, with the result, perhaps, that it is they who are disproportionately 
more likely to leave education with the 'universal' and self-reflecting knowledge 
that allows them to be reflexive in their labour market trajectories. This possibility 
is simply ignored by Beck, who instead portrays education, in spite of his telling 
concession that not all leave it equally reflexive, to be a remarkably 'class free' 
institution experienced in a uniform manner regardless of one's background. 
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A second dubious propellant of individualization in Beck's theory, chiming 
in different ways with analyses of postmodern culture and the lambasting of the 
ýculture industry' by the Frankfurt school, is the expansion of consumption beyond 
its class-specific forms into a standardizing mass phenomenon as a result of 
increased societal affluence and the new ethic of self-fulfilment and individuality. 
Some aspects of this argument are true enough: home-ownership, for instance, has 
spread considerably amongst the British population following the introduction in 
the eighties of the right to buy council houses by the Thatcher government (on this 
see Saunders, 1990), and living standards have, on the whole, increased,, allowing 
extended access to a range of consumer goods. The issue, however, is over the new 
ethic of self-fulfilment, and once again Beck appears to trip himself up with a fatal 
concession: "this development does not include all population groups equally by 
any means", he writes, but is instead a product "of better education and higher 
income" - the poorer and 'less well-educated' "clearly continue to be tied to the 
value system of the 1950s and its status symbols" (Beck, 1998: 47). This statement, 
especially in light of the contradiction noted above regarding who is more likely to 
attain a 'better education', almost amounts to an admission that the new ethic is 
essentially a phenomenon reserved for the middle classes. Now this has important 
consequences in terms of consumption, for if Beck's argument is considered fully 
then it leads away from the idea of an undifferentiated 'mass consumerism' and 
posits instead the existence of a consumption cleavage mapped along class lines: 
on the one hand, a poorer section who strive to consume conventional goods in a 
conventional manner, and on the other, a more affluent and educated section who, 
in their quest for self-realization, flit between attitudes, activities and goods like 
bees in search of pollen. In fact, a strikingly similar - though more complex - 
argument was forwarded by Bourdieu in Distinction, where he identified an 
emerging 'new petite bourgeoisie' whose lifestyle is characterised by a search for 
identity and self-expression and a refusal to be assigned to a class - all 
demonstrated in the vast number of practices they undertake, from aikido to yoga, 
astrology to weaving, dance to transcendental meditation (Bourdieu, 1984: 354-71). 
This class fraction, comprised mainly of producers and propagators of symbolic 
goods (those in sales, marketing, advertising) and consultancy and social assistance 
professions (such as social workers, counsellors, youth leaders, therapists) was, for 
Bourdieu, ascendant and its lifestyle becoming more commonplace. The point is, 
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whatever the many differences between Bourdieu's position and Beck's on this, 
Beck's vision of consumption, far from depicting the erosion of class differences, 
seems to re-establish class as a primary division in reflexive modernity in a way 
altogether compatible with existing class theory. 
Zygmunt Bauman: The Individualized Society 
Given his reputation as a trenchant critic of the vast differentials and 
endemic misery produced by contemporary capitalist societies, Bauman may 
perhaps seem an unlikely inclusion in today's inventory of anti-class theorists. Yet 
the view that class plays little part in the maladies of the age of the consumer, first 
worked out in Memories of Class (1982), Legislators and Interpreters (1987) and 
Freedom (1988), is clear enough. In these early monographs, which laid the 
foundations for his later ideas, Bauman contended that, on the one hand, the 
demands of the working class have been successfully integrated into the corporatist 
capitalist system and, on the other, the steady decline of industrial workers through 
automation had induced rounds of economic restructuring and created a new 
system of division between permanent, full-time workers on the one hand and the 
new poor of casual workers and the unemployed on the other (Bauman, 1987: 178). 
Moreover, he declared, because capitalism no longer engages society as producers 
in its reproduction, centring work and class as the principle axes of struggle and 
identity, but as consumers, it is now the freedom to consume and to choose which 
symbols of self-identity are to be appropriated that constitute the central stratifying 
principle of society, with the new poor being seen through the lens of consumerism 
as 'flawed consumers'. Not only was the working class 'on the way out' (Bauman, 
1987: 179), then, but viewing the world in terms of class at all now "clouds rather 
than clarifies vision" (Bauman, 1982: 193). 
Bauman's conversion to postmodernism at the turn of the nineties, signalled 
by Modernity and the Holocaust (1989) and Modernity and Ambivalence (199 1), 
built upon these core themes. Expanding his theoretical vocabulary, individuals 
were now claimed to be engrossed in an unceasing and apparently unconstrained 
4self-constitution' and 'self-assembly' of their identities, achieved through the 
adoption of 'symbolic tokens' of belonging (Bauman, 1992: 191-195; cf. 1991: 
206). No longer was identity, as it was in the modern age, much like a pilgrimage - 
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committed to a single 'destination', solid, stable and progressive through time (e. g. 
the identity constructed out of one's lifelong job or career). Instead, in the era of 
postmodernity, it now centred around 'avoiding fixation and keeping the options 
open' (Bauman, 1995: 81), that is, the refusal of long-term commitments to any 
one place or vocation, personified not by the pilgrim but by the tourist, stroller, 
player or, if one is less fortunate, the vagabond (Bauman, 1995: 80-104). More 
recently still, however, Bauman has rebranded his thought, leaving behind his 
image as the 'prophet of postmodernity' (Smith, 1999) to become the herald of 
25 'liquid modernity' (see especially Bauman, 2000). In his latest batch of writings, 
particularly those on disembedding, individualization and the individualized 
society, Bauman regularly draws on and indeed moves much closer to Beck's 
position. But he provides no mere carbon copy of the latter's theory, for many of 
the themes that established him as an original diagnostician of the postmodern 
condition are retained and elaborated, whilst those he does borrow from Beck are 
taken in novel directions. 
Essentially, Bauman's central proposition, modifying Beck's thesis, is that 
the condition of liquid modernity is characterised by a process of disembedding 
without re-embedding (Bauman, 2001: 41-56,140-52; cf. 2000: 32-7). Modernity, 
he argues, has always been characterised by disembedding - that is, the 'socially 
sanctioned' (Bauman, 2000: 32) deracination of individuals "from the plot in which 
they germinated and from which they sprouted" (in Gane, 2004: 32). Yet this was 
always promptly followed by a process of re-embedding in which individuals had 
to actively forge their self-identification with one of the 'beds' (broadly equivalent 
to a collectivity) ready to subsequently house them. When feudal estates were 
replaced by classes in the transition to capitalism, for example, individuals were 
uprooted from their ascribed position and forced to re-identify with a social class 
by 
actively conforming to emerging class-bound social types and models of conduct, [by] 
imitating, following the pattern, 'acculturating', not falling out of step, not deviating from 
the norm ... classes, unlike estates, 
had to be 'joined', and the membership had to be 
continuously renewed, reconfirmed and tested in day-by-day conduct (Bauman, 2001: 145). 
25 Interestingly, in a recent interview Bauman rejected the term 'reflexive modernity' associated 
with Beck and (less so) Giddens, condemning it for "projecting our own (professional thinkers') 
cognitive uncertainty on the world, or reforging quite real professional puzzlement into imaginary 
popular prudence - whereas that world out there is marked by the fading and wilting of the art of 
reflection... " (Gane, 2004: 18). 
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Once formed, however, class membership 
tended to become as solid, unalterable and resistant to Individual manipulation as the 
premodern assignment to the estate. Class and gender hung heavily over the individual 
range of choices; to escape their constraint was not much easier than challenging one's 
place in the 'divine chain of beings'. If not in theory, then at least for practical intents and 
purposes, class and gender looked uncannily like 'facts of nature' and the task left to most 
self-assertive individuals was to 'fit in' into the allocated niche through behaving as its 
established residents did (Bauman, 2001: 145). 
Moreover, class membership was by no means freely chosen but, instead, 
dependent upon access to material resources. Those endowed with fewer resources 
had fewer options of self-assertion and identification open to them, but, Bauman 
(2001: 46) argues, their deprivations 'added up' and 'congealed' into collective, 
class interests whilst their ineffectuality as individuals was compensated through 
the engagement in communal, class-orientated action: 
People endowed with fewer resources, and thus with less choice, had to compensate for 
their individual weaknesses by the 'power of numbers' - by closing ranks and engaging in 
collective action. As Claus Offe has pointed out, collective, class-oriented action came to 
those lower down on the social ladder as 'naturally' and 'matter-of-factly' as the individual 
pursuit of their life goals came to their employers (Bauman, 2001: 46). 
In liquid modernity, however, where social bonds and conditions of action 
cannot, as in the past, keep their shape for long, and where jobs for life have 
evaporated according to the demands of the evermore dominant market, 
individualization has assumed a modified form: individuals continue to be 
disembedded and compelled to take their identity as a task rather than a given, but 
no longer are there anyfirm beds waiting to accommodate their self- identification. 
Instead, individuals must remain chronically disembedded, on the move, searching 
out and choosing their flexible identities as they go from the vast array of options 
available, all the while feeling incomplete, insecure and unfulfilled. As Bauman 
(2000: 33-4; cf. 2001: 146) puts it: 
No 'beds' are furnished for 're-embedding', and such beds as might be postulated and 
pursued prove fragile and often vanish before the work of 're-embedding' is complete. 
There are rather 'musical chairs' of various sizes and styles as well as of changing numbers 
and positions, which prompt men and women to be constantly on the move and promise no 
'fulfilment', no rest and no satisfaction of 'arriving', of reaching the final destination, 
where one can disarm, relax, and stop worrying. 
In other words, it is not only "the individual placements in society, but the places to 
which the individuals may gain access and in which they may wish to settle" that 
are now 4melting fast', and this affects all equally, "unskilled and skilled, 
uneducated and educated, work-shy and hard working alike" (Bauman, 2001: 146). 
The 6problem of identity' for agents is thus no longer "how to obtain the identities 
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of their choice and how to have them recognized by people around" or "how to find 
a place inside a solid frame of social class or category", as it was in the preceding 
epoch, "but which identity to choose and how to keep alert and vigilant so that 
another choice can be made in case the previously chosen identity is withdrawn 
from the market or stripped of its seductive powers" (Bauman, 2001: 147). 
Accordingly, the idea of a 'whole life project' is no longer desirable; instead, a 
"flexible identity, a constant readiness to change and the ability to change at short 
notice, and an absence of commitments of the 'till death do us part' style" have 
become not only attractive options but prerequisites for survival (Bauman, 2002: 
35-6; cf, 2007a: 4). Of course, Bauman (2001: 50) adds, this implies there is a 
greater freedom for an 'ever growing number of men and women' to experiment 
with their identity and self-assert in liquid modernity, realised in the consumer 
market, but the necessary accompaniment is an unprecedented level of the 
underside of freedom - insecurity. 
A corollary of all this, Bauman argues, is that problems generated by social 
organization or, more specifically, by deregulated markets and extraterritorial 
capital, have come to be seen as personal failings and responsibilities that must be 
dealt with individually. 26 For example, if people 
... stay unemployed, it is because they failed to learn the skills of gaining an interview, or because they did not try hard enough to find a job or because they are, purely and simply, 
work-shy; if they are not sure about their career prospects and agonize about their future, it 
is because they are not good enough at winning friends and influencing people and failed 
to learn and master, as they should have done, the arts of self-expression and impressing 
the others (Bauman, 2001: 47). 
Personal troubles, to deploy C. Wright Mills' (1970) phraseology, may appear 
similar but are no longer considered to be connected to public issues or collective 
interests, like those of class, and in fact the company and advice of others assumes 
the form of little more than a reassurance that 'fighting the troubles alone is what 
all the others do daily' (Bauman, 2001: 48; see also Bauman, 1999). In Bauman's 
(2004a: 35) words, capital and labour "no longer seem to offer a common frame 
inside which variegated social deprivations and injustices can (let alone are bound 
to) blend, congeal and solidify into a programme for change". Instead individuals 
are cast as autonomous, responsible individuals de jure, even if they remain, as 
they do in liquid modernity, far from autonomous individuals defacto. To secure 
26 Purging Giddens' phrase of its positive connotations, Bauman often describes this as a 
supplanting of politics with 'life politics' (see especially Bauman, 2002). 
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the latter, ironically, requires collective work (Bauman, 1999: 7), and this can only 
be achieved through a revitalisation of the agora, that is, the space where private 
and public issues meet and mutually translate. 
Despite all this, however, issues of stratification, polarisation and inequality 
have never disappeared from Bauman's work. Whether conceived in terms of the 
freedom to consume and experiment with one's identity versus exclusion as 
'flawed consumers' and bearers of unshakeable, stigmatising identities (Bauman, 
1998a, 2004a: 38), in terms of freedom to move around the globe at will ('tourists') 
versus either those who have to move because of the inhospitality of the world 
('vagabonds') or those who can not move for lack of resources (Bauman, 1998b), 
or simply in terms of a polarisation of wealth, income and life chances (Bauman, 
2001: 115), there are, in Bauman's vision of society, always winners and losers. In 
fact, the latter are, in their function of 'offsetting the otherwise repelling and 
revolting effects of the consumer's life lived in the shadow of perpetual 
uncertainty' by reminding the former of what may befall them if things go awry 
(Bauman, 2001: 116), crucial to the reproduction of liquid modem social order, 
whilst the 'winners' constitute not adversaries against which the 'losers' shall 
struggle until the 'final dinouement', as Marx put it, but the idols they yearn to 
become (Bauman and Tester, 2001: 118). However, because of Bauman's frequent 
appeal to the differences in economic resources in defining whether individuals are 
winners or losers, some have argued that despite his rhetoric of fluidity and his 
rejection of class as an axis of inequality, his ideas on the stratification of freedom 
are in fact nothing but a theorisation of rigid class differences (Gane, 2001a, 
2001b). But Bauman has replied to this charge, emphatically arguing that not only 
do the losers stand outside of any class hierarchy, thereby 'eroding the class-based 
order of society' itself (2007b: 123), but more importantly 'the two actual, feared 
or desired social conditions of freedom and un-freedom' are not 'class-ascribed' 
(in Gane, 2004: 34, some punctuation removed). Instead, he claims, 
... realistic prospects 
for each and every resident of a liquid modem society. None of the 
currently privileged and enjoyable situations is guaranteed to last, whilst most of the 
currently handicapped and resented positions can be in principle renegotiated using the 
rules of the liquid modem game. There is, accordingly, a mixture of hope and fear in every 
59 
heart, spread over the while spectrum of the emergent planetary stratification (in Gane, 
2004: 34-35, some punctuation removed). 
27 
Bauman rarely states it this baldly, but in a society where 'structures that limit 
individual choices' no longer 'keep their shape for long' (2007a: 1), where 
individuals are granted a new freedom to 'annul' and 'disable' the constraints 
imposed by the past so that 'what one was yesterday will no longer bar the 
possibility of becoming someone totally different today' (2007b: 104), and where 
ýassignment to "waste" becomes everybody's potential prospect' rather than 'a 
misery confined to a relatively small part of the population' (2005: 32) because 
endemic flexibility and insecurity in the world of work mean that 'everyone is 
potentially redundant or replaceable' and 'every position, however elevated and 
powerful it may seem now, is in the long run precarious' and its privileges 'fragile 
and under threat' (2001: 52), the logical result, he holds, is that class divisions are 
'cancelled' (2005: 101). 5 
Critical Comments 
Bauman's perspective bristles with insights into the deleterious operations 
and effects of consumer markets, the flexibilisation of work patterns and, even if it 
is no longer held to fit the mould of class, the plight of the poorer denizens of 
liquid modernity. Nevertheless, as with Beck and Giddens, his argument suffers 
from a multitude of deficiencies and areas of ambivalence that seriously undermine 
what he has to say. Some of these are relatively minor and need not be explored in 
any depth here - for example, his abstract, generalising style, his questionable 
characterisation of the transition to classes at the dawn of capitalism and his failure 
to clarify, like Beck, the mechanisms or causes of both disembedding and the loss 
of 'beds' in liquid modernity beyond the rule of the deregulated market. Others, 
however, are rather more substantial and, as such, require rather more attention. 
Perhaps the most immediately apparent problem is Bauman's ambivalence 
and contradiction on the characterisation offreedom in liquid modern societies. As 
seen above, the general thrust of his argument would seem to be that the lack of 
solid beds in which to be re-embedded has allowed a new level of freedom and 
27 Hence, and when added to all that has already been said, Beilharz's (2000: 32) assertion that 
Bauman's is not "a frame of interpretation within which we encounter the 'end of class... seems 
somewhat misplaced. 
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autonomy for an 'ever growing number' of people - class and other such 'beds% 
after all, no longer 'hang heavily over the individual range of choices' as they once 
did. This new found freedom, this 'emancipation from constraints' (Bauman and 
Tester, 2001: 103) or 'being free of chains', is, Bauman adds, 'indispensable for 
decent human life' (in Gane, 2004: 32), though so too is security, a casualty of the 
increase in freedom that can only be rescued and restored alongside it through a 
decoupling of earning entitlement from earning capacity (Bauman, 1998a, 1999). 
However, Bauman then seems to utterly contradict this conception of freedom 
when he goes on to contend, like Adomo and Horkheimer (1944/1997) half a 
century earlier, that, in fact, the freedom on offer in liquid modem consumer 
society is a false fteedom; that the new form of 'privatised individuality' so 
prevalent today 'means, essentially, unfreedom' (Bauman, 1999: 63). No longer are 
the majority of the populace deemed to have attained something 'indispensable for 
decent human life': de facto freedom and autonomy - the ability to "gain control 
over [one's] fate and make the choices [one] truly desire[s]" (Bauman, 2000: 39) 
that looks uncannily like the 'emancipation from constraints' achieved more or less 
across the board above - now remains a distant reality and de jure autonomy - 
autonomy by right - all the bulk of the populace have. Then again, Bauman is 
hardly consistent on the de jurelde facto dualism either. In some places, for 
example, he claims that only a collective translation of private troubles into public 
issues will suffice to make de facto autonomy a reality for most individuals (e. g. 
Bauman, 1999), yet, elsewhere, we are told that the passage to defacto autonomy, 
though littered with obstructions and difficult to sustain, is achievable by 
individuals, especially if they are endowed with money (Bauman, 2005: 23ff). In 
fact, his model of the stratification of freedom is, it seems, measured in terms of de 
facto freedom - it would be senseless to describe the elite as 'privileged', as he 
often does, if this was not the case - with the elite free to pick and choose their 
identities and travel at will at the top, the immobile and stigmatised at the bottom, 
and most of us struggling to balancefteedom and security in the middle, 
never sure how long our freedom to choose what we desire and renounce what we resent 
will last, or whether we will be able to keep the position we currently enjoy for as long as 
we would find it comfortable and desirable to hold it (Bauman, 2004a: 38). 
It may be insecure, but now the majority in the middle do have more than de jure 
freedom after all. 
61 
This leads us to consider a second area of difficulty in Bauman's 
perspective, namely his take on the composition of the new stratification order of 
liquid modernity. It is obvious that, most of the time, Bauman envisages this order 
in terms of a polarised dichotomy between the winners and losers, seduced and 
repressed, tourists and vagabonds (see e. g. Bauman, 1987: chaps 10 and 11; 1998b: 
chap 4; Gane, 2004: 23ff). This is a powerful image, no doubt, but one that suffers 
from at least two problems. First of all, who exactly constitutes the minority and 
who the majority in the polarisation varies considerably across Bauman's writings. 
In some places, for instance, the 'losers' - the 'new poor', 'flawed consumers' or 
'underclass' - are seen very much as the minority (Bauman, 1998a), counterposed 
to John Kenneth Galbraith's ever freer 'contented majority' of consumers (Bauman 
and Tester,, 2001: 154). Elsewhere, however, the dividing line of the polarisation is 
suddenly said to have 'moved up the hierarchy' in liquid modernity, with the elite 
of extraterritorial global actors at one end and, at the other, the 'great majority' for 
whom 'effective therapy' (apparently higher education) against the afflictions of 
liquid modernity has been lifted 'beyond reach' (Bauman, 2004b: 14; cf. Gane, 
2004: 23ff). In yet other places, though much more rarely, the dichotomy is, as 
indicated above, thrown out completely and most are said to reside in the middle. 
Such inconsistency, especially when added to the oscillations on freedom, makes it 
difficult to take any one of his positions seriously - who might now be judged a 
winner and who a loser may change dramatically over the page, so to speak - and, 
ultimately, chips away at the credibility of Bauman's overall perspective. 
Secondly, it has to be said that Bauman's tendency to draw a single 
dividing line between winners and losers in liquid modernity is incredibly 
simplistic and detached from the intricacies of daily life, bunching together in each 
camp a myriad of heterogeneous actors and failing to recognise any internal modes 
of division and differentiation (cf. Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, 2005b: 205). 
Doubtless such a binary view of society stems from Bauman's Marxist roots - he 
often depicts the global elite/localised masses division of today as an outgrowth of 
the capital-labour relation (e. g. Bauman, 2001: 25; Gane, 2004: 26; cf. Bauman, 
1987: chap 11), and even, in some places, still refers to the elite as (extraterritorial) 
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capital. But an undifferentiated binary division loses its justification when the 
Marxist categories are jettisoned. After all, there is no necessary nexus between 
Bauman's winners and losers like there is between Marx's bourgeoisie and 
proletariat, no relation of exploiter and exploited, no sense that each group depends 
on the other for its existence yet stands utterly opposed to it on the plane of 
interests to the extent that the ensuing struggle between the two will inevitably 
result in the dramatic conclusion of history's dialectic - especially in those 
instances where the winners are held to be the consuming majority rather than the 
elite minority. Having said that, even Marx was faithful to the complexities of the 
social world in a way that Bauman clearly is not, recognising the existence of 
multiple class 'fractions', as Poulantzas (1978) called them, in his more detailed 
analyses (e. g. the distinction between industrial capitalists and 'money- capital i sts' 
in volume three of Capital - Marx, 1959: chap XXIII), as are the more 
sophisticated Marxist writers on class today (e. g. Wright, 2005b: 15ff). 
Evoking Bauman's Marxist background raises a further, basic aspect of his 
position: he has, in complete contrast to Beck, a very particular conception of class 
and, thus, what it takes to kill it off. Only when labour ceased to provide a 
meaningful frame for action (Bauman, 2004a: 34-5; cf. 1982), that is, and when 
capital qua capital - "money which serves first and foremost to turn out more 
money" - rather than simply income and wealth ceased to confer a position of 
advantage and dominance (Bauman, 1998a: 3 1), did the concept of class pass away 
in Bauman's eyes. Now this is all fine and well as a case against Marxism, but such 
claims would hardly perturb a neo-Weberian, for example, for whom the elements 
Bauman cites are irrelevant to the measurement and substantiation of classes. 29 As 
Goldthorpe and Marshall argue - explicitly taking in their crosshairs Bauman and 
other ex-Marxists "who, having lost faith in the Marxist class analysis that once 
commanded their allegiance, or at least sympathy, now find evident difficulty in 
envisioning any other kind" - demolishing the Marxist project scarcely provides 
"the quietus of class analysis tout court" (1992: 381-2), for "[v]arious objections 
that may be powerfully raised against" Marxist class analysis - the lack of class- 
based collective action, the inadequacy of exploitation as a concept, the poverty of 
28 One commentator explicitly dubs Bauman a post-Marxist, arguing that Marx has disappeared into 
Bauman's work 'like labour into the product' (Beilharz, 2000: 49). 
29 Or, as we shall see in the next chapter, a Bourdieusian. 
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historicism, and so forth - "simply do not apply" to the version of class analysis 
they champion (1992: 393). All that is needed to demonstrate the 'promising future 
of class analysis' is, for them, empirical evidence that an agent's position in 
employment relations impacts on their life chances, social identity and social 
values in some way - something they feel they have no problem producing. 
Perhaps with all this in mind Bauman's statement above in response to 
Nicholas Gane that whilst freedom and unfreedom are indeed delegated by material 
wealth they are by no means ascribed according to classes in liquid modernity can 
be seen in a new light - there is, after all, 'nothing Marxist' about such a position 
(Gane, 2004: 27). Yet there is more to this crucial statement, one of the most 
explicit rebuttals of class as a meaningful concept in Bauman's recent work, than 
that, and, when examined further, it reveals itself as a major source of serious error. 
On the one hand, Bauman makes the point that, given the intensified insecurity and 
flexibilisation of employment across the occupational spectrum, 'none of the 
privileged positions is bound to last' (in Gane, 2004: 35). This kind of statement, 
highlighting the shift in employment culture under neo-liberal capitalism toward 
incessant redundancy, downsizing, streamlining and so on in both the private and 
the public sector, is relatively commonplace in social science today, with versions 
propounded by both Beck and Giddens, as witnessed above, but also by others such 
as Richard Sennett (1998) and Bourdieu (1998a) - two thinkers with whom 
Bauman professes intellectual affinity. It has not, however, been without its 
challengers. Goldthorpe and McKnight (2005), for example, use statistical analysis 
based on Goldthorpe's class schema to demonstrate that the experience of frequent 
and long-term unemployment, despite claims to the contrary, remains a misfortune 
visited predominantly upon the working class, particularly those at the lower end of 
this category, not least, they argue, because of the form of employment contract, 
that is, the 'spot contract' carrying little expectation of continuity, supposedly 
defining their class membership. The measurement of class and proffered 
explanation aside, Goldthorpe and McKnight's argument provides an effective 
reminder that Bauman's - and of course Beck's and Giddens' - statement cannot, 
despite its general currency, be accepted as a truism. 
On the other hand, Bauman also claims more overtly than either Beck or 
Giddens that the reverse of this scenario also holds: that the 'currently handicapped 
and resented positions can be in principle renegotiated using the rules of the liquid 
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modern game' (in Gane, 2004: 35). It is not entirely clear whether Bauman is 
actually referring to the prospect of upwards mobility here or just the ability to 
ýrenegotiate' one's identity using consumer products, but either way it is perhaps 
one of the most contradictory and superficial comments in his entire oeuvre. It goes 
against all that he has said on the predicament of the immobile or vagabond, 
stigmatised poor in liquid modernity, described throughout his work as 
permanently excluded (Bauman, 2004b: 78; 2007a: 69) or made permanently 
redundant by the global economy (Bauman, 1999: 175), unable and not allowed to 
shed their 'stereotyping, humiliating, dehumanizing, stigmatizing identities' 
(Bauman, 2004a: 38) and pushed only 'deeper into the precipice of indignity' 
(Bauman and Tester, 2001: 154). Furthermore, the appeal to the 'rules of the liquid 
modern game' seems a little out of place with all that he has said before on the 
'falling apart' of any 'hard and fast rules' in liquid modernity (Bauman, 200 1: 11), 
adding weight to the suspicion that the statement is little more than an ad hoc 
response to a well-targeted question with no firm reasoning behind it. 
Conclusion 
The positions of Giddens, Beck and Bauman on the demise of class have 
now been given the clarificatory and critical analysis hitherto sorely missing in 
class theory. The precise character of their claims and the conceptual clothing in 
which they are swaddled have been unpacked, and, importantly, the several 
problem areas that plague each theory and gnaw at their credibility have been 
exposed and explored. These were, to sum up, Giddens' damaging inconsistency 
on the exact status of class in late modernity and the wider theoretical deficiencies 
in his conceptualisation of motivation and ontological security this revealed, 
Beck's incessant ambivalence on both the nature of individualization and the 
concept of class as well as his flawed reasoning on the mechanisms at work in 
propelling individualization, and, lastly, Bauman's conflicting views on the nature 
and existence of freedom and on the composition of the stratification order in liquid 
modernity, added to the somewhat contradictory and superficial reasoning behind 
his boldest statement on the irrelevance of class. 
These critical points demonstrate that the theories of individualization and 
reflexivity cannot be accepted as they stand: they are, as conceptual totalities, 
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unsound and replete with untenable particularities - Giddens' notion of ontological 
security and the idea of 'renegotiation' so dear to Bauman, for example. Yet 
theoretical critique of the type presented here is not, on its own, enough to refute 
the theories of individualization and reflexivity outright, for there remain many 
themes running through them which, when extricated from the conceptual 
problems highlighted in the foregoing, might yet manifest themselves in the social 
world. In other words, the specific theorisations may be deeply flawed, but the 
overall essence of their diagnosis might still hold water. Whether agents 
increasingly are or see themselves as atomised, self-governing individuals with full 
responsibility for their actions and no ties to collective frames of meaning, whether 
some form of 'biographical decision-making' has become more prevalent and 
assumed a more 'reflexive' nature, however that might be defined, than once was 
the case, and whether inequalities, identities, lifestyle choices and political 
orientations have been set afloat from the class docks must thus be answered by 
means of a dialogue with the social world itself in the form of empirical work. 
However, before embarking on empirical scrutinization it is necessary to clarify 
what exactly constitutes the concept at the heart of the study - class - and, 
subsequently, to engage in another round of theoretical critique. This is the task of 
the next chapter. 
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4. Fine-Tuning the Bourdieusian Theory of Class 
Class is not exactly an under-theorised phenomenon. As Erik Olin Wright's 
(2005a) recent collection indicates, a whole gamut of perspectives envisioning the 
concept in starkly contrasting ways currently exists, ranging from those still finding 
inspiration in the writings of the classics to those seeking to push beyond them in 
fresh directions. As chapter two documented, however, there is one standpoint in 
this assortment enjoying particularly frequent adoption and discussion in both the 
UK and the US at present: that forwarded by the late French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu. As we saw, a good portion of this popularity stems from his inclusion of 
cultural processes in the definition of class, heightening its resonance with the so- 
called 'cultural turn' in sociology (see especially Devine and Savage, 2005). But 
Bourdieu's theory, as I intend to show, bears fundamental insights and advances 
over alternative conceptual schemes far beyond this aspect of his work and, 
importantly, can be used to counter and reformulate many of the arguments of 
Beck, Giddens and Bauman without completely rejecting them. His concepts have, 
however, received intense critical scrutiny. Once the main pillars of his approach 
have been outlined, therefore, a central aim of this chapter is to consider some 
critical points as they bear on the focus and methodology of the present study, 
defending Bourdieu against misreadings but also, more importantly, bolstering his 
ideas where undeveloped facets have been flagged by drawing on their roots in and 
converges with phenomenological philosophy and social theory. 
The Bourdieusian Theory of Class 
Social Space 
The best entry point to Bourdieu's theory is his substitute for conventional 
models of the class structure in terms of hierarchical strata: the 'social space' 
(Figure 1). Essentially, this is a space in which all agents are plotted according to 
three axes or dimensions (Bourdieu, 1984: 114). The first of these, running along a 
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Figure 1: The social space, with some occupations plotted for illustration (based on Bourdieu, 
1984: 128-9; 1998b: 5. The third dimension, trajectory, is not represented pictorially here). 
vertical axis, is the overall amount of capital that the individual holds, including 
economic capital in the form of wealth and property, cultural capital, that is, 
signifiers of cultural competencies existing in embodied ('intelligence', cultural 
knowledge), objectified (cultural goods and items such as artworks) and 
institutionalised (educational qualifications) forms, and finally social capital, 
understood as resources based on personal networks and associations with certain 
names or titles (see especially Bourdieu, 1997a) . 
30 A fourth capital, symbolic 
capital, is the form taken by all other capitals when they are (mis)perceived as 
legitimate. Secondly, and importantly, agents are differentiated along a horizontal 
axis according to the composition of their capital - i. e. whether it is predominantly 
economic (as is the case for large industrialists) or cultural (such as for higher 
education teachers). This serves to subsume cultural differences usually analysed 
under the separate heading of status into the definition of class, increasing the 
30 Note that these particular capitals need not be the most salient in structuring social space; it is just 
that they are in contemporary capitalist societies. In state socialist societies Bourdieu (1998b: 14- 
18) identified 'political capital' as of central import instead of economic capital. 
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explanatory power of the concept whilst, as Sayer (2005: 77) notes, bringing it 
closer to lay experiences of class which tend not to differentiate it from status. It 
also introduces the phenomenon, otherwise smothered by one-dimensional class 
schemes, of horizontal or 'transverse' mobility based on the conversion of capitals 
(e. g. through monetary investment in education producing cultural capital) 
alongside vertical mobility based on accumulation (Bourdieu, 1984: 13 1). The third 
dimension is the individual's trajectory through social space over time as their 
volume and composition of capital evolves. 
Three points need to be made before moving on. First of all, and most 
generally, the idea of social space yields a 'relational' view of class in which each 
position derives its meaning from its relations to others - distance, proximity, 
above, below, between and so on - within the totality, with these distances and 
relations translating into real social distances and relations .31 This is opposed 
principally to what Bourdieu calls a 'substantial i st' view of class in which the 
meaning of each position is rooted in the substantial properties (practices, 
behaviours and attitudes) associated with it, but it also stands in opposition to the 
relationalism commonly claimed for Marx and Weber (e. g. by Wright, 1979) 
insofar as it is not concrete relationships of production or in the market that are 
constitutive of class, as the two patriarchs of class theory have it, but social 
positions defined relative to one other in terms of volume and composition of 
capital. A crucial corollary of this is that the axes defining social space are 
continuous or gradational, meaning that, unlike for Marx and his followers or 
Goldthorpe, there are no hard and fast boundaries between classes, though since 
agents tend to form clusters in the different regions of social space they can be 
separated out as classes for analytical purposes. As Bourdieu (1987: 13) puts it: 
The boundaries between theoretical classes which scientific investigation allows us to 
construct on the basis of a plurality of criteria are similar, to use a metaphor of Rapoport's, 
to the boundaries of a cloud or forest. These boundaries can thus be conceived of as lines 
or as imaginary planes, such that the density (of the trees, or of the water vapour) is higher 
on the one side and lower on the other, or above a certain values on one side and below it 
on another. (In fact, a more appropriate image would be that of a flame whose edges are in 
constant movement, oscillating around a line or surface. ) 
31 As the language used here probably betrays, this definition of class owes much to the structuralist 
tradition (for an acknowledgement of this debt see particularly Bourdieu, 1968), but it also draws on 
P. F. Strawson's philosophy of space and Ernst Cassirer's (19233) historical analysis of the transition 
from Aristotelian substantialism to relationalism (or 'functionalism') in the natural sciences. 
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Thus sidestepped are the stale debates that raged between neo-Marxists and others 
over the 'real' boundaries of social classes. 
Secondly, it should be made clear that the social space is not, strictly 
speaking, an occupational structure, as Weininger (2005) implies, but a structure in 
which all agents are plotted - to limit it to the former is to unnecessarily eliminate 
the unemployed, the retired and housewives/husbands, all possessors of capital that 
could be positioned at any point in social space, from analysis in the same way as 
the 'employment aggregate' (Crompton, 1998) class schemes of Goldthorpe and 
Wright. 32 Bourdieu himself is not always consistent on this, and indeed sometimes 
refers to the space of 'posts' (especially in his early work with Luc Boltanski - 
Bourdieu and Boltanski, 1981), but his usual argument is that occupations, insofar 
as they require and perpetuate a certain amount and structure of capital, are 
generally convenient and economical proxies for or indicators of agents' positions 
(e. g. Bourdieu, 1987: 4). Occupations thus act as 'signposts' marking out the 
structure of social space, but nevertheless the social space and the agents' positions 
within it exist independently of occupations and consequently the jobless need not 
be neglected so long as their capital stocks are known. 
Lastly, it seems necessary to respond to Beck's contention, registered in the 
last chapter, that Bourdieu is ill-equipped to deal with globalisation by noting that 
the concepts of social space and capital, whilst indeed remaining pitched at the 
level of the nation-state, by no means Preclude consideration of global processes 
such as information flows, the imperialistic spread of neo-liberalism -a target of 
scolding criticism in Bourdieu's later years (Bourdieu, 1998a) - or, Beck's main 
concern, immigration. In fact, as regards the last of these it should be remembered 
that whether immigrants thrive or barely survive in the receiving country is shaped 
by the level of capital valued there that they hold. Those with little in the way of 
economic and recognised cultural resources, for example, will, as Bourdieu (1984: 
108) noted in Distinction, come to occupy the lowest positions in social space and 
be subject to all the consequences that brings, whereas those who come equipped 
32 This argument also runs counter to Lovell's (2000,2004) contention, seemingly based on a partial 
reading of Masculine Domination (Bourdieu, 2001), that Bourdieu conceptualizes women not as 
capital-accumulating subjects in social space but as merely objects accruing capital for men, with 
only the latter positioned in social space. Not only did the survey acting as the empirical foundation 
for the social space constructed in Distinction question both men and women, but throughout that 
book there are a number of passages in which Bourdieu discusses the capital of women and their 
distribution in social space (on charwomen, for example, see Bourdieu, 1984: 108). 
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with ample stores of recognised or convertible capital will have an altogether 
different experience. Furthermore, the fact that some immigrants and asylum 
seekers may, as Beck suggests, be well-educated and respected citizens in their 
home nation but bottom of the pile in the receiving one is often due to the fact that 
their educational credentials (cultural capital) are not recognised as legitimate by 
the new system (i. e. turned into symbolic capital) and thus fail to secure them 
appropriate jobs (generating economic capital) (for an interesting first-hand 
33 account see Amirzada, 2006). 
Conditions of Existence and Habitus 
The social space, according to Bourdieu, is constructed in such a way as to 
reveal the maximal differences and similarities between people. This is because 
those in neighbouring positions within it, by virtue of their capital possession, share 
similar 'conditions of existence' and conditionings which, in turn, produce within 
them similar habitus, that is, a complex of durable cognitive and corporeal 
dispositions, propensities, and schemes of perception and appreciation that 
manifest themselves in tastes and lifestyles. By 'conditions of existence' Bourdieu 
generally means the agent's relative distance from material necessity and the 
experiences this generates, with those in the upper regions of social space, 
possessing plentiful stocks of capital, being subject to an overall distance from 
necessity whilst those in the lower sections, holding less capital, are somewhat 
closer to its demands and urgencies. Through the practical adaptation to frequently 
experienced situations the objective probabilities of 'access to goods, services and 
powers' inscribed in these conditions are then - making a 'virtue of necessity' as 
Bourdieu often likes to say - transformed into the dispositions, schemes of 
appreciation and subjective aspirations of the habitus (Bourdieu, 2000a: 136; 1990a: 
60). Thus Distinction documents how on the one hand the dominant class's (or 
bourgeoisie's) distance from necessity results in a privileging of 'form over 
function' and 'manner over matter' not only in the assessment of art but in the 
choice of food and clothes and in ways of walking and talking (Bourdieu, 1984: 5, 
176-7), whilst on the other hand the dominated (or working) class's experience of 
33 For a more detailed critique of Beck's view on class and globalisation see Atkinson (2007b, 
2007c). 
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the urgencies associated with less capital inculcates within them a propensity to 
give primacy to substance and functionality and, therefore, to make the 'choice of 
the necessary' (Bourdieu, 1984: chap. 7). 
This adjustment takes the form of a subconscious bodily learning process in 
which the limits and regularities of the world are inscribed into the habitus as a 
practical evaluation of what goods, practices and aspirations are accessible and 
reasonable or,, as Bourdieu puts it, as a 'feel for the game' and its forthcoming 
immediacies. In his words, 'we learn bodily' (2000a: 141) - with the body acting 
as a kind of 'living memory pad' and 'automaton' that 'leads the mind 
unconsciously along with it' (1990a: 68) - through 'practice rather than discourse' 
34 (1977: 87; cf. Wacquant, 2004b). Much of this learning takes place in childhood, 
where 'familial manifestations of necessity' - 'forms of the division of labour 
between the sexes', 'household objects', 'modes of consumption', 'parent-child 
relations', 'domestic morality' and the like (Bourdieu, 1990a: 54; 1977: 78) - feed 
into the habitus via 'silent censures' (2000a: 167) and implicit and explicit 
pedagogy, often inculcating their effects through the experience of corporeal 
suffering and visceral emotion (2000a: 141), as well as through subconscious forms 
of mimesis and "sheer familiarization, in which the learner insensibly and 
unconsciously acquires the principles of an 'art' and an art of living... " (1990a: 74). 
For example, in households rich in cultural capital, the 'bourgeois culture and the 
bourgeois relation to culture' are acquired 
pre-verbally, by early immersion in a world of cultivated people, practices and objects. 
When a child grows up in a household in which music is not only listened to (on hi-fi or 
radio nowadays) but also performed (the 'musical mother' of bourgeois autobiography), 
and a fortiori when the child is introduced from an early age to a 'noble' instrument - 
especially the piano - the effect is at least to produce a more familiar relationship to music, 
which differs from the always somewhat distant, contemplative and verbose relation of 
those who have come to music through concerts or even only through records, in much the 
same way as the relation to painting of those who have discovered it belatedly, in the 
quasi-scholastic atmosphere of the museum, differs from the relation developed by those 
born into a world filled with art objects, familiar family property, amassed by successive 
generations, testifying to their wealth and good taste, and sometimes 'home-made' (like 
jam or embroidered linen). (Bourdieu, 1984: 75; see also Bourdieu, Darbel and Schnapper, 
1991: chap. 4; Bourdieu, 1993a: chap. 13). 
However, because the habitus is an 'open system of dispositions' constantly subject 
to new experiences well beyond infancy it is 'endlessly transformed' through a 
34 Originally Bourdieu inserted the caveat that learning took place through practice rather than 
discourse only where education had not been institutional Ised, but since then, particularly in 
Pascalian Meditations and Wacquant's Body and Soul, the proposition seems to have been 
generalised. 
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dialectic with its environment (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 133; Bourdieu, 
1990b: 116; cf, 2000a; 161). On the other hand, agents are statistically bound to 
encounter similar, reinforcing situations as a result of their objective social 
conditions of existence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 133), and because so much 
is instilled in childhood and the habitus operates as the individual's lens through 
which to receive new experiences, it proves to be remarkably durable (Wacquant, 
2005). Thus, for example, the habitus acquired in the family underlies the reception 
of the experiences of schooling, that is, the 'reception and assimilation of the 
pedagogic message', with the habitus as transformed by schooling going on to 
frame all subsequent experiences of culture, work and so on (Bourdieu, 1977: 87). 
On the basis of this process, Bourdieu often describes the habitus as the 
'integration of past experiences' (1977: 83) or the 'active presence of the past' in 
the present (1990a: 56). Yet this does not imply a role for consciousness in the 
form of memory, for the body 
does not represent what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it enacts the past, 
bringing it back to life. What is 'learned by body' is not something that one has, like 
knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one is (Bourdieu, 1990a: 73). 
It should be clear by now that the habitus is not an apparatus of the 
conscious, but instead functions "below the level of consciousness and language, 
beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny or control by the will" (Bourdieu, 1984: 
466). The 'unchosen principle of all choices' (Bourdieu, 1990a: 61), it orients 
action and practices based not on consciousness or intentional aims but on the 
dispositions and inclinations built out of a practical, pre-reflective, corporeal sense 
of limits and realistic possibilities, leading agents, as captured in the phrase 'that's 
not for the likes of us', to refuse what they are refused in reality anyway (Bourdieu, 
1977: 77). Bourdieu is, however, keen to stress that the habitus is not a mechanistic 
translation of objective structures into action, but a generative and creative 
capacity for thought and action within limits (e. g. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
122). More particularly, he claims, the habitus is predisposed to generate 
unconscious 'lines of action' or strategies aimed at maximising the agents' profits, 
whether they be economic or, more importantly, symbolic (Bourdieu, 2000a: 55; 
1990a: 16; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 25). In practice this means that agents 
endeavour, without the intervention of consciousness, to improve or at least 
maintain their position in social space intra- and inter- generational ly through 
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investing and converting their capital in a multitude of ways (Bourdieu, 1984: 
125ff, cf. 1996a: 272ff), though in fact optimising strategies are diffused through 
all spheres of life - 'fields', in Bourdieu's terminology - including those, such as 
the academic or literary field, supposedly governed by disinterestedness (see 
Bourdieu, 1998b: chap. 4). 
Symbolic Space 
The next component of Bourdieu's theory of class is the notion that the 
practices and consumption tastes generated by the different habitus map into a 
relational space of their own - the 'space of lifestyles' or 'symbolic space' - 
homologous to the social space. Put another way, corresponding to the different 
sections of social space are different practices, goods and activities which, because 
of their homologous distribution, function as signifiers of one's position. For 
example, golf is plotted in the section of symbolic space which, if laid over the top 
of the social space, corresponds with the section occupied by industrialists and 
commercial employers, whilst football is plotted low down in the position 
homologous with that of manual workers. 35 More generally, practices and goods 
based on the dominant's taste for form, manner and distinction cluster in the upper 
regions of social space, bisected according to whether it takes the lavish form of 
those with predominantly economic capital (luxury cars, boats, expensive holidays) 
or the ascetic form of those with primarily cultural capital (reading, museums, 
classical music) (Bourdieu, 1984: 283ff), whilst the practices and goods associated 
with the dominated class's 'choice of the necessary' gather at the lower end. 
Between these two extremes the petite bourgeoisie display a lifestyle that betrays 
both their aspiration to the dominant style of life and their insufficient means and 
dispositions to appreciate it properly (e. g. listening to popularised opera). 
This homology between the social space and the symbolic space yields 
within agents a practical 'class sense' (Bourdieu, 1990a: 140), that is, a relational 
sense of difference and similarity, of antipathy and sympathy, of 'one's place' and 
the place of others, and ultimately of distance and proximity in social space, based 
35 The position of each practice was worked out by Bourdieu through the statistical technique of 
correspondence analysis. This means that whilst, for example, football may also be a pastime of 
those in different section of social space, it is statistically most closely associated with manual 
workers. For a useful introduction to correspondence analysis see Phillips (1995). 
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on the 'reading' of the signifiers of symbolic space borne and performed by bodies 
(Bourdieu, 1984: 241-4,467-7; 1987: 5; 1990b: 113-4; 1991a: 235; 1998b: 8-9; 
2000a: 184; cf. Goffman, 195 1). Two consequences follow from this. First of all, 
far from interaction being the source of all meaning, as the symbolic interactionists 
have it, the source of meaning of all interaction lies in the objective system of 
36 differences and similarities undergirding it (Bourdieu, 1990b: 127-8). That is to 
say, the way in which agents behave and act towards one another - for example, 
being distant, aloof and standoffish, consciously monitoring and correcting one's 
behaviour in the presence of someone higher in social space, avoidance, 
friendliness or condescension (in the sense of strategies aimed at denying the social 
distance) - as well as who they are likely to interact and form relationships with, is 
structured by their 'practical intuition' of the homologies of the spaces (Bourdieu, 
1987: 11; see also 1984: 472; 2000a: 184). Secondly, the agent's position in the 
spaces, its relation to - or rather its difference from - other positions and the 
agents' vision of their position, coupled with the specific effect of trajectory 
(Bourdieu, 1984: 111), furnishes them with their social identity (Bourdieu, 1991 a: 
234). 
Ultimately, argues Bourdieu (1984: 175), the differences in symbolic space 
are organised around 'structures of opposition' homologous to the oppositions of 
the social space. The central opposition is between the rare or 'distinguished' 
practices of the dominant and the common and 'vulgar' practices of the dominated, 
which maps onto the central opposition in social space between those distant from 
necessity and those in proximity to it. This means that each practice and disposition 
in symbolic space, like the positions in social space, derives its meaning only from 
its relations to others -a practice can only be rare in opposition to the common - 
and that, therefore, the lifestyle of the dominated serves as a kind of 'negative foil' 
against which the dominant can define themselves (Bourdieu, 1984: 57). In contrast, 
the dominated for the most part perceive the bourgeois lifestyle as a positive 
reference point, that is, as legitimate. This is the principle of what Bourdieu (1998b: 
9) refers to as 'symbolic violence': "dominated lifestyles are almost always 
perceived,, even by those who live them, from the destructive and reductive point of 
36 Likewise, far from differential association being the principle basis for identifying classes. as the 
Cambridge School hold, the principle basis of differential association is the objective space of 
differences. 
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view of the dominant aesthetic". Of course, it should be added that the practices are 
not intrinsically distinguished or vulgar, and thus legitimate or not, but are only so 
when perceived through the principles of division - the ways of dividing up the 
social world in perception manifest most simply in binary classifications (high/low. 
fine/coarse, unique/common, strong/weak, etc. ) - instilled into all agents' habitus 
as ýcommon sense), primarily through schooling, though with the particular spin 
given by the conditionings of the agent's conditions of existence (see Bourdieu, 
1984: 466-84 and Appendix 4; 1990a: 139-40; 2000a: 172f). These principles of 
division are subject to perennial contestation and struggle (the 'symbolic struggle') 
at both the level of the individual (strategies of self-presentation and manipulation 
of one's self-image, but also insults) and the level of collectives (the naming and 
bringing into existence of groups - see below) (Bourdieu, 1990b: 134; 1991a: 239), 
but because the dominant have more resources, and thus monopoly over the 
education system, they have more power ('symbolic power') to impose their 
definition as the legitimate one (Bourdieu, 1990a: 139). 
Class Making 
So far, then, we have documented the existence of what Bourdieu calls 
'theoretical classes', 'logical classes' or 'classes on paper', that is, classes of agents 
clustered in the social and symbolic spaces on the basis of similar conditions of 
existence, habitus and lifestyle practices. What has not been revealed, however, is 
the existence of 'real', practically mobilisable social groups or classes with 
predefined boundaries, definite criteria of membership or a 'unity of 
consciousness' or interests (Bourdieu, 1987: 7). In fact, such groups and their 
boundaries, including those posited by Marx, Wright, Goldthorpe and other class 
theorists, never exist ready made in reality - such an idea is an essentialist or 
substantialist one - but are instead symbolic and discursive constructions 
constituted in history through the symbolic and political struggles over the 
legitimate principle of vision and division of social space. In other words, the ideas 
and labels of 'middle class' and 'working class', 'bourgeoisie' and 'proletariat' are 
nothing more than representations of the divisions and differences of social space, 
building upon and raising to the discursive level the practical sense of difference 
and similarity, which, through specific political processes, have come to mobilise 
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individuals in social space and feed into their social identity and sense of belonging. 
The act of naming a class or group is the crucial first step in fostering the belief in 
its existence, followed by the establishment of organisations, symbols and 
representatives delegated the task of speaking for and about it, though of course 
which constructions gain credence depends not only on its concordance with the 
realties of social space but on the symbolic power of the constructor (Bourdieu, 
1987: 8-9; 1991a: 239-51). Once in circulation, representations of social space can 
have real effects on the distributions within it, especially when they are recognised 
by the state in law, through, for example, various processes of exclusion and the 
credential i sation of occupations. 
37 
Representations are firmly anchored in the social space and the differences 
it yields and do not, therefore, 'take place in a social void' or come ex nihilo 
(Bourdieu, 1998b: 12). Bourdieu's position is thus not one of relativist nominalism. 
Instead he follows a programme of what Wacquant (1989: 173) calls 'constructivist 
realism' that, first observing Durkheim's (1982) rationalist directive to push aside 
agents' subjective constructions and 'prenotions' and identify the existence of real 
structures independent of human thought that shape action and form a base for 
representations - the social space - then recognises the fact that this reality is 
perceived and constructed by agents, that the objective structures do not 'uniquely 
determine what social collectives emerge out of it and in what form' (Wacquant, 
1991: 60), and that these constructions contribute to 'producing the facticity of the 
objective world' (Wacquant, 1989: 173; see further Bourdieu, Chamboredon and 
Passeron, 1991). In other words, the social world is both 'real' in the sense of 
existing independent of our perception of it and 'constructed' in the sense that "its 
mechanisms function only as they are perceived and appreciated by agents through 
37 For concrete studies of this 'class making' process see Boltanski's (1984,1987) work on the 
construction of 'cadres' as a class in France and Wacquant's (1991) discussion of Jurgen Kocka's 
analysis of the rise of the German Angestellten. Thompson's The Making of the English Working 
Class (1980) can also, mutatis mutandis, be read as an account of the constitution of the 'working 
class' as a symbolic class, and, in fact, many studies examining the varying linguistic and social 
constructions of class as means of making sense of the social order in perception, its rhetorical uses 
in determinate historical contexts and its shifting representation in media and political discourse can 
be assimilated to Bourdieu's perspective (e. g. Furnbank, 1985; Marwick, 1990; Joyce, 1991; 
Cannadine, 1998), provided that the objective underpinnings furnished by social space are factored 
in as a corrective to the occasional lapses into subjectivism. For an application of Bourdieu-inspired 
approaches to the making of ethno-racial groups see Wacquant (1997) and Brubaker (2002). It 
should also be noted that it is only because they ignore Bourdieu's analysis of class making that 
Lamont (1992) and Sayer (2005) can accuse him of ignoring the role of national discourses or 
grepertoires' in the experience of class. 
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schemes that are socially produced within, and homologous to, objective 
structures" (Wacquant, 1989: 174). 
Proximity in social space by no means 'automatically engenders unity' 
(1998b: 11), guarantees symbolic and discursive articulation or gives rise to 
mobilised groups - as Wacquant (1991: 57) puts it, classes at the symbolic level are 
'largely underdetermined at the structural level'. Part of the reason for this is the 
fact that the "the relative indeten-ninacy of the reality which offers itself to 
perception", the "plurality of principles of vision and division available at any given 
moment" as a result of past and present symbolic struggles and the specific twist 
given by the individual's position in social space as they produce their classifications 
of the social world to meet the exigencies and experiences of their daily lives 
(Bourdieu, 1987: 10-11) mean that the divisions of social space can, according to 
Bourdieu, be perceived, constructed, represented and acted upon by agents in different 
ways - including in terms of ethnicity, nationality, religion, occupation, community 
and even in terms of the explicit absence of social classes. Nevertheless, it is 
harder to draw together and mobilise as a practical group agents distant in social 
space, and when this is done on the grounds of, for example, nationalism, ethnicity 
or gender there are social and cultural fissures liable to result in fractures (Bourdieu, 
199 1 a: 232-3; 1998b: 11; cf. 2001: 93). 
The separation of theoretical classes from symbolic classes is one of the 
most refreshing aspects of Bourdieu's perspective and, as Weininger (2005: 116-7) 
notes, leaves him adequately equipped to recognise processes usually associated 
with the demise of class - pitching them at the level of symbolic and discursive 
construction - whilst continuing to uphold the significance and analytical value of 
theoretical classes. Thus the decline of traditional working-class identities and 
solidarities, the fragmentation of their communal heartlands and the demise of 
socialist politics are all documented at length in the interviews of The Weight of the 
World (Bourdieu et al., 1999), as well as in Charlesworth's (2000) broadly 
Bourdieusian study of de-industrialised Rotherham, without implying that the 
distributions and clusterings of social space, the similar conditions of existence and 
lifestyle practices or the practical sense of proximity and distance have altered 
significantly. 
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Some Defences and Developments 
Like most influential theoretical positions, Bourdieu's has attracted 
sustained critical attention over the years. Much of this has, unfortunately, been 
polemical in nature or fallen victim to Bourdieu's greatest bugbears - 
misunderstanding, misreading and decontextualisation (see e. g. Bourdieu, 1993b, 
1997bý 1999). Others, however, whilst still failing to hit their target head on, have 
succeeded in spotlighting areas in which his perspective could indeed benefit from 
further attention. Taken together, both forms of appraisal spawn not only a need to 
defend the overall position outlined above by delving further into the depths of 
Bourdieu's thought and clearing up misunderstandings, but also a requirement to 
heed Wacquant's exhortation that if we are to think with Bourdieu then we must 
think beyond or even against him on some issues (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
xiv), the latter endeavour being achieved, I want to argue, by exploiting the links 
38 and converges between Bourdieu's theory and phenomenology. The breadth of 
criticism, of course, matches the breadth of Bourdieu's influence, and so the areas 
explored in the following are only those that have direct bearing on the substantive 
topic of interest here - class and its impact on action and thought via the habitus - 
and the method of research to be undertaken - qualitative interviews possessing a 
biographical dimension. Thus, far from being concerned with the scholastic search 
for an 'integrated paradigm' (Ritzer, 1980: 231-63) implied in many contributions 
to abstract debates over the dualisms of social theory, the themes pursued and 
developments suggested remain tied to the real problems of social inquiry. 
Individuation: the Structured Lifeworld 
The first criticism to be scrutinised relates to what Lau (2004: 373) 
describes as a 'well-known' problem in Bourdieu's theory and is forwarded most 
rigorously by social psychologist Bernard Lahire (2003), a foremost critic of 
Bourdieu in France attempting to found a 'sociology at the level of the individual' 
(see also Cicourel, 1993; Reay, 2004; Silva, 2006). This is the treatment of 
individuation, that is, of the multitude of differences between individuals, within 
38 On the relationship between Bourdieu and the various versions of phenomenology see Ostrow 
(1981), Dreyfus and Rabinow (1993), Charlesworth (2000), Crossley (2001), Marcoulatos (2001), 
Robbins (2002), Throop and Murphy (2002), Lau (2004), Myles (2004) and Endress (2005). 
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the general categorisation of relative distance from necessity, that make them - 
their habitus - idiosyncratic. This might seem a strange point to respond to given 
that the focus here is class and, therefore, generality. Yet Lahire's point clearly has 
ramifications for qualitative studies of class which, equipped with Bourdieu's 
conceptual tools, seek to dissect individual lives and lay bare the multitudinous 
social forces refracted through concrete events, persons and places that have and 
continue to fashion them whilst being able to handle conceptually the individuality 
of their circumstances and habitus that may in extreme cases, such as the capital- 
poor individual with a love for fine art, engender 'dissonance' from established 
homologies between social and symbolic space (see Silva, 2006; Bennett,, 2007). 
The thrust of Lahire's criticism is that Bourdieu's notion of the habitus and 
its constitutive dispositions built out of distance from necessity, whilst offering 
promise, capitalise on the supposed homogeneity of habitus between individuals in 
sectors of social space and, as a result, are unable to adequately handle the 
heterogeneity and subtlety of human lives revealed in studies conducted at the level 
of concrete individuals (cf. Cicourel, 1993). The best he can muster, argues Lahire, 
is a reduction of the individual habitus to the collection of positions occupied in 
different fields - an approach applied in his study of Heidegger, where that 
thinker's habitus is designated a product of his positions in social space, the 
academic field and the field of philosophy (Bourdieu, 1991b: 47; cf Bourdieu, 
1975, cited in Lahire, 2003: 334-5). This is all very well, Lahire (2003: 335) 
comments, but it just cannot grasp the impact on Heidegger's habitus and 
dispositions, and thus actions, of a whole array of social factors such as the 
different schools he attended, his family, his friendships, his political contacts and 
so on - and for the less celebrated members of society, one might conjecture, their 
work, their neighbourhood, particular social and personal events and the like. 
All this demonstrates a rather simplistic understanding of Bourdieu on 
individuation. For one thing, the focus on membership in different fields - which 
Bourdieu (2000b: 302) dubs an individual's 'social surface' - allows a greater 
grasp of the factors shaping individuals, such as their specific workplace or their 
particular schooling, than Lahire makes out. After all, in one of his later studies 
Bourdieu (2005: 69ff) suggested that firms, at least those with a large workforce, 
can themselves be fields generating different positions and thus experiences for 
their employees, putting flesh on his earlier assertion that sociologists must account 
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for 'occupational effects' on agents' habitus, that is, 'the effects of the nature of 
work, of the occupational milieu, with its cultural and organizational specificitiesý 
(Bourdieu, 1987: 4). Similarly in the case of schooling, in the methodological 
addendum to The Weight of the World -a study very much concerned with 
concrete individuals - Bourdieu stresses that to "grasp the essential of each 
[person's] idiosyncrasy and all the singular complexity of [their] actions and 
reactions" sociologists must uncover the objective structures past and present 
expressed in the actual academic establishments through which they traverse and 
which are themselves organised with other academic institutions in a relational 
field (Bourdieu et al., 1999: 618). 
Furthermore, the 'social surface' is only one aspect of Bourdieu's approach. 
Elsewhere, whilst rightly stressing the homogeneity of habitus between individuals 
in the same region of social space, he also writes that 
The singular habitus of members of the same class are united in a relationship of homology, 
that is, of diversity within homogeneity reflecting the diversity within homogeneity 
characteristic of their social conditions of production. Each individual system of dispositions is a structural variant of the others, expressing the singularity of its position 
within the class and its trajectory. 'Personal style', the particular stamp marking all the 
products of the same habitus, whether practices or works, is never more than a deviation in 
relation to the style of a period or class... 
He continues: "The principle of the differences between individual habitus lies in 
the singularity of their social trajectories, to which there correspond series of 
chronologically ordered determinations that are irreducible to one another. " No two 
members of the same class will have had 'the same experiences in the same order', 
he argues, but "it is certain that each member of the same class is more likely than 
any member of another class to have been confronted with the situations most 
frequent for members of that class", and so whilst the habitus brings about a 
4unique integration' of experience it remains an integration of "the experiences 
statistically common to members of the same class" (Bourdieu, 1990a: 60). 
However, probing into Bourdieu's perspective on individuation to counter 
Lahire's superficial reading reveals that the former's thought on this issue is not 
39 
entirely unproblematic or fully developed for detailed qualitative research. On the 
one hand there is a sense in which the idea of the social surface yields aftagmented 
depiction of the agent, with individuals being abstracted from the total experiential 
39 Bourdieu's most qualitative study (excluding his early ethnography in Algeria), The Weight of the 
World, is actually relatively light on theoretical explication and thus skirts the issues explored here. 
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context of their lives as they live them in concrete time and space to trace the 
effects of each field without then recombining these multiple field effects to grasp 
the whole. Indeed, at its most extreme it leads Bourdieu (2000b: 299-300) to imply 
that a single person should be conceived and analysed as multiple social agents, 
unified only by a personal name and biological individuality, as if experiences and 
actions could be neatly compartmentalised. On the other hand, it remains unclear 
how some elements of the individual's experiential and situational milieu which 
clearly imprint upon the dispositions, expectations, sense of what is 'normal' and 
schemes of perception of the habitus (such as their particular locality, certain 
events, consociates and so on), 40 whilst remaining generally configured by material 
and cultural conditions of existence, are graspable with Bourdieu's conceptual tools. 
Take, for instance, Cannadine's (1998: 171-80) suggestive analysis of the 
origins of Margaret Thatcher's incoherent visions of the social world - in 
Bourdieusian parlance, the subjective perceptions of her habitus, including her 
consumerist individualism and (or despite) her acute 'class sense'. Cannadine 
makes much of the experiences of Thatcher's petite-bourgeois upbringing - her 
antipathy towards the aristocracy and the working class on account of being 'in the 
middle' (something Bourdieu would no doubt corroborate), serving in her father's 
shop and seeing people as individual consumers regardless of their occupation - 
but also the experiences granted by the particularities of her home town, Grantham, 
with its lack of heavy industry and traditional working class, its celebration of 
hierarchical relations in civic events and so on. That these experiences fed into 
Thatcher's vision of the world is, so far as Cannadine is concerned, indisputable, 
but just how they would be grasped through the social surface is less certain. 
Bourdieu's account of differential experiences creating diversity within 
homogeneity could perhaps offer a starting point, but remains tied principally to the 
idea of trajectory and is thus of little use in this case. As another example, consider 
the passage from Distinction cited above, in the exposition of conditions of 
existence, on the practical familiarisation with music or art in early life. This 
account, highlighting the structuring of formative experience by possession of 
40 On the impact of the locality cf. Reay and Lucey (2000); on the impact of consociates on the 
habitus see Crossley (2004: 64; cf. 2006). So far as biographical events go, the best we get from 
Bourdieu is a claim that they should be conceived as moves or investments in the social space or 
fields (Bourdieu, 1996b: 258; 2000b: 302) -a claim that applies to the production but not reception 
of events, that is, to events understood as actions undertaken by the individual but not those seen as 
experiences feeding into the habitus as the generative principle of action. 
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cultural capital and the latter's reproduction, is highly persuasive, yet the 
experience and incorporation into the habitus of the specific worlds of art or music 
is not fully accounted for by position in social space (both require the same level of 
economic and cultural capital), participation in fields (what field is the young child 
a member of? ) or trajectory, only its general conditions of possibility. A similar 
example is offered, though in a different conceptual vocabulary, by Margaret 
Archer (2000: 285): though position in social space may indicate a likely 'set of the 
role array' (or a 'field of possibles' in Bourdieu's terminology) for a future career - 
for example, semi-skilled or skilled manual work - only a more differentiated 
account of residual factors such as 'available information, role models and work 
experience' would allow a fuller understanding of precisely 'why Johnny becomes 
a fireman and Tommy a policeman'. 
So, in order to deepen Bourdieu's framework, heighten its powers in 
handling individuation and prepare it for qualitative analysis, I propose to introduce 
and develop the phenomenological notion of the lifieworld, not as employed by 
Habermas, Husserl or even the great many phenomenologists, such as Aron 
Gurwitsch (1970: 50), who equate it with "the cultural world of a certain socio- 
historical group", but as defined specifically by Schutz (1970a: 320, emphasis 
added) as "[t]he total sphere of experiences of an individual which is circumscribed 
by the objects, persons, and events encountered in the pursuit of the pragmatic 
objectives of living". 41 The lifeworld, on this definition, is the agent's practical, 
everyday world consisting of the domains encountered in their routine 'time-space 
paths' (see Giddens, 1984: 110-6,132-9) - their home and family, school or work, 
neighbourhood and so on - and containing a certain type and particular 
manifestation of objects (tools, clothes, furnishings), people (friends, family, work 
41 Schutz also often gives the impression that the lifeworld exists at the collective level, but the 
definition here - in fact that of Helmut Wagner, the editor of the volume in which it appears in the 
glossary - is the single best encapsulation of the more 'individualistic' way in which he and others 
sometimes use the term and which I want to develop it to complement Bourdieu (on the lifeworld as 
'my world' cf. Schutz, 1970b: 134ff). It should also be pointed out that Schutz (and Husserl) 
sometimes operate with an 'idealist' conception of the lifeworld in which it is depicted as 
constituted purely in consciousness at the expense of the material (see Wolff, 1979: 522). The 
definition of the lifeworld used here, however, is taken to designate a reciprocal interweaving of 
consciousness (broadly defined) and experience with 'external', material, spatio-temporal 
conditions. This is also in line with Merleau-Ponty on the lifeworld (or be ing- 1 n-the- world) and 
takes insight from the Lund school of time-geography, Giddens on recurrent time-space paths and, 
of course, Bourdieu, who claimed that the social order exists twice - once in minds as schemes of 
perception (the natural attitude), but also in objective social structures that pattern conditions of 
existence (Bourdieu, 1996a: 1-6). 
83 
colleagues) and events. The agent is born into this world, experiencing it from the 
outset as not only 'already constituted' (Schutz, 1962: 133) but, because of 
recurrent exposure, as what is 'normal', familiar and taken for granted (becoming 
what Bourdieu, following Husserl, calls 'doxa'). There are phenomena that are 
only peripherally part of one's lifeworld. because of their infrequent occurrence and 
there are phenomena that, because they are never or rarely encountered, are not a 
part of the lifeworld at all, yet that which is distant in physical space can, because 
of telecommunications and the media, be brought into the lifeworld in the form of 
'secondary' or 'mediated' experience (Schutz and Luckmanng 1973: 44). 42 
Now importantly the lifeworld - its objects, occupants and so on - is, as the 
quote from Schutz above suggests, both the agent's milieu and conduit of everyday 
experience, and because it is particular to the agent so too is the flow of experience 
that builds into their biography and habitus. However, to avoid getting drawn into 
the predominantly descriptive and anti-genetic enterprise of phenomenology we 
must turn back to Bourdieu and argue that the experiences of the lifeworld are 
structured by, amongst other things'43 one's position in social space, such that 
whilst the actual articulation of experience is unique to the individual it remains 
patterned by the material and cultural conditions of existence associated with their 
relational position. 44 So, two agents close in social space have individual lifeworlds 
insofar as they attended different schools, have different occupations and 
workplaces, live in different neighbourhoods and have different family and friends 
- not just because of their membership of different fields - and thus have 
distinctive experiences, biographies and habitus, but because all these facets of the 
lifeworld are structured to some degree according to material conditions of 
42 Schutz and Luckmann here anticipated Giddens' (199 1) focus on time-space distanciation and his 
own idea of 'mediated experience' in his treatment of globalisation, and can therefore accommodate 
many of the related themes explored by Thompson (1995). 
43 Chiefly, the structural forces at play in the institutions and fields in which the individual is 
positioned and through which they move, but also of course gender and ethnicity. 
44 Compare Bourdieu's (1977: 86) fleeting remarks on both the structuring of the 'physiognomy of 
social environments' by the 'dead ends', 'closed doors' and 'limited prospects' associated with 
particular conditions of existence (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 144 n96) and the 'immersion 
in a world of cultivated people, practices and objects' (Bourdieu, 1984: 75) characteristic of 
bourgeois socialisation, as well as his earlier definitions of conditions of existence as including 
'dwelling place and the daily life associated with it' and 'environment and working conditions' - 
definitions broader than simply distance from necessity and suggestive of the lifeworld (Bourdieu 
and Passeron, 1979: 12; 1990: 259; see also the passage building on a revealing quote from Husserl 
in Bourdieu, 1971: 205), A similar argument to that pursued here, but using Merleau-Ponty rather 
than Schutz, is presented in Bufton's (2003) analysis of the lifeworlds of working-class university 
students. 
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existence they and the experiences and habitus they generate display, to use 
Wittgenstein's (1952) phrase, 'family resemblances', that is to say, they are 
analogous or, as Bourdieu would say, 'homologous'. This can help explain, for 
example, the differences which lead one agent in the cultural section of the 
dominant class to pursue, be at ease with and be knowledgeable of music and 
another art - both agents' past and present lifeworlds involve a cultured upbringing 
and distance from necessity, but one may well be characterised by musicality (e. g. 
a musical parent, instruments and paraphernalia around the home), the other by all 
things artistic (most lifeworlds are, of course, more complex than this and full of 
contradictory elements which then play out in the habitus and patterns of action). 
It should be noted that position in social space designates the material and 
cultural structuring of the lifeworld and typical experiences at any one time, not 
those that have flowed into the agent's habitus hitherto (unless their position has 
remained more or less static over time). So, Bourdieu's focus on trajectory, the 
temporal dimension, is of crucial importance, for it designates the past structuring 
of the lifeworld, and thus the past experiences, that have shaped the individual's 
habitus. The individual can remain in the same point of social space and thus face 
similar, reinforcing experiences over time, though the character of the lifeworld 
and experience inevitably changes in other respects and over time as one gets older, 
or they can move through social space with the accumulation or conversion of 
capital, changing the domains of and thus character of experience in the lifeworld, 
through 'gearing into it' with their own actions (see Schutz, 1970a: 318) or through 
the actions of others, including distant, 'abstract' others. 
The Formation of the Habitus 
The argument so far presupposes another slight modification of Bourdieu's 
perspective, or to be fair a drawing out of what he sometimes implies anyway (e. g. 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 133): rather than say the habitus is a product of 
adaptation to frequently experienced situations only we can state that, more in line 
with Husserl's (1973) use of the term, Merleau-Ponty (1962) on the presence of the 
past in the present and Schutz's concept of the stock of knowledge, the habitus - 
the lens for receiving and interpreting present experience - is in fact a product of 
the agent's past experience in toto, that is, an accumulation and sedimentation of all 
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the experiences and events that the agent has encountered in living out their 
biography (Erfahrung). However, though rare, extraordinary and non-routine 
events, occurrences and actions can often leave a significant and abiding imprint on 
the individual (see Schutz and Luckmann, 1989: 62-3; Wagner, 1973: 72ff), most 
of these experiences take place in the routine domains of their lifeworld and 
therefore reaffirm and solidify already existing sedimentations (Schutz and 
Luckmann, 1973: 124). Furthermore, because the lifeworld and the recurrent 
experiences it provides are, as argued above, shaped by material and cultural 
conditions of existence,, the habitus of those in a sector of social space, whilst 
heterogeneous on account of the heterogeneity of events experienced in their 
unique biographies (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 123), can still be considered in 
Bourdieusian fashion as homogeneous and amenable to being grouped into a 
theoretical class. As Schutz and Luckmann (1989: 115-6) put it: 
[There are] contemporaries whom I do not know personally at all, but who can be assumed 
to have had in their life experiences that were the same or similar to mine. They speak the 
same language, they grew up with parents whose attitudes were stamped in a similar 
way ... as my parents' attitudes, they went to the same sorts of schools, they practice 
professions with which I am familiar... [But there are also] contemporaries who speak a 
different language from mine, who went to completely different schools or to no schools at 
all, who heard different fairy tales or read different books, whose life was shaped by 
different local events ... whose parents belong to a different social stratum [or sector of 
social space] from mine... 
This obviously begs the question of how exactly these experiences are 
translated into the dispositions and interpretive schemes of the habitus. A complex 
issue for sure, and one that Bourdieu has done much to answer convincingly. 
However, whilst sedimentation and disposition formation do indeed take place 
throujzh many of the 'Practical' processes he identifies - the 'sheer familiarisation' 
with the objects, events and likelihoods of the lifeworld through recurrent 
experience which builds into the agent's sense of what is 'normal' and 'reasonable', 
a pre-symbolic 'imitative acceptance' of observed modes of conduct (Bourdieu's 
'mimesis') (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 270) and so on - critics are right to note 
his tendency to understate the extent to which some learning can involve or indeed 
require varying levels of conscious participation - from phenomena simply 
becoming themes to consciousness, however transient, fuzzy and ill-formed, 
through to some form of understanding (Sayer, 2005: 28). Not only is this slightly 
contradictory - pedagogy and inculcation, both acknowledged by Bourdieu as key 
methods in forming the habitus, presuppose conscious or cognitive internalisation 
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(Lau, 2004: 374) - but, as Sayer (2005: 26-7) and Schutz and Luckmann (1973: 
106; 1989: 28) before him point out, even the most 'bodily' or 'practical' of 
knowledge from dancing and boxing to swimming and walking were once 
problematic and, to some extent, consciously thernatised. 
Bourdieu is, however, absolutely right to emphasise the disproportionate 
weight of childhood experiences in the formation of the habitus, though his account 
needs respecifying, albeit sketchily, in light of the argument so far. The child, we 
can say, is born into a lifeworld shaped by the social, economic and cultural capital 
of its parents or guardians and surrounded from the start by certain objects (piano, 
artworks, sports cars), events (museum visits or football matches, including on 
television) and people (associates of the guardians, but also others such as home 
music teachers or social workers) with which, as Bourdieu argues in the passage 
quoted earlier, it becomes familiar as 'normal' and unquestionable (though not 
necessarily comfortable and liked) through recurrent experience. Alongside this 
familiarisation the socialisation provided by the guardians in the lifeworld is 
obviously crucial and, once again, though articulated uniquely dependent on their 
unique habitus, structured by the amount of capital they hold. Thus the implicit and 
explicit pedagogy of what is 'for us' and what is not ('we can't afford it'), but also 
the broader differences in socialisation documented by a number of researchers 
between the use of reason, elaboration and extra-curricular activities by parents 
with high cultural and economic capital, thereby reproducing in the child embodied 
cultural capital, and the more authoritarian and autonomy-granting, but low capital- 
yielding, approach of those with less (Bernstein, 1971; Walkerdine and Lucy, 1989; 
Lawler, 2000; Lareau, 2003; cf. Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990, on the inculcation of 
'symbolic' and 'practical mastery'). This socialisation lays the ground for and runs 
tandem with the child's experience of institutionalised education which then, as 
discussed above, underlies all subsequent experiences and action. Here, masses of 
knowledge and the dominant constructions of the world (the 'pedagogic message') 
are run through the filter of the extant habitus and the sense of difference and 
similarity is developed, whilst all the while the processes described by Bourdieu 
and other sociologists of education through which capital begets capital take place. 
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'Mundane Consciousness' and Habitus as Stock of Knowledge 
So much for the formation of the habitus. But what about the concept itselP 
As one of the central columns in Bourdieu's theoretical edifice the habitus has been 
subject to a multitude of criticisms from all sides of the sociological spectrum, 
from structuralists such as Levi-Strauss condemning it as a vehicle for a 
'spontaneist' philosophy of action (see Bourdieu, 1990b: 10,61-2) to Jeffrey 
Alexander's (1995: 136) infamous description of the term as a 'Trojan horse for 
determinism'. The specific issue to be addressed here,, however, is one raised by 
Alexander (1995: 143 ff) and noted by an increasing number of other commentators 
(e. g. Margolis, 1999; Crossley, 2001; Jenkins, 2002; Lau, 2004; Reay, 2004; Sayer, 
2005): the extent to which Bourdieu claims that action based on the habitus, 
including strategic action, is 'bodily' and undertaken without consciousness or 
intention. In Alexander's (1995: 144) terms, Bourdieu practices a crude 
'sociologized biologism' which "allows him to ignore the complexities and 
subjectivities that the category 'self implies", 'eliminates the significance of 
motive' (139), expunges reflexivity and intentionality from social life (146) and, 
ultimately, as McLennan (1998: 84) summarises it, eradicates any sense of a 
45 'thinking, feeling self. Similarly, Jenkins (2002: 93), another scathing, though 
slightly more sympathetic critic of Bourdieu, claims that the focus on the primacy 
of the corporeal effectively reduces conscious activity to "an epiphenomenon, 
almost an effect, of the body", whilst Reay (2004: 437) and Sayer (2005: 29) argue 
that Bourdieu is in danger of denying the 'life of the mind' in others. Other critics 
(e. g. Crossley, 2001) recognise that Bourdieu does not deny that there is conscious 
or ýrational' action, but decry the fact that he generally sees it as an exception, 
separate from the habitus and surfacing only in times of crisis such as when the 
habitus fails to fit with a situation (see, for example, Bourdieu, 1990b: 108; 2000a: 
64). 
Bourdieu supplies plenty of ammunition for this kind of criticism: his 
descriptions of the habitus do underscore the bodily dimension, especially in later 
works such as Pascalian Meditations, and can give the impression that talk of 
intentions or consciousness should be banished from sociology altogether. Thus we 
45 Though they do not meet head-on the exact issue discussed here, see McLennan (1998), Potter 
(2000), Crossley (2001) and especially Wacquant (2001) for effective responses to Alexander that 
reveal his attack to be based on gross misreadings, misunderstanding and polemical rather than 
intellectual intentions. 
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are told that the habitus grants 'spontaneity without consciousness or will' 
(Bourdieu, 1990a: 56; cf. 2000a: 137) and 'intentionless improvisation' (1977: 79), 
with the underlying practical sense being nothing other than social necessity 
'converted into motor schemes and bodily automatisms' (1990a: 69) which 'lead 
the mind unconsciously along with [them]' (1990a: 68). '[S]tates of the body', he 
puts it elsewhere, give rise to 'states of mind' by 'awaken[ing] ready-made feelings 
and experiences' or 'recall[ing] associated thoughts and feelings' (1984: 474; 
1990a: 69). Even the schemes of perception or 4cognitive structures' are 
'dispositions of the body' rather than 'forms of consciousness' (2000a: 176). 
Furthermore, he argues, action takes place 'without a conscious aiming at ends' 
(1977: 72) and is guided not by projects and plans, that is, the future, but by the 
past as embodied in dispositions (1977: 72) or, if anything, by the protentive sense 
of the upcoming immediacies furnished by the 'feel for the game' (1990b: 12; 
2000a: chap. 6; 2005: 214). As such, 'thought objects', reasons and motives should 
never be treated as the 'determining causes of Practices' (1977: 21). At its most 
extreme there are, as Crossley (2001: 115) and Farnell (2000: 403) have noted, 
moments in Bourdieu's writing when the agent disappears from the formulation of 
action altogether and is effectively replaced by the habitus, with the latter, as in 
Freud's depiction of the id, ego and superego, being falsely attributed capacities 
(action, comprehension) only agents possess (cf. Giddens, 1984: 42). For example, 
adopting the anti-humanist idiom of structural Marxism, agents are said to be 
'supports' of the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977: 85) 'possessed by [it] more than they 
possess it' as it 'acts within them' to organise action (1977: 18), whilst it is the 
habitus rather than the subject that comprehends the similarities and differences of 
social space (2000a: 130) and possesses a margin of freedom (2005: 13 1). 
The result of all this, it seems, is a model of action grossly at odds with the 
realities of the social world, especially the kind revealed in qualitative research, 
including that constituting the bulk of The Weight of the World (1999: esp. 5 80-89), 
where agents appear as thinking, intending, deliberating beings. Conscious and 
intentional (including, though not necessarily, 'rational') action, deliberation and 
even some form of reflexivity, Bourdieu's critics argue (e. g. Mouzelis, 1995: 112; 
Crossley, 2001: 117,140-60; Jenkins, 2002: 97; Sayer, 2005: 27-30; Archer, 2007: 
41-4; Elder-Vass, 2007), are simply much more of a routine feature of the human 
condition than he admits. However, these points often 
(though not always) miss the 
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point that Bourdieu, borrowing a phrase from Mao Tse-tung, is usually 'twisting 
the stick in the opposite direction', that is, playing up his propositions in reaction to 
academic orthodoxy. In fact, buried underneath the kind of assertions documented 
above is a much more subtle concept than that typically described by critics, one in 
which conscious intentions and 'rational' action, despite Bourdieu's usual 
disclaimers, are not antithetical to it at all, but rather issue ftom it. Thus his 
contention that agents' 'wills and intentions' depend on their positions in social 
space (Bourdieu, 1981: 308), his claim that the propensity to be 'rational' depends 
on ones habitus and particular conditions of existence (1990a: 64; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 124; cf. Bourdieu, 1979,2000c, 2005), his assertion that the 
habitus informs 'all thought and action (including thought of action)' (1977: 18, 
emphasis added) and Wacquant's (2005b: 3) description of the habitus as 
ýcognitive and conative [a term usually associated with will and volition] schemata 
that inform ... thoughts, feelings and conduct'. Indeed, Bourdieu's stress on the 
4generative' capacities of the habitus should be read as a claim that the schemes of 
perception and dispositions of the habitus generate, alongside more automatic 
modes of conduct, intentional actions, with his refutation of 'conscious' or 
4rational' action simply being a dismissal of the idea that agents - e. g. the working- 
class adolescent leaving school (perhaps one of the 'lads' in Willis, 1977) - fully 
consider and weigh up all options (work, college, university etc. ) in formulating 
their intentions rather than a rejection of intentional action altogether (the working- 
class adolescent still thinks about and intends to get a job) (cf, Bourdieu, 2000a: 
137-8). Perhaps to make this clearer and to separate it from scholastic visions of 
voluntaristic agents formulating action ex nihilo, the latter should be called, 
adapting a phrase from Sayer (2005: 29), 'mundane consciousness'. 46 
But mundane or not, so long as conscious activity and intentional action are 
based on the habitus do they not remain epiphenomena of the body? Not, I want to 
argue, if we depart slightly from Bourdieu's strict definition and interpret the 
habitus as being akin to what Schutz calls the 'subjective stock of knowledge' and 
its framing 'attitudes'. A number of convergences exist between the two theorists , 
concepts: for example, like the habitus the stock of knowledge and attitudes, 
46 1 use the term consciousness and avoid Sayer's own idea of 'mundane reflexivity' in order to 
better separate it from the reflexivity of the well-trained social scientist according to Bourdieu and 
of the self-oriented agent in Beck and Giddens' work. I also have my doubts over Archer's (2003. 
2007) characterisation of the 'internal conversation', the concept on which it is based. 
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according to Schutz, serve as the agent's 'scheme of interpretation' for making 
sense of the world and experience (Bourdieu's 'schemes of perception') (Schutz, 
1964: 283; cf. 1972: 84), and both are products of sedimentations of multiple past 
experiences - practical and more consciously thernatised - anchored in manifold 
situations and encounters which, as should be established by now, are shaped by 
the material and cultural conditions of existence characterising the agent's 
lifeworld. However, what Schutz makes explicit is that the stock of knowledge is 
multilayered, that is, inclusive of many different interpenetrating levels, from the 
more cognitive or declarative forms of knowledge gleaned from past experiences 
and 'at hand' from situation to situation in different degrees of clarity and 
coherence (which Bourdieu seems to downplay or see as separate from the habitus), 
through routinised modes of knowledge, conduct and skills (or 'know how' - Ryle, 
1949) down to the most basic, habitual and bodily forms of knowledge so ingrained 
into agents that they no longer appear as elements of knowledge at all but are 
instead 'on hand' in all instances, that is, automatically implicated in situations and 
acts without the need to direct attention at them (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 
105-1 1). 47 As Bourdieu would say, the latter are less something we have than that 
we are. This is even more the case for what Schutz calls 'attitudes', that is, the 
complex of 'inclinations to act' and propensities to 'steer toward certain goals and 
modes of conduct' (i. e. dispositions) combining skills, habitual knowledge and 
'frames of mind' which articulate the stock of knowledge and underlie expectations 
and verbalisable forms of knowledge without themselves (usually) being 
reflectively grasped (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 215-23; 1989: 20-1). 
Importantly, for Schutz the different levels of the stock of knowledge and 
the attitudes which frame it combine to give rise to a variety of forms of action, 
from consciously deliberated projects and long-term plans through habitual or 
routinised modes of conduct which 'unreel almost without the actor's participation 
47 In fact, in one of his earliest books, before he appropriated the term habitus and began to 
emphasise the corporeal, Bourdieu did explicitly argue that agents derive from their conditions of 
existence many different levels of knowledge: habits, skills, attitudes, cognitive knowledge, know- 
how, tastes and manners (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979: 17). Schutz's conception of the 
multilayered stock of knowledge can be seen to cover the different forms of knowledge variously 
named by others, such as discursive and practical consciousness for Giddens, though he downplays 
the bodily dimension too much and, as demonstrated in the last chapter, lacks an adequate 
conceptual i sation of how these layers of consciousness mediate between formative experiences and 
action; or 'knowledge that' and 'knowledge how' 
for Ryle, Dewey and James, though the formative 
role of differentiated experience is better captured 
by Schutz and phenomenology. 
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and conscious planning' at all, the goals of which enter consciousness 'at most just 
briefly' (Schutz and Luckmann, 1989: 39,27), right down to the 'completely 
autonomized' elements of action which Bourdieu puts under the label of hexis - 
ways of walking, standing and so on (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 108). 
Furthermore, more conscious or intentional action is seen as having two faces: one 
in which it is motivated by the future, by the actor's conscious projects or goals of 
varying time-scales and clarity which they can supply reasons or rationalisations 
for,, that is, in which it is constructed 'in order to' do something; and one in which 
it is 'caused' (or 'generated') by the sedimented past experiences constituting the 
stock of knowledge and attitudes or, to use the preferred nomenclature, the habitus, 
that is, in which it is done 'because' of the prior experiences sedimented as 
dispositions, tastes and so on (Schutz, 1962: 69-72; 1964: 11-12; 1972: 86-96; 
1 qf 
. 
48 Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 209-23; 1989: 0 To put it more simply, action 
is often driven by conscious projects, but those projects are themselves based on 
the past experiences of the agent - sometimes particular sedimentations, sometimes 
the totality of sedimentations embodied in dispositions or giving rise to the sense of 
what is 'reasonable' or 'for us' - which are,, of course, materially and culturally 
patterned. This is true even for action that is preceded by deliberation -a 'dramatic 
rehearsal in imagination of various competing possible lines of action', as Dewey 
(1922: 190) defines it - and even so-called 'rational' action: what is rehearsed, 
considered and weighed up, the ends valued and means considered, and the final 
choice or decision, are not separate from the interpretative schemes and 
dispositions of the situated habitus but based on them (cf, Hodkinson and Sparkes, 
1997: 34; Sayer, 2005: 27). The habitus thus remains the unchosen principle of 
choices, as Bourdieu would say, but those choices are infused with intentions and 
mundane consciousness and originate not from the body alone. 
What, in all this, of the vexed notion of strategy, a concept closely tied to 
the habitus? Bourdieu's use of the term seems, as several commentators have noted 
(Alexander, 1995; Swartz, 1997; Crossley, 2001; Jenkins, 2002; Sayer, 2005), 
48 This distinction between 'in-order-to motives' and 'because motives', nowadays paid so little 
attention, rejects the age-old oppositions between reasons and causes of action and between free will 
and determinism. Some confusion is generated by Schutz's use of the term 'motive' though, which 
clashes with the distinction between 'motives' and 'causes' of action in post-Wittgensteinian 
philosophies of action (Bernstein, 1979: 162), 
but if the literal meaning of the term as 'a factor 
inducing a person to act in a particular way' (OED) is employed, this is not, as Richard Bernstein 
wishes to argue, a problem. 
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problematic, excessive and, like rational action theory, tautological insofar as 
practically any action can be reconstructed in retrospect as being a 'move' in an 
'objectively economic' strategy that the agent herself has no idea about (Bourdieu, 
1990b: 90). Yet the idea, notwithstanding Bourdieu's infelicitous use of it at times, 
is more nuanced than usually depicted. This is because strategies are aimed at 
maximising symbolic profit rather than economic profit, status or power per se - 
though these are misperceived as means of achieving symbolic profit - and in the 
end this equates to nothing other than the desire for social valuel dignity, or 
recognition, to feel important and worthy, in whichever walks of life one finds 
oneself in (Bourdieu, 1990b: 196-8; 2000a: 240-5; Wacquant, 1998: 218). It 
would thus be foolhardy to claim that the concept has no theoretical mileage 
whatsoever. On the other hand its universality is still contestable, and so perhaps it 
would be better to argue that agents often possess a deep-seated and not necessarily 
verbalisable, calculative or competitive inclination, instilled via a complex 
combination of childhood socialisation and later experiences, for themselves or 
their offspring to 'do well' or 'better' or to conserve what they have through some 
of the methods described by Bourdieu, even in disinterested spheres of life, but that 
if action can be demonstrated not to be guided by this inclination then it is 
inappropriate to superimpose the language of strategy onto it. The existence and 
character of strategies would thus be more of an empirical question, as would their 
differential distribution amongst agents (cf. Lau, 2004: 378) 
Subjectivity 
As already mentioned, the habitus as interpreted above remains the agent's 
subjective scheme of perception and interpretation giving rise to principles of 
division and representations of difference. However, whilst the bulk of what 
Bourdieu has to say on this facet of the habitus - the existence of 'class sense', the 
discursive and symbolic articulation of difference and construction of class and 
other groups which builds on this, the fact that they are the products of the agent's 
position in social space and so on - is both highly illuminating and convincing, 
laying firm foundations for studying the subjective dimension of class, there is a 
sense in which his account is undeveloped and in need of some padding out, 
particularly in terms of the nature and genesis of the schemes and constructions. 
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Fortunately, Crossley (2001: 130-3), who also notes this deficiency, has already 
persuasively specified a way it can be remedied and further linked to the more 
phenomenological conceptualisation of the habitus forwarded above, though his 
discussion remains largely indicative and in need of connecting to Bourdieu's 
particular theorisations of class. 
Drawing specifically on Husserl's (1977) analysis, but also chiming with 
Schutz's work on the same topic, Crossley suggests that the schemes of perception 
49 of the habitus can be conceived in terms of 'typifications' and 'pairings' . He 
surnmarises these processes as follows: 
Typification entails the formation of habitual perceptual schemas which simplify complex 
perceptual input. In effect the uniqueness and particularity of each new moment of our 
experience is simplified by being subsumed into a general category or 'type'. Thus, even 
when we approach objects which, strictly speaking, we have never encountered before, we 
will see them in terms of the broader type to which they belong. Moreover, newly typed 
objects are 'paired' with objects of the same type which we have experienced in the past, 
and properties and qualities attributed to them accordingly (Crossley, 2001: 132). 
Far from being conscious phenomena, typification and pairing occur automatically 
and 'without our participation', as Husserl (1973: 123) puts it, at the pre-reflexive 
or 'prepredicative' level - the child who encounters and understands scissors for 
the first time will thereafter simply perceive scissors as scissors at first glance 
without any 'explicit reproducing, comparing, [or] inferring' (Husserl, 1977: 111). 
Only when typification is problematic, such as when a perceived object is distant 
and we are struggling to 'make it out', does it move closer to consciousness. 
Furthermore, as should be readily apparent, the typifications and pairings 
comprising the scheme of perception are constituted out of the agent's past 
experiences and overlap greatly with the varying forms of knowledge and know- 
how described above (Crossley, 2001: 132), meaning that they too, like the habitus 
more generally, can be considered structured according to the material and cultural 
conditions characterising the agent's lifeworld. Finally, argues Crossley (2001: 133; 
cf. Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 233-5), language plays a crucial role as the 
objectifying vehicle of typifications and pairings, from furnishing individuals with 
the oppositional adjectives identified by Bourdieu to providing the names and 
descriptions of the most elaborated symbolic construction of class or another 
grouping. 
49 Wacquant also describes the subjective dimension of the habitus as 'definitions of the situation, 
typifications, interpretive procedures' (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 12), but nowhere does 
Bourdieu corroborate this interpretation. 
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With the subjective side of the habitus thus refined we can start to put some 
new flesh on the bones of Bourdieu's framework. First of all, the 'reading' of the 
signs of symbolic space giving rise to 'class sense' can be conceived as a 
prepredicative attribution or recognition of types and pairings. That is to say, the 
practices and goods of symbolic space are associated, paired and typified with 
agents in certain sections of social space homologous with their position, such that 
when a 'sign' of symbolic space is perceived it triggers a prepredicative association 
of the bearer with a certain position in social space relative to the perceiver 
(rendered in terms of occupation, wealth, 'intelligence' and so on) and other 
practices as well as with linguistic descriptors ('posh', 'fancy', 'vulgar') and 
affective states (loathing, discomfort, fear) . 
50 However, the typifications 
constituting the scheme of perception are built out of multifarious experiences, 
often emanating from contradictory sources, and tailored toward practical purposes 
and considerations (such as insults or descriptions) (Bourdieu, 1987: 10). Bourdieu 
(1987: 10) is thus right to assert that they 'are never totally coherent or logical in 
the sense of logic' but instead 'necessarily involve a degree of loose-fitting', 
fuzziness and incoherence. This is even more the case when those perceived are 
either from the middle sections of social space where 'the indeterminacy and the 
fuzziness of the relationship between practices and positions are the greatest' and 
open to manipulation (Bourdieu, 1987: 12), or from a position distant in social 
space, outside of the agent's routine lifeworld, and thus grasped with more 
generalised criteria or by reference to representatives of that sector with which they 
are familiar (including those from the media) (Bourdieu, 1987: 10). 
Moreover, though typifications remain structured by the symbolic space as 
an index of objective statistical associations and the determinate position the 
perceiving agent occupies within it, because the agent's subjective scheme of 
50 The other side to this is that others' expectations of an agent and their actions based upon them, 
such as discriminatory practices, shape the agent's lifeworld and build into their habitus, more 
deeply the more recurrently they are experienced (cf. Jenkins, 1996: 154-70; Crossley, 2001: 
150ff). It should be noted at this point that some practices and objects, such as the Muslim hijab, are 
typified and paired according to ethnicity rather than position in social space, though these 
inevitably appear in combination with other practices, goods and modes of being which do signify 
the latter. Furthermore, some practices and goods - for example 'gangsta rap' music - are typified 
with and thus signify both ethnicity and position in social space at the same time (in this case black 
and dominated). Either way, discrimination based on the reading of ethnic or ethnically-flavoured 
signs (or for that matter skin colour), bound up with the symbolic and discursive construction of the 
ethnic 'group', impacts upon the agent's position in social space and their habitus in the way 
suggested. This applies mutatis mutandis to gender as well. 
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perception is constructed out of the practical exigencies and experiences 
characterising their lifeworld the signs recognised, the specific meaning they are 
given and their linguistic objectification are all particular to them. For this reason 
differences in social space are often grasped at a local level - between concrete 
individuals or, as in Southerton's (2002) study of class identification in Yate, 
between housing areas within a conurbation - or in terms that have had the greatest 
salience in the agent's experience (see Bourdieu, 1987: 10). Having said that, it is 
important to remember, in line with both Bourdieu and Schutz, that many 
linguistically objectified typifications and constructions are, as products of past 
symbolic struggles, appropriated 'ready made' by individuals - from parents during 
socialisation, but more importantly from agencies of symbolic power such as the 
school, the media and political discourse (the latter of which is mediated by the 
media: Bourdieu, 1998c; see also Bourdieu et al., 1999: 620) - and applied to their 
circumstances. One need only think of the contemporary construction of 'chavs', 
ýmetrosexuals' or, a little older now, 'yuppies', all of which are associated with 
certain clothes, goods and practices and figure in everyday discourse, but even the 
labels 'working class', 'bourgeois' and, more popular these days, 'middle England' 
fall within this bracket. 
Individualization Revisited 
Having outlined, defended and developed Bourdieu's position, the issue 
now is its precise consequences for the theories of individualization and reflexivity. 
To what extent can the claims of Beck, Giddens and Bauman now be refuted on 
conceptual grounds? On the other hand, what, if anything, can be salvaged from 
their work and reformulated in Bourdieusian terms as theses to be examined in the 
research? Given their particular visions of social change, each theorist must be re- 
examined in turn if we are to answer these questions effectively. First of all, 
however, it is worth reconsidering separately two themes common to all three 
individualization theorists as well as other detractors of class. 
The first of these is the supposed flexibilisation of work and the 
generalisation of job insecurity across the board. It was noted in the last chapter 
that the purported consequences of this for class should be treated with caution, but, 
in light of the arguments developed above, it should also be pointed out that even if, 
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as Bourdieu (I 998a) himself has claimed, insecurity were now to know no bounds, 
the experience of that insecurity as a part of the agent's lifeworld and how it feeds 
into them would differ according to their habitus, whilst their ability to handle job 
loss or job-shifting would depend on the resources (i. e. the capital) they possess 
and can mobilise to their advantage. In short job insecurity would, in all likelihood, 
remain inflected by class processes. The second issue, already touched on in the 
exposition of Bourdieu's position on 'class making', is the decline of collective 
class identities and the rise of other divisions in their place or the onset of 
atomisation. Far from spelling the end of class per se, from a Bourdieusian 
perspective these processes can be conceived as a decline of the symbolic 
construction of 'class' as a frame for articulating the differences of social space and 
mobilising agents with the rise of individualist political visions of the social world, 
particularly in the eighties, and the increased prominence of alternate constructions 
of difference such as ethnicity, nationality or 'social exclusion'. The disappearance 
of some of the symbols associated with discourses of 'class' - certain jobs, 
communities, ways of life and so on - with changing social conditions could also 
be an important factor in shaping perceptions and linguistic descriptions of the 
social world, though it must be made clear that this is only because of the 
substantialist mode of thought usually in operation amongst agents whereby what 
makes someone a member of a 'class' is the display of a particular combination of 
properties and practices with which it is typified. This must be separated from the 
relational definition of class of the analyst, where theoretical classes exist so long 
as differences - relative distances and directions - in social and symbolic space 
persist and manifest themselves in the sense of difference, no matter what the 
actual symbols homologous with each sector of social space may be or how they 
are discursively articulated. 
Giddens 
With those two general issues dealt with we can turn to the specific 
positions of the individualization theorists and, firstly, to Giddens. Much was made 
in the last chapter of Giddens' inability to link lifestyle choices to social positions 
via a theory of motivation in order to explain how the former contribute to 
stratification processes. If we adopt a Bourdieusian perspective. however, this 
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problem dissolves: the habitus formed out of the experiences of the agent1s 
materially and culturally structured lifeworld is the wellspring of action and 
principle of lifestyles, and because the structuring of agents' lifeworlds depends on 
their position in social space their motivations and lifestyles would differ 
accordingly. The symbolic space into which practices map through homology then 
becomes the site of the 'symbolic struggle' over the relative legitimacy of the 
different 'arts of living' - only then would lifestyles be implicated in the 
production of social differentiation in the way suggested by Giddens. Yet this is not 
all, for adopting the framework outlined above also supplies effective remedies to 
some of the other difficulties plaguing Giddens' approach. The tension between 
voluntarism on the one hand and the depiction of lifestyle orientations as guiding 
behaviour on the other, for instance, evaporates. This is because 'lifestyle 
orientations' are, in fact,, nothing other than the orientations furnished by the 
habitus in the form of schemes of perception, something agents cannot transcend to 
make choices ex nihilo as Giddens implies in his more voluntaristic turns. Further 
to this, there is no need for the concept of ontological security in explaining the 
4routinized' character of social life, and so we can easily evade its apparent 
psychological determinism. Instead, routine is largely a product of the particular 
habitus, but also more generally of the practical, unquestioning relation the agent 
has to the world that is built into it. 
If lifestyles and even identities - which, even if granted a temporal 
dimension, flow from the sense and vision of one's place in social space - are not a 
simple matter of choice by increasingly autonomous agents at all but based on the 
materially and culturally shaped habitus,, does this mean they cannot be 'reflexive' 
in the way Giddens describes and that, therefore his theory should be dismissed 
outright? Not necessarily, for his overall position can, in fact, be reformulated 
along the following lines: due to what he describes as the decline of traditional 
modes of practice and globalisation, the lifeworlds of individuals have become 
suffused with new experiences and information on different ways of life and thus 
appear to offer new choices on how to live. Coupled with the pressures of 
consumerist individualism promulgated by the culture industries and political 
rhetoric in Britain over the last few decades, the propensity to 'reflexively' change 
and experiment with one's lifestyle choices could then become incorporated in the 
habitus as an unreflexive disposition, combining different levels of knowledge and 
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attitudes built out of these new lifeworld experiences, in a way similar to that 
suggested by theorists of the 'reflexive habitus' (e. g. Sweetman, 2003). Bourdieu's 
description of the new petite bourgeoisie, recounted in the last chapter whilst 
criticising Beck, supplies a clue as to how this might manifest itself. However, it is 
not hard to imagine that new experiences and information flows would be 
distributed remarkably unevenly into lifeworlds on the basis of, firstly, the latter's 
material and cultural structuring (e. g. access to the internet, association with 
cosmopolitan significant others) and, derivatively, the practices and pursuits 
issuing from the agent's habitus: which television channels and programmes they 
watch, what they look up on the internet, which newspapers and magazines they 
read and so on. Even if they do permeate the lifeworld, they would be interpreted 
according to the extant perceptual schemes of the habitus. Furthermore, it seems 
likely that not only would a certain amount of both economic and cultural capital 
be required to realise a fully 'reflexive' pursuit of different lifestyleS5 1 but also, 
because of this fact, the reflexive construction of one's lifestyle would for the most 
part be perceived through the lens of the habitus of those with less capital as 'not 
for the likes of us'. To put it in a nutshell, the reflexive habitus might well be a 
preserve largely of those more distant from necessity, with the dominated 
remaining rather more 'univorous' in their consumption patterns, even if, recalling 
the principle of symbolic violence, they recognise that reflexivity is a legitimate or 
desirable style of life. 
Beck 
If Giddens' particular take on the declining relevance of class can be 
reformulated in a more palatable conceptual language, what of Beck's thesis of 
individualization? This is perhaps less straightforward, for whilst the 
'disembedding mechanisms' that form the explanatory heart of Beck's position - 
the expansion of education, new consumption pressures, geographical mobility, the 
flexibilisation of work and so on - could be conceived as forces radicalising the 
physiognomy of lifeworlds and the basic experiences they yield, producing more 
51 in a recent book Giddens (2007: 66) claims that lifestyle differences between classes are based 
not on 'financial constraints' (i. e. economic capital) but on different tastes, without recognising that 
different tastes are formed on the basis of the structuring of lifeworlds by economic capital. 
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4reflexive' agents compelled to make life choices to an unprecedented degree, the 
serious blindness to the way some of these mechanisms may be shot through with 
class processes themselves, and even in accord with a Bourdieusian approach to 
class, has already been documented in the last chapter. Nonetheless, the conclusion 
there was that if not the majority then at least some - namely those possessing 
ample stocks of cultural and economic capital - may indeed display some form of 
ýreflexivity' and, as with Giddens, this could be cleansed of its voluntaristic 
renderings, captured in hollow claims that individual volition is somehow more 
prevalent than before (Beck and Willms, 2004: 24), and recast as an unreflexive 
disposition, generated out of a particular combination of recurrent experiences, to 
consider and choose different options with reference to oneself, alter facets of one's 
biography and follow diverse paths through life in the way Sweetman (2003) 
suggests. If this is indeed the case, then not only is Beck, as Skeggs (2004) claims, 
depicting as universal a mode of behaviour restricted to the more privileged but, 
more importantly, class (in Bourdieu's definition) is not dead at all. And, of course, 
if Beck's thesis is to hold even this meagre amount of water it has to be shown that 
the underlying forces behind such 'reflexivity' are the disembedding processes he 
describes and not simply the distance from necessity the more privileged have long 
enj oyed. 
Some of Beck's other clairns,, when run through a Bourdieusian conceptual 
filter, are rather more debatable. Take, for example, his hyperbolic declaration that 
positions in the social structure are characterised by transience, incessant 
movement and ambivalence, with inequality ultimately being distributed over the 
phases of an 'average work life' -a phrase that conceals vast differences between 
occupations (say Giddens' 'Apple Mac' workers compared with 'Big Mac' 
workers) - rather than between groups. 
52 This should be contrasted with 
Bourdieu's assertion that movements in social space can only occur with the 
accumulation (or loss) or conversion of capital, which generally takes a specific 
amount of labour and thus time (Bourdieu, 1991a: 232), or the inflation and 
depreciation in value of particular forms of capital such as educational 
52 Urry'S (2004: 9) claim in his eulogising introduction to a set of interviews with Beck that the idea 
that poverty is now distributed across the life course rather than groups is evidenced by the fact that 
middle-class students now experience poverty not only attempts to collapse real distances in social 
space but displays a gross insensitivity to the differential experience of higher education on the basis 
of capital stocks - something documented by Bourdieu and Passeron (1979) as well as more recent 
studies. 
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qualifications. This is not to say that, for example, jobs are not lost at higher 
reaches of social space, but only that those unfortunate enough to be made 
redundant do not instantly plummet down the hierarchy: they retain their capital 
(unless, in the case of economic capital - perhaps the least important compared to 
social or cultural capital in securing new employment - they are unemployed long- 
term, implying a distinct temporal dimension far removed from the erratic 
immediacy implied by Beck, though unlike those lower down in social space their 
stocks are often boosted by generous pay-outs) and thus, as already discussed, are 
better equipped to job-shift and to do so horizontally rather than downwards. They 
would also likely retain their dispositions and attitudes or, if the experience of job 
loss is recurrent, develop new ones - both positive (reflexivity) and negative (such 
as an inability to grasp the future - Bourdieu, 2000a: 234) - still distinct, on the 
whole, from those of the dominated. 
Even more problematic is Beck's own definition of class (when one can be 
pinned down). Having failed to break with the substantialist logic of everyday 
thought that binds classes to particular practices and recognise the relational nature 
of class in which the actual practices are less important than the relations between 
them in symbolic space, a number of his arguments simply miss their target. For 
instance, his claim that social classes are "losing their distinctive traits, both in 
terms of their self understanding and in relation to other groups" (Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim, 2002: 39) and are thus 'no longer experienced' (Beck, 1992: 98; cf. 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 36) can be reduced to little more than the much 
less threatening proposition that the particular differences associated with 'class' 
as a symbolic construction are disappearing: the old jobs, communities and 
practices which marked out in people's minds 'the working class' and 'the middle 
class' as popularly conceived. For whilst strictly speaking an empirical question, 
the idea that symbolic differences per se have disappeared, and with them the sense 
of difference and similarity based on the prepredicative association of perceived 
symbols with positions in social space, seems exceptionally hard to sustain. For 
example, whilst for Beck (1992: 95) the supposed 'demo crati sation' of car 
ownership and foreign vacations may signal the end of class, seeing as the working 
class are obviously defined by their domestic holidays and lack of a car, for a 
Bourdieusian the differences and relations within these 'democratised' practices 
would signify the continued existence of symbolically 
differentiated classes - the 
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4old banger' of the dominated class, or the 'souped-up' machines of younger, 
usually male members, versus the executive or sports car or four-wheel drive (the 
'Chelsea tractor') of the dominant; package beach holidays in cheap destinations 
such as Spain for the dominated versus independently booked adventurous or 
4 cultural' holidays for the dominant, and so on. If such difference exists, whether or 
not encased in the language of social classes, then theoretical classes exist; 
conversely, to deny classes on this definition "means in the final analysis denying 
the existence of differences and principles of differentiation" (Bourdieu, 1998b: 12). 
Bauman 
Of all the positions on individualization, Bauman's is perhaps the easiest to 
assimilate to a Bourdieusian perspective. This is because, unlike the others, and 
notwithstanding his remarks on job insecurity and the 'negotiability' of positions in 
liquid modernity which can be responded to in the same way as Beck's assertions 
to the same effect, he continues to underscore the rigid stratification of society in 
terms of freedom, an emphasis that could be conceived as nothing other than an 
insistence on the continued potency of the social space - which, of course, maps 
the stratification of freedom from necessity - conveyed in a different conceptual 
terminology. Reinforcement for this view is provided by Bauman's (2004b: 14) 
stress on not just the continued influence of economic resources in shaping this 
hierarchy, but also educational qualifications, that is, the institutionalised form of 
cultural capital. His prevarications over the pertinent dividing line can then be seen 
as simply his own inconsistent imposition of principles of division on this space 
devoid of rigid dividing lines in reality depending on his purpose at hand. 
But what of the idea of disembedding? Does this not imply the 
reconfiguration of experiences on a broad scale in the same way as Beck's thesis? 
The answer is no, for there is a key difference between the two theorists here, one 
which shifts Bauman closer towards Bourdieu's vision of the social world than 
Beck's. To put it simply, whilst the above reassessment of Beck's thesis 
reconceived disembedding as an alteration of objective determinants of experience 
feeding into the habitus and trajectories, for Bauman disembedding essentially 
refers to a subjective process whereby individuals can no longer identify with fixed 
groups but are instead forced to construct and revise their identities themselves 
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(once again the reflexive habitus suggests itself). So, on his view the decline of 
capital and labour, or other collective categories for that matter5 represents not the 
withering of objective patterns of inequality, but a decline of 'class' as a ftame for 
interpreting those 'variegated social deprivations and injustices' produced by the 
stratification of freedom (Bauman, 2004a: 35), fitting snugly with the ideas 
mentioned above on the decline of symbolically represented classes. Furthermore, 
the assertion that individuals are increasingly cast in liquid modernity as either 
'flawed consumers' or autonomous individuals responsible for their own lot can be 
reinterpreted as a perfectly plausible description of new ways of carving up the 
social space in perception, ways propagated in the political sphere by the Thatcher 
government of the eighties and largely continued today under New Labour. 
Rethinking one of Bauman's dualisms, de jure freedom could then be understood 
as the widespread construction of social space as composed of autonomous, 
atomised individuals, with defacto freedom referring to the real degree of freedom 
granted by one's position in social space. However, the same reservation forwarded 
against Beck has to be entered here as well: if symbolic differences homologous to 
the divisions of social space continue to yield some sense of difference and 
similarity - which indeed Bauman's description of the vilification of 'flawed 
consumers', whilst squeezing out the subtle differences in symbolic space between 
various areas of social space, implies - then the efficacy of the social space and the 
theoretical classes it contains in impressing upon visions of the social world 
remains. 
Conclusion: Themes for the Research 
Reassessing the theories of individualization from the Bourdieusian 
standpoint outlined and developed above, then, does not inevitably lead to the 
conclusion that all three should be rejected outright. Instead we are left with a 
multitude of themes and concepts that could still signal social changes broadly 
resembling those outlined by Giddens, Beck and Bauman, albeit re-articulated in a 
different conceptual vocabulary in which the concept of class is both more subtle 
and more stubborn, and which must ultimately be confirmed or refuted through 
empirical research. Let us now. in this concluding section, draw together the 
strands so far left dangling by recapitulating the main themes, or hlypotheses, the 
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research must examine if it is to deten-nine whether class has ceased to be in the 
manner specified by the individualization theorists. 
First of all, it must be established whether lifeworlds and trajectories remain 
differentially structured by economic and cultural (but also social) capital in the 
ways described by Bourdieu and those influenced by him or whether, in line with 
the theorists of individualization, they are characterised by a flux of new 
experiences and structural changes as a consequence of globalisation (manifest in 
knowledge and pursuance of different ways of life) or institutional processes (such 
as education) that diminish the hold of capital in shaping what is 'normal' for 
people and their movements in social space. Concomitantly, it will be vital to 
ascertain the dispositions and attitudes constitutive of each individual's habitus and,, 
crucially, whether 'reflexivity' counts amongst them - in terms of lifestyle 
practices (Giddens) or key life decisions (Beck) - whether this appears to be a 
product of new lifeworld experiences and, finally, whether such reflexivity and the 
experiences generating it are unevenly distributed according to position in social 
space. Secondly, and moving further towards the subjective dimension of class, the 
research must examine whether agents still display some form of 'class sense' 
based on the typification and reading of signs and behaviour as they narrate their 
biographies and reconstruct their lifeworlds or whether this has dissolved in a sea 
of individualized consumption practices. Moreover, it must determine whether 
people talk about 'class' and conceive and label others and their practices in these 
terms, whether and how this categorisation has any salience and coherent meaning 
for them, and whether they use it as a framework for interpreting social injustices 
and political projects or whether personal failings, as Bauman suggests, or lifestyle 
issues, as Giddens claims, have largely taken its place. Only after all this will we be 
able to pronounce with some degree of certainty whether class lives on and is fit 
and well or, conversely, whether it should be interred once and for all. 
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5. Researching Lifeworlds, Biographies and Habitus 
Having emphasised that the method adopted to investigate the empirical 
credibility of the theories of individualization and reflexivity will be qualitative in 
nature,, and having structured much of the argument in the last chapter and parts of 
Chapter 2 around this fact, it is time that some space was devoted to justifying the 
choice of method and outlining its key features and tasks. In what follows, 
therefore, the precept underlying the selection of qualitative interviews in this 
instance - Bourdieu's 'methodological polytheism' - will be elaborated, followed 
by a clarification of the particular phenomena the interviews aim to uncover and a 
consideration of some of the salient methodological issues and quandaries raised. 
After that some detail will be given on the characteristics of the sample providing 
the empirical material for the remaining chapters and the interviews themselves. 
Methodological Polytheism 
The division between quantitative and qualitative research methods is often 
depicted as insurmountable. Particular research methods, it is claimed, presuppose 
a particular philosophical conception of human beings and, therefore, of what the 
social sciences can and should endeavour to study. Ethnographic and other 
qualitative methods, for example, are seen to be tightly bound to interpretive or 
micro - sociologies such as ethnomethodology and Blumerian symbolic 
interactionism, as only these theorise the complex subjective meanings conferred 
upon phenomena that such methods document, whilst statistical analysis of data 
sets is congenial to those who wish to detect the systematic constraints and 
determinants of action imposed by macro -structures. In practice, however, such a 
divide is as bogus as it is frequently transgressed. Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in post-war research on class, where the early tradition of community studies 
(e. g. Dennis et al., 1969), sociological investigations of the industrial workplace 
(e. g. Nichols and Beynon, 1977; Beynon, 1984) and those practicing the 
Birmingham brand of cultural studies (e. g. Willis, 1977) all employed qualitative 
methods - most frequently ethnography, 
but supplemented with interviews - with 
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the specific intention of displaying the manifestation and consequences of objective 
class structures in everyday life. This brazen disregard for a supposedly established 
antinomy was bolstered through the eighties by the emergence of explicit 
challenges to the idea that particular methods of inquiry inevitably bind their 
practitioners to conceptions of the social world (Marsh, 1982; Bryman, 1988), and, 
since then, there has been a perceptible move towards a preaching if not necessarily 
a practicing of methodological pluralism and pragmatism amongst British 
researchers (Payne et al., 2004). 
This commendable development chimes well with the approach to method 
flowing from the broadly Bourdieusian theoretical scheme outlined in the previous 
chapter. Grounded as it is in a non-dualistic conception of social practice in which 
micro and macro, structural and agential and objective and subjective elements of 
the social cosmos are conceived as 'ontologically complicit' (Bourdieu, 1981), the 
full breadth of methods - from large-scale statistical analysis to ethnography and 
in-depth interviews, not to mention discourse analysis and documentary research - 
can, if stripped of the theoretical assumptions often assigned to them by others and 
attuned to the Bourdieusian apparatus, be mobilised in the service of advancing 
knowledge (see e. g. Bourdieu, 1984,1988b, 1996a). With such a 'methodological 
polytheism', as Wacquant calls it, the tools of inquiry employed in any particular 
research act are selected on the simple basis that they 'fit the problem at hand' 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 30; see further Inglis et al., 2000). As far as this 
study is concerned, 'the problem at hand' is obviously the assessment of 
individualization and increased reflexivity, and this requires the deployment of 
qualitative research covering life histories, present practices and salient 
typifications. 
The core reason for this has already been touched upon in criticising 
Goldthorpe's response to individualization: the kind of reflexivity described by 
Giddens and the others, and its potential differential distribution, would be difficult 
to capture through quantitative techniques deploying closed, fixed-choice questions 
or tracing 'origins and destinations', because the actual process through which the 
patterning of trajectories or lifestyle practices takes place - constant negotiation of 
multiple options, restriction by recognised constraints or tacit pursuance of 
ingrained possibilities - would remain largely opaque. Instead, some qualitative 
examination of decision-making processes at key junctures past and present, their 
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circumstances and historical antecedents is necessary (cf. Brannen and Nilsen, 
2005). The same applies to claims regarding the more subjective element of 
individualization or class - the angst, atornisation and attribution of individual 
responsibility theorised by Bauman and Beck or the sense of social distance and the 
linguistic typifications with which it is articulated could not be rendered in all their 
analytically-vital intricacy in answers to survey questions but instead flow forth 
best when agents narrate and describe their lives, significant events and relations 
with others in detail. The latter in particular has, notwithstanding some conceptual 
and terminological differences, been a pivotal premise and finding of the empirical 
work of the cultural class analysts and those sympathetic to or homologous with 
them (see especially Skeggs, 1997; Reay, 1998a, 1998b; Lawler, 2000,2002; 
Savage, 2000; Southerton, 2002; cf. also Lamont, 1992,2000; Archer et al., 2007). 
Take, for instance, Surridge's (2007) valiant attempt to mount a defence of 
the use of quantitative analysis for studying class subjectivities. Some of her points, 
such as the inability of much qualitative research to systematically compare social 
and geographical differences, are sound enough. Nevertheless, her approach 
demonstrates the common weaknesses of quantitative techniques for this purpose, 
seeing as the 2003 British Social Attitudes Survey, upon which her empirical 
findings are based, not only imposes pre-conceived class categories on people by 
giving the options of 'working class' or 'middle class' in asking for class 
identification - thereby forcing individuals to think that these categories are the 
legitimate way to divide up the social space in perception and inadvertently 
perpetuating their use when they may otherwise not be used - but misses the 
various typifications through which individuals may perceive social distance that 
fall outside of the explicit discourse of 'class' (e. g. 'Nike people' versus 'Gucci 
people', as in Archer et al., 2007, or even 'chavs') which itself may have little 
tangible meaning to individuals and be denied. As Bourdieu (1984: 472-3) argues, 
class sense 'in no way implies the capacity to situate oneself explicitly in the 
classification [i. e. an explicit taxonomy of social classes] (as so many surveys on 
social class ask people to do)... ' and has 'nothing to do with an intellectual 
operation implying conscious reference to explicit indices and the implementation 
of classes produced by and for the concept'. 
This is not to say that quantitative analysis has no value whatsoever, and 
indeed statistics are drawn on where necessary to contextualise the data. 
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Furthermore, a mapping of the homologies between social space and symbolic 
space using national statistics would be a useful supplement, but as Gayo-Cal et 
al. 's (2006) endeavour to do just this demonstrates, even this could not 
conclusively document whether or not many of the themes theorised by Giddens 
and the others and reformulated at the end of the last chapter have any empirical 
validity. 53 It should also perhaps be noted at this juncture that though some form of 
ethnography would be an effective means of observing reflexivity or its absence in 
situ, it would remain less able to gather information not only on targeted and thus 
comparable core themes but, more generally, on the full sweep of individuals' 
trajectories. The historical antecedents of their current circumstances, dispositions 
and choices and the structural conditions in which they have lived their lives, of 
which knowledge is necessary for grounded causal postulations, would therefore 
remain beyond grasp. 
For his own part, Beck (the most attuned to empirical research of the three 
theorists under examination) would seem to agree that individualization is best 
assessed with qualitative interviews, and not only because he is critical of 
quantitative class analysts for continuing to impose static zombie categories on a 
precarious reality. On one of the rare occasions he has referenced research 
regarding individualization, for example, he has claimed that the theory has been 
'verified' in qualitative interviews insofar as they have documented 'the demand 
for control over one's own money, time, living space and body', or, in other words, 
the demand for the 'right to develop [one's] own perspective on life and to be able 
to act upon it' which has 'arise[n] from actual conditions of life' in countries 
playing host to individualization (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 32; for 
references to the actual studies see Beck, 1992: 92). Furthermore, he has explicitly 
described how narrative, life-history research can provide 'rough pragmatic 
indicators' of individualization: if people speak of 'blows of fate', 'objective 
conditions' and 'outside forces' that have 'overwhelmed', 'predetermined' or 
ýcompelled' them throughout their lives, he argues, then individualization is refuted; 
if, on the other hand, 'individuals perceive themselves as at least partly shaping 
themselves and the conditions of their lives, even or above all in the language of 
failure', and thus an 'individualistic and active narrative form' in which individuals 
53 A forthcoming book by the same research team behind Gayo-Cal et aL's findings promises to be 
much closer to Distinction in terms of methodological pluralism, 
however. 
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describe their life events in terms of individual 'decisions, non-decisions, capacities, 
achievements' and so on is present, then the theory will be vindicated (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 25). The theoretical tenuousness of this claim has already 
been pointed out in the earlier critical over-view of his position - when have people 
ever exclusively used one set of descriptors? 54 - but, nevertheless, Beck can be met 
on his own empirical terms. 
Reconstructing Lifeworlds, Trajectories and Habitus 
With the method now justified, it is time to consider how the research will 
actually proceed. Hopefully it is clear by now that the objective is to reconstruct 
individual lifeworlds, trajectories and habitus - the latter including dispositions and 
schemes of perception - and the nexus between them, but what has not been 
specified and needs elaborating is how exactly this is to be achieved using 
qualitative interviews, how it corresponds to existing research traditions and some 
of its built-in limitations. 
We can begin this indispensable endeavour by considering first of all the 
task of reconstructing lifeworlds. Within the phenomenological tradition, from 
whence the concept originated, conducting research into lifeworlds essentially 
consists of harvesting vivid idiographic descriptions of the routine, everyday 
'reality of common sense' (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 34) as it is lived, 
experienced and interpreted by an individual, group, or wider collectivity. More 
specifically, it appears to follow Schutz in seeking to capture the 'natural attitude', 
conceived as the 'cognitive setting of the lifeworld', as it is 'embodied in the 
processes of subjective human experience' (Titchen and Hobson, 2005: 124) and, 
as a guiding principle, 'refrains from any causal or genetic hypotheses' (Berger and 
55 Luckmann, 1967: 34) . 
The approach outlined in the last chapter, however, 
" in yet another demonstration of contradiction, Beck rightly concedes that an 'active' narrative of 
one's life is separable from the actual chain of events and that the two need not coincide (see 
below), leading him to the stunning conclusion thatfalse consciousness is not 'ruled out' (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 25). 
55 There is, in fact, no extant phenomenological tradition of research into the lifeworld in sociology 
- indeed, phenomenological sociology as a whole was 
largely subsumed into ethnomethodology in 
the sixties and seventies - and so this understanding is drawn from theoretical sources and from the 
disciplines of psychology, education and nursing research, where phenomenology remains a strong 
school of thought in its own right (see e. g. Moustakas, 1994; Creswell, 1998; Ashworth, 2003; 
Titchen and Hobson, 2005). The latter are, however, usually less focussed on the lifeworld than on 
109 
demands more. Whilst description of the past and present quotidian milieu of the 
individual, as relayed in qualitative interviews, is indeed an essential starting point 
in order to understand the form of experience that has sedimented into the habitus 
(cf. Bufton, 2003), we must go beyond phenomenological description to uncover 
the objective social structures that have shaped and continue to shape that milieu - 
its objects, settings and consociates - and the experiences (and hence habitus) it 
yields without, of course, neglecting the formative impact of the particularities that 
necessitate the concept. As Bourdieu remarks, phenomenological analysis of the 
taken-for-granted "is excellent as far as description is concerned but we must go 
beyond description and raise the issue of the conditions ofpossibility of this doxic 
experience" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 73, emphasis added). 56 An 
understanding, therefore, of what was and is 'normal' or 'taken for granted' for 
agents (doxa), as indicative of what was and is perceived to be 'reasonable' and 
ýexpectable% is crucial, but as they relate specifically to objects, practices, people, 
constraints and attitudes acting as manifestations of the different forms of capital 
possessed and their transmission or, if Beck and the others are correct, of insecurity, 
choice and openness. In this way we can, pace the programmatic declaration of 
Berger and Luckmann, explore the genesis of the habitus and through it practices 
and trajectories. 
Inevitably this is not a straightforward or unproblematic process. It must be 
borne in mind that a reconstruction of the lifeworld is precisely that -a 
reconstruction. Its key parameters and salient features - housing, schools, 
workplaces, parents, friends - and the resultant impact on the habitus can be 
gleaned, but the constraints of the interview situation and the limits and 
particularities of memory recapitulation mean that the picture of the lifeworld 
pieced together from the participant's account can only ever, like a map of a 
territory with vague patches, be a rudimentary and partial approximation to its rich 
complexity as a lived reality. But more importantly, perhaps, there is the thorny 
the experience of specific phenomena and, furthermore, where it is investigated it is often 
understood in the overly 'idealist' manner mentioned in Chapter 4. 
56 The language here is Kantian, and indeed there are links with the Kant-inspired transcendental 
argument of critical realism - what must be the case a priori for this doxic experience to have the 
features it does and to be different from or similar to the doxic experience of others? The answer: 
social structures. See Bhaskar (1975,1998), Porter (2002) on critical realism and social structures in 
qualitative research and, on the ambiguous relationship between Bourdieu and critical realism, 
Wacquant (1989), Vandenberghe (1999) and Potter (2000). 
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question of exactly how to move beyond the participant's description of their 
lifeworld - which, as linguistic typifications built into their habitus, are still 
analytically epicentral - to unveil the underlying objective structures that exist 
independently of their words and, indeed, have shaped their acquisition and use. 
Strict constructivists (including phenomenologists), after all, would claim that the 
agent's description is an active construction of 'reality' and that access to anything 
beyond that is illusory (see Roberts, 2002: 7). However, following the tenets of 
Bourdieu's constructivist realism,, introduced briefly in the last chapter, the 
descriptions must be treated as at one and the same time linguistic typifications 
conveying reality from the point of view of a subjective scheme of perception and 
in at least some sense pragmatic indicators of facets of the milieu demonstrative of 
the operations of relational structures that could be verified with alternative sources 
- documents, records, others' accounts - if needed. 
The same applies to the analysis of biographies, and here Bourdieu has 
explicitly warned against the so-called 'biographical illusion' that haunts much 
life-history analysis, that is, the failure to move beyond the subject's 
rationalisations and construction of events (their reasons or 'in-order-to motives') 
to trace their trajectory through the space of objective relations and the cumulative 
effect this has on dispositions and attitudes (the 'because motives') (Bourdieu, 
2000b). In order not to fall foul of such an illusion, therefore, the interviewee's 
account of the junctures and episodes from their neonatal years up to their present 
'biographical situation' (Schutz, 1970b: chap 7) must be treated as a rough guide to 
the travels made through social space and homologous fields, bolstered by the 
accumulation of information on certain objective indices (occupation, pay, 
qualifications). In this way, the altering physiognomy of the lifeworld brought by 
the movements - horizontal, transverse, and possibly more complex combinations 
like curves - or the lack thereof and their resultant impact on the habitus can be 
considered along with the events which patently reveal either the constraints or 
opportunities granted by a certain level and structure of capital or, if the 
individualization thesis is correct, the general flux, reflexivity and changeability 
across the board. 
At the same time, however (and this Bourdieu does not mention), whilst the 
rationalisation and explanation of events is to be sifted for indicators of objective 
movements and conditioning experiences, it is also, as a construction of personal 
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history from a certain scheme of perception produced through engagement in the 
social world, a vital source of data in itself. For it is here that the chain of life 
events (whether or not they actually demonstrate constraints and so on) would 
either be dressed in the language of active choice, decision-making and individual 
responsibility, as Beck and Bauman suppose, or conveyed in an idiom less 
favourable to the theories of individualization and reflexivity. The latter could 
include, in direct contradiction of Beck and Bauman's claims, a recognition of the 
role of broader social issues such as widespread unemployment and inequality 
(including that explicitly described as class-based) in shaping the constraints and 
expectations that have characterised their path - akin to what Willis (1977) called 
4partial penetration'. But it could also take more complex, subtle and implicit forms, 
such as the naturalisation of inequality as differences of cultural capital are 
perceived as rightly-rewarded innate intellectual capabilities and talents - what 
Bourdieu often referred to as the dominant's 'sociodicy of their own privilege' - or 
more simply an explanation of events in terms of what was 'normal', 'the done 
thing', 'what everyone did', or 'for people like me', thereby evincing the 
expectations and orientations of the habitus built out of the objective probabilities 
inscribed in the lifeworld by its position in the social space. In all cases, the agent's 
narrative must be linked to the experiences encountered in carving their trajectory 
in order to detect the generation and distribution of inclinations towards particular 
4vocabularies of motive' (Mills, 1940). 
Again, however, this is not an easy task. As with the investigation of 
lifeworlds, the reconstruction of biographical paths is limited by not only the 
peculiarities of memory recall - confabulation, exaggeration or just plain forgetting 
- which depend on the structure and content of the habitus qua stock of knowledge 
and the situational imperatives of the interview, but also the limited information 
which can be attained in an interview. A comprehensive understanding of the 
structure and history of each field the agent is and has been positioned in and of the 
fields in which the institutions they have passed through are and were positioned, 
for example, must remain elusive. Nevertheless, interviews can, as Bourdieu argues, 
grant a general and 'genetic' comprehension of the participants by enabling an 
overall "grasp of the social conditions of which they are a product", that is, a 
"grasp of the circumstances of life and the social mechanisms" affecting them - 
including, in departure from Bourdieu's own strict approach, the salient formative 
112 
experiences and events of the evolving lifeworld which fall outside the strict logic 
of fields - and the primary categories to which they belong and of the "conditions, 
inseparably psychological and social, associated with a given position and 
trajectory in social space" (Bourdieu et al., 1999: 613). 
This leads us to consider, finally, the habitus. In fact, much has been 
implied on the investigation of its genesis and characteristic dispositions so far, and 
indeed it is in the narration of life histories and the taken- for-granted world that the 
different facets of the habitus - expectations, orientations to the future, principles 
of action, tastes, schemes of perception and class sense - come to the fore. Here,, 
then, only a few comments on some of the more direct ways in which it is to be 
tapped are necessary. First of all, the interviews aim to elicit information on the 
lifestyle practices, tastes (specifically, as an exemplar, musical tastes) and political 
views of participants and their origins in the lifeworld with the intention of 
uncovering either their roots in the experiences granted by the material and cultural 
conditions of life, therefore lending some support to Bourdieu on the homology 
between such symbolic markers and the social space, or, if there is anything to 
Giddens' thesis, their reflexively-chosen nature in the face of augmented choice 
and availability. Secondly, although the life-history component of the interviews 
will endeavour to uncover the practical typifications and associations mobilised by 
individuals, the interviews will also aim to explore in depth the participants' 
schemes of perception as they relate specifically to class - that is, what 'class' 
means to them as a system of typifications, whether and how they perceive their 
life events, sense of difference and similarity and symbolic markers in class terms, 
and how important they see it to be - and, again, their connection to positions, 
trajectories and experiences. However, in order to better capture whether class has 
any explicit salience for the participants without specific prompting and to avoid 
the kind of criticism levelled at Marshall et al. (1988) who did the opposite, this 
line of investigation obviously comes last, after the narration of the life history and 
discussion of lifestyle practices and views, so as not to influence the terms used to 
relay them. 
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The Characteristics and Construction of the Sample 
The only question left to answer is whose lifeworlds, trajectories and 
habitus are being reconstructed? Originally, and motivated in part by the approach 
of the Affluent Worker team, the intention was to target and compare three specific 
sets of workers as theoretically-relevant 'test cases' of the individualization thesis - 
manual workers drawn from one factory, what Giddens calls 'wired workers' 
(problem-solving IT workers who he claims are at the forefront of the kind of 
political changes he describes) drawn from one 'post-industrial' workplace, and 
managers drawn from both the employers already yielding workers, all of whom 
were to be aged between 18 and 40 in order to capture the experiences of the 
generations living the key phases of their lives through the period of social change 
theorised by Beck, Bauman and Giddens. However, in the end, and for reasons that 
will be examined shortly, the final sample does not correspond to this neat tripartite 
division. Instead, as Table I shows, the sample consists of 26 individuals from 
various sectors of social space, two of which (Dave and Frank) peak above the 
designated age range to give the insights of a slightly older generation (no bad 
thing given their ability to compare their own trajectories with those of their 
children and the fact that Giddens claims that increased reflexivity and 
ý experimentation with lifestyles' applies as much to older people as to their 
younger counterparts - 2007: 66). Many of these have comparatively little in the 
way of economic, cultural or social capital because of their tra ectories and 
occupations and hence inhabit varying positions in the dominated lower to lower- 
middle section of social space. The rest of the sample consists of a mix of more or 
less dominant positions ranging from the middle belt of social space (e. g. Paul) to 
the higher reaches (e. g. Claire) and from those possessing more cultural capital and 
further to the left of social space (e. g. Nigel) to those with more economic capital 
and further to the right (e. g. Oliver), thus allowing considerable scope for 
comparison. 57 Amongst these there is, fortunately, a sizeable contingent of those fi- 
57 For practical reasons interviewees were required to 
be in full-time work to take part: occupation 
allows a 'good and economical indicator' of capital 
(Bourdieu, 1987: 4), but it was also a guard 
against an over-representation of the unemployed 
in the sample, seeing as they are more likely to 
have time to participate and hence volunteer themselves. Periods of unemployment 
for the dominant 
and dominated are still covered 
in their life histories. Hannah represents an exception because she 
moved from full-time to part-time work 
between initial contact and the interview date. 
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Table 1. The Research Participants 
Name* Occupation Age** Position/Trajectory 
in Social Space' 
Notes 
Abby Teacher (secondary) 28 Dominant/static 
Andy Studio manager 43 Dominated/static 
Bernadette Computer graphic 32 Dominant/upwardly French 
designer mobile 
Claire Senior manager 38 Dominant/static 
Dave Lorry driver 51 Dominated/static 
Elizabeth Computer programmer 39 Dominant/static 
Frank Hospital technician 53 Dominated/static 
Gary Driving instructor 44 Dominated/static 
Hannah Administrator (part-time) 30 Dominated/static 
Isabelle NHS scientist 26 Dominant/static 
Jackie Project manager 38 Dominant/static 
Joe Technician 35 Dominated/static 
Karen Junior doctor 28 Dominant/static 
Lisa HR officer 34 Dominant/upwardly 
mobile 
Mark Computer programmer 35 Dominant/static 
Nigel University reader 45 Dominant/static Irish 
Oliver Operations manager 40 Dominant/static 
Paul Software developer 41 Dominant/upwardly 
mobile 
Phil Shift co-ordinator 33 Dominated/static 
Rebecca HR advisor 30 Dominant/static Canadian 
Samuel Doctor (hospital surgeon) 35 Dominant/upwardly 
mobile 
Tessa Junior doctor 28 Dominant/upwardly 
mobile 
Tina Apprentice painter 18 Dominated/static 
Trisha Technician 37 Dominated/static Trans- 
gendered 
Yvonne Driving instructor 42 Dominated/static 
Zack Software engineer 28 Dominant/upwardly 
mobile 
All names are pseudonyms 
All ages have been changed by one or two years either way 
The attribution of broad positions and trajectories in social space, which does violence to the complexity of 
social positioning and disallow any consideration of 
differentiation by class fraction but nevertheless serves as a 
useful heuristic, is worked out only loosely on the 
basis of a knowledge of interviewees' origins, incomes, wealth, 
education, cultural competences and possessions and social 
ties and their place within the overall system of which 
they are a part (i. e. average incomes, distributions of educational credentials and so on, taken 
from the January- 
March 2007 sweep of The Labour Force Survey, an imperfect 
but sufficient source for the purpose). The term 
'dominant', so as to capture the key contrast, is perhaps slightly more encompassing 
here than Bourdieu's (1984). 
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tting to greater and lesser degrees the description of wired worker, that is, they 
work with computers most of the day, are oriented to problem solving and so on 
(Bernadette, Elizabeth, Mark, Paul and Zack), so Giddens can still be held to 
account on this front. 58 The sample comprises 14 women (including one trans- 
gendered individual) and 12 men '59 all are British save three participants born 
overseas (Bernadette, Nigel and Rebecca) who have nevertheless lived in the UK 
and been positioned in its social space for at least ten years, and all of the 
participants are white. This last fact is particularly regrettable, for not only does it 
render the sample unrepresentative of the UK population on this score but it 
precludes analysis of the intersection of class or individualization with race or 
ethnicity beyond 'whiteness'. All respondents were from Bristol, a fairly typical 
British city insofar as it has experienced a significant downturn in industrial 
activity and a corresponding burgeoning of its service sector (especially in finance, 
IT and low-level call centre work) in line with broader shifts in the economy and is 
starkly segregated spatially in terms of economic and cultural resources (for details 
see Fenton and Dermott, 2006), or else its satellite communities. 
The final sample differs so much from that originally planned because of 
persistent difficulties of access. Relevant employers of the three groups mentioned 
above had been contacted and possible gatekeepers identified in their midst in the 
hope that they might assist in contacting potential participants, but such hopes were 
unrealised as numerous impediments accumulated: unreturned calls, letters and 
emails; referral and deferral around multiple departments; constant evasion; and, 
once in communication with a suitable representative of the employer (either in 
hurried phone conversations or fruitless meetings), lack of interest, suspicion of 
veiled intentions and unwillingness to bear the responsibility and time-burden 
required to support the research. Smaller employers in the region were also 
58 It is worth noting that Giddens' terminology has recently changed, so that whereas once the term 
wired workers referred to new occupations in the 'infotech' sector involving work with computers, 
non-hierarchical settings and creative problem solving, such as software development, web design, 
graphic design and systems analysis (2000: 43-4; cf. 2001b: 294,382), now they are seen to be 
lower level computer-based occupations, with the more specialised IT workers now being separated 
out and referred to as 'Apple Mac workers' (2007: 62). Given the extreme superficiality and 
brevity 
of his reasoning in this latest change compared to 
his earlier logic, which itself was far from well 
developed, where it is used in this study the term wired worker is given its original, more 
encompassing meaning. 
59 1 should stress that though class is always gendered, and though relevant points will 
be flagged 
where necessary, the aim of the analysis 
is to draw out the class-based similarities across the sexes 
rather than their differences. 
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approached less formally through a contact within the university, but this was again 
unsuccessful. Such resistance, whether from private or public organisations, is a 
common obstacle in sociological research (see, for example, Devine, 1992: 33; cf 
also Hammersley, 1997: 137), and, in this case, appeared to be the product of 
several interacting factors: the demanding schedules of harassed and indifferent 
middle-managers who did not perceive any utility or significance in the research, 
distrust of exogenous researchers of the workforce who may produce unfavourable 
findings at odds with the self-perception of the company and the tendency for large 
corporations to have 'in-house' research teams that, as far as they are concerned, 
obviate or at least take priority over external research. 60 
With much time expended, two trade unions were contacted instead and 
both, unlike the employers, expressed interest in the project and were keen to assist. 
In one case, the union contact took it upon himself to strive to recruit participants 
by approaching union members; in another I was invited to present the research to 
stewards at educational classes and conduct brief focus group interviews with the 
hope of inciting interest and disseminating leaflets. In both cases, unfortunately, 
participants once more proved elusive. Only one respondent came forward through 
the first union, despite the best efforts of the contact over several months,, and the 
education classes, notwithstanding the apparent enthusiasm of the participants, 
were uncomfortably reticent when explicitly propositioned. Some of the stewards 
did take leaflets to pass on to others (others did not even look at them), but, after a 
long wait, it was apparent that nothing was to come of it. 
Clearly if the research was not to be suffocated once and for all, alternative 
means of access would have to be employed, and with time leaching relentlessly 
away such means would have to be relatively expedient and efficient and would 
hence have to jettison the focus on specific occupations and employers and instead 
switch attention to individuals from across the social space. Two new methods 
were mobilised: firstly, to set the wheels of the study in motion some were 
60 On this last trend see Savage and Burrows (2007). They tie it to a shift toward a reflexive, 
'knowing capitalism', not dissimilar to Giddens' vision of increased institutional reflexivity, and 
prognosticate rather stark consequences for empirical sociology. However, though they rightly 
highlight the regrettable monopoly of private organisations on certain forms of data, they underplay 
the comparative epistemological and theoretical rigour of academic sociology given by i tl its 
(increasingly threatened) relative autonomy in the field of knowledge production which allows the 
distance ftom practical and exogenous demands to make the required break from prenotional 
experience (cf. Bourdieu, 2004). 
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recruited through informal contacts, and secondly, inspired in part by Savage, 
Bagnall and Longhurst's (2005b) procedure of access to interviewees, a letter 
inviting individuals to take part was mailed out to three-hundred individuals 
selected at random from the electoral register for three separate wards of Bristol, 
themselves chosen on the basis of their occupational constitutions as revealed by 
census statistics in order to maximise the spread of respondents across social space 
(i. e. one characterised by predominantly manual occupations, one predominantly 
pro fes si onal -managerial, one mixed). 
The mail-out, however, produced a problem. Whilst an acceptable overall 
number were recruited through this method, the overwhelming majority of those 
who replied were in professional or managerial occupations and, to complicate 
things further, were disproportionately clustered at the upper region of the 
designated age range. Not only were the experiences of manual workers thus 
lacking in any serious capacity, making it impossible to compare across regions of 
social space and draw any satisfactory conclusions, but those of young people, who 
have experienced within the time frame of the individualization thesis the kinds of 
transitions through education and work that should clearly reveal either reflexive 
decision making or class processes, were to all intents and purposes absent. In 
order to balance the sample on these two fronts, then, two further methods of 
contact were employed. Firstly, to increase the participation of younger individuals, 
letters were sent out on a random basis to recent graduates of the university through 
the alumni office. Several participants were recruited through this means, so it was, 
overall, successful. Secondly, as regards the manual workers, once again small 
employers in the area were contacted, but again the phone calls were deflected and 
emails unreturned and it was finally conceded that employers would not provide 
the help needed. So more contacts were creatively unearthed and pressed and a 
sufficient number recruited, though these participants were, in many ways, 
untypical - for instance, Trisha is trans-gendered, whilst another recruit from this 
method had a history of serious drug use. In fact it was most likely their 
untypicality that prompted them to take part, seeing as, in the face of broadly- 
pitched research investigating (dis)advantages and values, 
61 they felt they 'had a 
story'. It can thus only be speculated how many heard the call for participants and 
6' At all stages the research was advertised and explained without the term 'class' ever being used 
so as not to influence who took part and what they said and 
defeat the object from the start. 
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decided not to take part under the impression that sociological research would not 
be interested in them because they are 'nothing special' or 'just normal' and 
'haven't had anything interesting happen to them' and 'wouldn't know what to say' 
anyway. Indeed, coupled with the inconvenience many no doubt assumed the 
research would be and possibly a more general disinclination for 'talking about 
oneself , especially with a stranger, it is possible that such an impression underlay 
the overall dearth of people willing to take part. 62 
The result of all these tribulations is a montage of methods of access, with 
part of the sample being randomly sampled from two separate sampling frames and 
part of it purposively selected for balance, but not a wholly unrepresentative or 
unsatisfactory collection of interviewees for the purpose at hand. Still, it must be 
acknowledged that the power of gatekeepers motivated by practical concerns and 
the reluctance of people to partake in the research meant that the theoretically- 
optimal sample had to be abandoned. Such social obstacles to sociological inquiry 
and resultant accommodations are, given their frequency, to be expected and the 
researcher must, like Canguilhem's pirate- s cienti sts (cited in Bourdieu, 1996a: 232), 
harness opportunities where they arise, seize chances and creatively negotiate 
constraints if they are to successfully produce adequate knowledge on their subject 
matter. They must, in other words, 'win the social fact' not just epistemologically, 
as in Bourdieu's rationalist axiom, but practically as well. That said, both problems 
encountered, insofar as they appeared to stem at least partially from it, point to a 
broader, regrettable situation that raises fundamental questions for sociological 
research: the disjunction between the perceived necessity and utility of sociological 
research on behalf of the sociologist and on behalf of those who would partake in it, 
itself largely the product of the frustratingly low status of sociology in the public 
consciousness - in the double sense that awareness of sociology is scarce and 
where there is acknowledgement it is often pejorative. Indicators of this include the 
British Sociological Association's recent inquiry into the use of sociology in the 
UK media, which revealed a disheartening paucity of cited research and its 
supplanting with the quasi - soci olo gical musings of journalists (reported in Gaber, 
2005), as well as the fact that the discipline has a negligible hold on the public's 
imagination compared to popular disciplines like evolutionary psychology (see 
62 Especially in the case of manual workers, there are perhaps parallels here with Bourdieu's (1984: 
chap. 8) analysis of 'don't know' responses 
in surveys. 
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Jackson and Rees, 2007) and a feeble influence in the political and commercial 
spheres - the realms of those dominating the field of power in contemporary 
society - compared to the 'research' of politically-oriented think-tanks, opinion 
pollsters and market research institutions. Indeed, some respondents in the present 
study, on learning of its disciplinary orientation, produced disparaging comments 
to the effect that sociology was misguided, crude and somehow outdated. There is 
not the space to fully examine why this state of affairs is so - though increased 
institutional reflexivity, the discipline's relative youth in the UK, debates over its 
scientificity, its heterogeneity and internal discord and the fact that social reality Is 
seen as too important to be left to the sociologists alone (Bourdieu, 2004: 86-7) 
who, in any case, 'cause trouble' for the dominant by revealing domination and 
inequality where it is claimed there is none (Bourdieu, 1993a: 8-19), probably play 
their part - or how it can be effectively remedied. In any case, clarion calls for 
'public sociology' (Burawoy, 2005), that is, a sociology that can contribute to 
public debates over the direction and values of society, are all very well, but to 
have a sociologyfor the public a sociology with the public is first necessary, and 
that is by no means an easy feat. 
Before moving on to describe the interviews, a closing word on 
generalisation. Unlike many studies deploying qualitative methods, some level of 
extrapolation is desirable if the assessment of individualization and reflexivity is to 
move beyond the local level. Given the recurrent dissociation of qualitative 
research from any generalising capacities, however, some may question the extent 
to which conclusions can be drawn regarding theories held to have a national and 
even international application on the basis of twenty-six interviews with 
individuals from one British city, even if random sampling from the electoral 
register helps by not restricting the findings to specific categories of people. In 
response, insight can be taken from Bourdieu's claim that the relational mode of 
thought in play here allows us to overcome the distinction between generalising 
nomothetic research and localised idiographic analysis by allowing us to 'grasp 
particularity in generality and generality in particularity', with the end result that 
the unearthed themes can be treated, as Bachelard would say, as a 'particular case 
of the possible' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 75). This guiding principle can, it 
seems to me, be clarified, elaborated and reinforced 
by two extant strategies of 
generalisation in qualitative research. First of all, there are parallels with a 
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neglected method of extrapolation dubbed 'theoretical generalisation' in which 
wider inferences can be drawn from small-scale qualitative research on the basis of 
uncovering conceptualised structures and patterns with a broader applicability 
beyond the sample (Mitchell, 1983). If, for example, capital stocks are shown to be 
pivotal in shaping trajectories and habitus, then logically this can be generallsed to 
some degree because capital stocks only exist in a relational structure (i. e. the 
social space) that is trans-local. The consequences for the theories of 
individualization and reflexivity on this front would, therefore,, be far from 
restricted. At the same time, however, and especially in the case of more particular 
themes that emerge inductively (e. g. those regarding identity, subjectivity and so 
on), over- generalisation must be avoided and something akin to what has recently 
been called a 'moderatum' form of generalisation, in which claims of broader 
applicability can be forwarded so long as they are relatively moderate in scope, 
made on an open-ended basis and explicitly acknowledged as such (Williams, 2000, 
2002; Payne and Williams, 2005), adopted. 
The Interviews 
Five interviews were conducted at the university, but the rest took place at 
the interviewees' homes or workplaces, thus allowing access to the domains of 
their lifeworlds, the objects and people that populate them and, to some extent, the 
experiential parameters of their daily lives. There is a sense, therefore, in which a 
form of basic ethnographic research began before the interviews were underway, 
indeed before the houses or workplaces were even entered and the interviewees 
greeted as the areas in which people lived and worked revealed the material and 
cultural structuring of their lifeworlds and, what is more, the tastes characterising 
their habitus. So, for example, the home of Samuel, an ambitious surgeon, was 
situated in a quiet suburban street comprised of large Georgian houses converted 
into luxury flats and, on the inside, was capacious and lavish with elegant modem 
decoration, parquet flooring and expensive consumer goods, whereas Hannah's 
house in a predominantly red-brick street of varyingly decrepit semi-detacheds was 
much smaller, cluttered and filled with well-worn, functional furniture. Some 
homes, like Abby's, bore testament to the ample cultural capital of their inhabitants 
by having, in her case, poetry anthologies and works by Flaubert embedded in large 
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literature- filled bookcases, whereas others, such as Yvonne's, contained few books 
but numerous family photos and knickknacks instead. Or again, compare the large 
bucolic cottage, situated in a tranquil hamlet on a country lane, belonging to 
Elizabeth, a computer programmer rich in both economic and cultural capital and 
cohabitating with her 'hospital-building' partner, with Dave's house wedged in the 
middle of a weathered terrace lining a narrow city street filled with ageing cars. 
Similarly with workplaces, some interviews were conducted in the plush, serene 
private offices of the interviewees (e. g. Nigel and Oliver) whilst another took place 
in a cramped canteen smaller than either office but meant for a whole workforce 
(e. g. Phil, a low-level supervisor). Nevertheless, the exact biographical provenance 
of the various environs and artefacts and their place in systems of tastes and 
perceptions could not be illuminated until the interviews were underway. 
The interviews themselves lasted eighty minutes on average, ranging from a 
little over two hours in length to just thirty minutes (the only interview to be below 
an hour in duration). All were recorded, with permission, using a digital voice 
recorder and transcribed. The interviews were informal events, with some 
participants more loquacious than others, but contrary to what might be expected, 
and unlike Byrne's (2006: 36) experience, this propensity did not neatly correlate 
with positions in social space or social distance between interviewee and 
interviewer, most likely because those in the lower sections of social space who 
came forward to be interviewed were, ý perhaps at odds with the general disposition 
of those in similar positions on account of their particular experiential histories, 
obviously comfortable enough with the prospect of talking at length about 
themselves to volunteer themselves and in some cases, as mentioned above, saw 
themselves as having a worthwhile 'story' to tell. 
Insofar as the interviews were opportunities for people to recount and 
explain their life choices and life paths, they regularly shifted into an 'induced and 
accompanied self-analysis' of the manner described by Bourdieu in The Weight of 
the World (Bourdieu et al., 1999: 615), the specific substance of which is, as 
previously discussed, an empirical theme covered later. In several cases though, 
and notably amongst those richer in cultural capital, such a self-analysis, whether 
or not it corresponded with the analysis of the sociologist, was accompanied 
by 
post-interview declarations that the experience 
had provoked contemplation and 
talk on themes and processes which they ýwouldn't usually think about' or that are 
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'taken for granted' (Isabelle), that it had prompted them to 'question themselves' 
and 'take stock' (Tessa) and even that it had been akin to a 'free therapy session' in 
which one can 'analyse, think about and discuss' oneself (Samuel). The language is, 
perhaps, reminiscent of that of individualization, but a distinction must be made 
here between reflection and reflexivity. The interviewees no doubt reflected on 
aspects of their lives usually 'taken for granted' in their descriptions and 
explorations, but this is not the reflexivity specifically described by Beck or 
Giddens: the interview situation,, once entered, did not present a plurality of options 
in relation to life paths and lifestyles amongst which the interviewees then selected 
in a bid to answer the omnipresent question 'how shall I live? '; and it did not, so 
far as I could tell, induce a revision of an existing life plan or contribute to the 
formulation of a resolution on a sphere of life newly open to choice. 
Conclusion 
The tasks set for this chapter are now complete and the empirical 
assessment of individualization can begin. The following analysis is divided into 
two parts. Just as Bourdieu (1987) distinguished the objective moment and the 
subjective moment of class, and just as he separately analysed cognitive structures 
and objective social structures in The State Nobility (1996a: Parts I and 3 
respectively), so the strategy here is to separate for analytical purposes the 
objective dimension of social life - structures of capital, social conditions and their 
effect on trajectories through the habitus or unhindered reflexive decision making - 
and the subjective dimension - tastes, schemes of perception, systems of 
typifications and the practical sense of difference and similarity or unbridled 
individualism and atomisation. In actuality these elements are inseparably entwined 
and, hence, in each case there will inevitably be interconnections and intrusions in 
the analysis - after all, objective structures operate through subjectivity as they are 
perceived and structure perception, whilst subjective perception is always anchored 
in the experiences shaped by one's position in objective structures. Nevertheless, 
for the most part we can, in a similar fashion to Giddens (1984), 'bracket' one 
dimension in order to concentrate on the properties and processes of the other, 
beginning first-by pushing aside the subjective constructions and typifications of 
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the world to explore the effects or non-effects of relational social structures on life 
paths and practices. 
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6. Classed Paths in a Changing Social Context 
Many of the shifts in the social architecture that Beck and Giddens perceive 
to be the underlying motors of individualization and increased reflexivity do indeed 
form part of the present context for individual lives. Post-compulsory education, 
and particularly higher education, for example, has expanded beyond its previous 
confines and offered an avenue of upward mobility to those who, in previous 
generations, would not have considered application, opening up the lifeworld to 
novel experiences of different physical spaces and diverse modi vivendi socially 
and geographically distant from the initial familial milieu. Mobility across the 
country or between nations trailing jobs or vacationing in distant locales, 
furthermore, coupled with an awareness and appropriation of cultural practices and 
goods originating in far-removed national contexts given technological advances in 
communications and transportation, inevitably feed into experiential streams and 
leave their indelible residue in minds, bodies and tastes. Finally, alongside such 
'disembedding mechanisms', as Beck would call them, there is even something to 
the idea that the transition from education to work is cast as a matter of individual 
choice in the face of multiple options, with schools and allied organisations 
supplying services and information and encouraging pupils to deliberate and decide 
what is 'best for them' in a post- (or de-) industrialised and neo-liberal climate. 
But this does not portend the decline of class. Only if the sociologist failed 
to Peer beneath the surface, to suspend the popular constructions and 
interpretations of social transformations and to operate with the relational 
conception of class, could such a claim be made. For at all stages, at all times, and 
through all the above-identified phenomena, class processes continue to permeate 
the life courses and life practices of individuals, from their earliest lifeworld 
experiences through their educational trajectories and occupational histories, not 
only where there is social reproduction - perhaps not directly occupational, though 
this does occur, but certainly within the same area of social space - but also where 
there is, against all odds, apparent vertical mobility in the social space. The social 
and economic context may have changed, and the processes through which 
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inequalities bom of capital distribution function may have been reconfigured, but 
the structure and effects of class remain as powerful and pervasive as ever. 
Though its full complexity must remain elusive given constraints of space, 
this will be the argument developed over the course of the present chapter. To do 
this as clearly and effectively as possible the interviewees' life histories have been 
split into three sections corresponding to the chronological unfurling of biography: 
the experience of education,, the transition out of schooling into either higher 
education or work and, finally, social trajectories as embedded in occupational 
histories. In each case, the experiences of the two predominant clusters of 
interviewees - those who have reproduced their social advantage and those who 
have reproduced their social disadvantage - are charted in order to reveal not the 
indubitable prevalence of a new-found, classless reflexivity but the manifold ways 
in which, in contrast, every experience and action is imprinted with the weighty 
stamp of one's relational position in the social space. After that there will be a 
word on the upwardly mobile within the sample -a not insignificant minority - 
and the general principles that set them apart from the majority. 
Schooling: Enjoyment versus Endurance 
In Beck's vision of 'second modernity' schools function as factories of 
unadulterated reflexivity, endlessly transforming children into fully individualized 
beings regardless of their conditions of life. The reality revealed amongst the 
interviewees, however, is rather different. For as Bourdieu and Passeron (1979, 
1990) argued several decades ago and contemporary sociologists of education 
inspired by their work continue to contend, the child enters school as an assumed 
equal but, in fact, the iniquitous distribution of the capital required to succeed - 
cultural capital - invariably, like a light-refracting prism, differentiates 
performance, experience and the valuation of schooling, with the capital they 
depart with as a result then shaping future life courses by delimiting access to a 
particular 'field of possibles' (Bourdieu, 1984: 110). 
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The Dominant 
In the case of those born to parents of the upper sections of social space, the 
ample capital inhering in their structured lifeworlds supplied them w1th the 
resources necessary to thrive, shaping their experience of and performance within 
the education system and thence their tacit assessment of realisable goals. This 
came principally from two sources: the direct and indirect transmission ofparental 
cultural capital and the mobilisation of economic capital. In terms of cultural 
capital, a social power the institutionalised markers of which (undergraduate and 
postgraduate degrees) most of the parents of the dominant interviewees possessed, 
this was imparted via two modes of transmission. The first, a simple but effective 
method, is concentrated and capable assistance with schoolwork - something 
which many of the advantaged interviewees reported. For example, Rebecca, a 
human resources advisor who completed her schooling in Canada but whose 
privileged position in the UK is a product of her privileged position and trajectory 
through the Canadian social space (her father is a PhD-educated dean of a cathedral, 
and her mother is a music teacher), said, when asked whether her parents had ever 
helped with her work: 
Yeah, not my dad, he was always working, he wasn't really home that much. He didn't get 
home 'til about ten most nights. So my mum would help if I needed it. Yeah, they always 
had a bigpart in my schooling when I needed it. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Abby, a languages teacher at a secondary school and daughter to an 
affluent and globally-mobile IT businessman and a teacher, stated that her mother 
would 'sit me down and we'd do homework and she knew what I was supposed to 
be doing and what I had to be getting on with, so yeah, she would help me. ' Some 
interviewees surreptitiously conveyed the same phenomenon disguised behind 
declarations of parental incapacity. Claire, a reserved senior manager with a 
national business services firm, for example, said this, with characteristic concision, 
when asked whether her parents -a self-employed ophthalmic optician and his 
administrator - had ever provided help with 
homework: 
Well I think by the end of the first year [of A levels] that was beyond them so [laughter]! 
But they did up Itil then. But after that then no. 
What this discursive morsel reveals is, of course, that her parents had helped her 
until A levels, topics outside of their sphere of 
knowledge, thus helping to lay the 
foundations for successful independent study. Elizabeth indicates much the same 
phenomenon - that whilst the parent in question was unable to assist with advanced 
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homework he had still attempted to, disclosing a relationship to schoolwork at odds 
with that of the dominated - in relation to her father, a wheat and beef cattle 
farmer, 63 but quickly reveals an alternative source of intellectual support: 
He liked maths. He couldn't do my homework either but - my grandmother was very brainy actually. My grandmother went to Bristol uni and read chemistry, which is quite 
unusual really if you think, cos that would have been sort of like 1920s, and a women 
reading chemistry would have been quite - particularly as you actually had to read Gennan in order to read chemistry cos all the textbooks were in German. Sounds very hard to me. 
But she used to be able to do my A level maths homework when I couldn't, which always 
impressed me. She was seventy-odd. 
This passage leads on to the second, indirect modality of cultural capital 
transmission in which the experiential fabric of the lifeworld, as shaped by parental 
capital stocks, sediments into the child and nurtures capital and capital- generating 
dispositions. The following are demonstrative, starting first with Elizabeth on the 
form of experiential input granted by acquaintance with that educated grandparent: 
Elizabeth: Yeah she [my grandmother] must've been [one of the first women to go to 
university], and certainly to sort of read a, you know read a science. I mean it used to make 
us laugh cos all her, in her cupboards at home she wouldn't have the names of things she'd 
have the chemical formulae on them. 
Abby: She'd [my mother] spend a lot of time testing me on spellings and talking about -I 
remember all the time, it'd be like driving home and work out whether something was a 
noun, adjective or verb. 
Nigel: But I think it helped that while I was at school my father was also studying for 
medical, further medical qualifications. So you know, we'd all sit in the same room and do 
our homework together, which was nice, you know, it felt it was natural to do this, sit there 
for an hour or an hour and a half or whatever it was in silence. 
Here demonstrated are the two principle means through which this occurs: parental 
socialisation practices which, quite apart from guidance and advice on specific 
schoolwork, takes the form of ongoing parent-child interactions pre-reflexively 
centred on everyday learning and the use of reason (cf. Lareau, 2000,2003) and, 
secondly, the recurrent routines, practices and experiences constituting time-space 
paths. So the routines established by Nigel's father in his effort to augment his own 
63 It might be inquired as to why, exactly, a daughter of a farmer has been included amongst 
interviewees said to have reproduced advantage given that, in the diagram of social space presented 
in Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984: 128-9), farmers occupy the lowest of all positions in the social 
space. The reality of the matter is that farming 
in the UK, perhaps unlike 1960s France, is and has 
long been a highly stratified field homologous with the social space, stretching 
from wealthy estate- 
owners with ties to the aristocracy, affluent capitalist 
fanners and 'gentlemen farmers' who are 
often privately educated to struggling tenant 
farmers and small crofters (for the historical context 
see Scott, 1982,1990; for an example of a well-heeled and educated 
farmer, see Allatt, 1993). it is 
difficult to place Elizabeth's father accurately, but her 
descriptions of him as educated (he was an 
agricultural college graduate) and well-spoken and of 
the farmhouse as a 'massive' six-bedroomed 
abode, as well as the fact that 
her mother was a teacher, are enough to distance her lifeworld from 
the poorer sections of social space. 
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capital induced disciplined study as a part of his child's natural attitude; the 
everyday learning practices foisted upon Abby by her teacher mother and doubtless 
missing or at least not as frequent or informed amongst the dominated, as a use of 
capital to produce capital, inevitably heightened her ability; and, finally, 
Elizabeth's immersion in a world where (inter alia) chemical formulae are not only 
present but woven in to quotidian life is bound to have left its mark on her stock of 
knowledge and, specifically, to have deposited socially valued contents within it. 
This is not, however, solely a tale of cultural capital, for economic capital 
and, through what can be safely (given the theoretical conditions laid out in 
Chapter 4) described as parental strategies, its investment and conversion also 
conferred substantial advantages. Principally this was through the purchase of 
private education, something almost all of the dominant interviewees either 
experienced or nearly experienced as their parents considered their options. This 
was not construed as an effortless commitment on their parents' behalf - many of 
the interviewees describe with lament how they had to forgo holidays, new clothes 
and the other goods and practices common amongst their contemporaries at school 
- but they still possessed the ample capital, often aided by scholarships won 
through the transmission of cultural capital, to pay school fees and live comfortably. 
In any case, the effects of private schooling - its ethos and pedagogic practices - in 
shaping the orientations and performance of the interviewees cannot be 
underestimated: as Debra Roker (1993) so clearly demonstrates in her own research, 
the assumption and expectation of hard work and educational success is 
communicated to pupils from day one, written into the pedagogic practices of the 
school and sustained by the dispositions (e. g. 'motivation') and induced self-belief 
of the pupils themselves. In such institutions 'you don't have any choice about 
working', said Elizabeth, whereas 'at comps you do', whilst Abby claimed that not 
just the small class sizes but the expectations within her school inculcated 'an 
ability to succeed'. She elaborates: 
Abby: [at private school] your own expectations, parental expectations, are different. That's 
probably why people do better coming out of private school - not cos the teaching's better. 
WA: What do you mean by expectations? 
Abby: Expectations of the school, expectations - everyone who was in my class. I mean I 
was probably middle of my class, but all my friends wanted their ten A*s and I remember 
one of my friends crying cos she got a B. Now at the school I work at probably someone 
would be crying with shame if they got aB cos it's not cool. It's a whole different thing, 
people don't answer back to teachers, people don't sit there going [she pretends to yawn in 
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a fed up way]. I mean the whole attitude is completely different. There are no big discipline issues in a-I mean I don't remember ever, ever - mean I got told off for going 'I don't know'. I think I just said it in the wrong tone of voice. Just a whole different kettle 
of fish [ ... ] We'd have frees and we'd go to the library and work. It was just a whole different, whole different kettle of fish. And you're kind of motivated by those people 
around you, cos that's the standard, that's how everyone works and behaves and does, 
whereas I suppose the people look around at the school I work at and it's a whole different 
set of mixed messages -I mean if you're not sure. 
WA: So is it discipline? 
Abby: There was no need, everyone wanted to do well cos they knew their parents were 
paying a lot of money for it and they all knew - my best friend wanted to be a doctor, and 
somebody else wanted to be - they all knew they had these great expectations, there was 
no doubt. 
Of course it was not just the school and the contemporaries there that 
conveyed the expectations forming the backcloth to life, as Abby hints, but parents 
too. 64 Indeed, all of the dominant interviewees' parents displayed a committed 
involvement and interest in and encouragement of schooling - which, as we will 
see below, is a far from universal phenomenon - no doubt based on an inculcated 
desire for their child to succeed (or 'reproduce' their social position), a knowledge 
of what is necessary for this given their own experience - the 'information on the 
educational system' mentioned by Bourdieu and Passeron (1990: end diagram, note 
5) and examined by Devine (2004) - and a tacit protention (upon which projects 
are built) that this is probable, or at least realisable, given the stocks of capital they 
can invest (cf. Allatt, 1993; Reay, 1998a; Lareau, 2000). Hence when asked about 
their parents' approach to their schooling, the interviewees would typically mention 
that 'they were really encouraging and really interested' (Karen, junior doctor and 
daughter to a social worker-turned-teacher and social worker), that 'they were 
always quick to congratulate and you know, reward with, I don't know, a toy car or 
a packet of sweets or whatever if you did well in exams' (Nigel, university Reader 
and son of a doctor), that they were 'on my case' and 'always saying "you've got to 
study", every day nagging me to do that' (Rebecca) or, quite simply and capturing 
the reproductive mindset that often paved the way for private schooling, that they 
'wanted the best possible education' for them (Isabelle, NHS scientist and daughter 
of an NHS scientist and a teacher). Abby states that, being 'very, very interested in 
64 The terms 'institutional habitus' and 'familial habitus' have recently been introduced by Reay et 
al. (2005) to capture the expectations of educational institutions and families respectively, but I 
have serious reservations apropos these terms because they not only extend to the aggregate and 
substantialist level a relational and individual property but threaten to smother the complex of 
complementary and contradictory expectations conveyed 
by individuals, who after all have their 
own habitus and trajectories, within these 
domains of the lifeworld. 
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education', 'very, very pro our education' and 'concerned that I wasn't being 
stretched enough at my primary school' her mother would even ask her primary 
school -a small institution situated in Abby's rural Northern village of origin 
which she only attended until she was eight years old - to set homework for her 
even though no other child, invariably the offspring of poor local farmers, did any. 
These described attitudes, exhortations and behaviours, as signifiers of the 
orientations to the world framing their early lifeworlds, inevitably sedimented into 
the interviewees' own perceptions, behaviour and orientations within the schooling 
system, furnishing a doxic intuition of what is 'normal', 'expected' or of 'what is 
done' in tune with the pedagogic ethos of the schooling system (disciplined study, 
etc. ) - they were 'good kids' who always did their homework (Isabelle), 'worked 
hard' (Karen) and refrained from 'slacking off or messing around' (Nigel). Not 
only that, but because they had the mastery to succeed they all positively enjoyed 
schooling, talking enthusiastically about their favourite subjects and conceiving 
them as avenues for self-realisation - Jackie, for example, was and is 'passionate' 
about music and studied it from school right through university. This disposition 
toward schooling - this feeling 'at home' in the school environment (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1979: 13) - is not, of course, necessarily exclusive to the dominant but 
could be held by dominated individuals as a product of some complex of 
idiosyncratic experience such as education-conscious parents or a drive to self- 
betterment (cf. Devine, 2004; Walkerdine et al., 1999), yet it would yield less fruit 
if parents did not, at the same time, transmit the ample cultural capital - as early 
ability to master the academic abstraction of symbols and principles - tofuel it. 
The Dominated 
In opposition to the privileged inhabitants of social space, it was the relative 
lack of capital acquired from the early lifeworld and the corresponding habitus of 
both child and parent that profoundly shaped the experiences and assessments of 
schooling described by the dominated interviewees and that provided the founding 
stones upon which their subsequent social stasis or short-range trajectories would 
be built. This argument can be unpacked into a series of steps, beginning first of all 
with the foundational fact that none of the interviewees' parents, by virtue of their 
own educational trajectories, possessed much 
in the way of cultural capital. 
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Consequently, they did not possess the means - nor, given their relative proximity 
to economic urgency and their own assessment, based on a subjective expectation 
of objective probability (cf. Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 155ff), of the utility of 
education, the time or inclination - to prepare their child for the demands of the 
education system and to complement them at home (cf. Evans, 2007). There was 
not the help and involvement reported by the capital-rich interviewees, not the 
persistent encouragement and intervention, because their conditions of life dictated 
otherwise. Instead, parental input was generally, and often bluntly, described as 
non-existent. 
Gary, for example, a driving instructor whose early life was described as 
one of relative penury (manifest in rotten carpets and an unkempt house) and 
disregard by his engineer 65 father and secretary mother who divorced in his mid- 
teens, simply stated that his parents 'didn't show a lot of interest in me in 
schooling' and did not 'push' him in any way. Similarly, Yvonne's parents -a 
young single mother working as a secretary and described as 'nalve' and a violent 
and largely absent father who was a 'jack of all trades' on the building site - 
provided 'Absolutely no involvement at all. Nothing. That's it. [ ... ]I 
didn't have 
any support, I didn't have any direction. Even in my exams, I don't think my 
parents even knew what exams I was taking'. In fact Yvonne's mother had not 
even taught her basic reading and writing before she entered primary school - not 
because she could not, but because, deferring to the reproachful advice of teachers 
at a different school in the context of her own inabilities and lack of confidence on 
schooling of the kind that often mark a habitus deprived of cultural capital (cf. 
Reay, 1998a, 1998b; Lareau, 2000,2003), she was doing what she thought the 
school required - which almost led to an early misdiagnosis of learning difficulties. 
This lack of involvement extends to even the younger members of the sample 
(Gary and Yvonne both went to school in the eighties, a period still safely within 
the range of the individualization thesis), despite recent moves amongst educational 
authorities to push parental involvement to the foreground (see Reay, 2005): Tina, 
an apprentice painter and decorator fresh out of school, declares that her parents -a 
bus driver and cleaner - 'weren't fussed' and 'didn't care' about her schooling and 
65 'Engineer' is one of those elastic occupational labels that can cover a broad spectrum, from 
highly-skilled graduate-level professions to semi-skilled and routinised manual work (cf Jackson 
and Marsden, 1962: 197). In Gary's case 
it referred to the latter. 
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that their input extended only so far as 'having a go at one of the teachers a few 
times' for allowing her to be mistakenly punished. 
The consequence of all this is that the interviewees reported in this section 
were not equipped with the cultural capital or 'symbolic mastery' to succeed in 
school or conform to its demands and ethos. Alienated by a system that valorised 
what they had little of, that "gives training and information which can be fully 
received only by those who have had the training it does not give" (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1990: 128), many developed, in a way reminiscent of Willis' (1977) 
'lads', oppositional attitudes based upon a vague valorisation and pursuance of 
what they did possess: practical knowledge or bodily prowess. This is most simply 
expressed as a displeasure and lack of interest in schooling, sometimes coupled 
with claims of being a 'bit of a tearaway' (Gary), or an assessment of it as a 
4pointless waste of time' preventing them from engaging in something more 
'practical and interesting' (Tina), but a fuller example is provided by Hannah, the 
daughter of a salesman and a house manageress for a charity. Having been brought 
into a lifeworld characterised by a distinct scarcity of cultural capital, insufficient 
economic capital to invest and a supportive but laissez faire parental disposition 
towards schooling, Hannah became, as she described it, 'disillusioned' with 
education. After portraying herself as not 'focussed on school', 'not very academic' 
and 'a bit of a rebel' who was often disruptive yet as someone who has 'done very 
well in lots of different aspects' and with 'a passion for certain things, albeit a lot 
of it wasn't academic' (in her case horses, initiated by contact with pony-owning 
cousins), when asked what would have improved her experience of school she 
reflects: 
[ ... ] schools 
back then, they were purely academic to be honest and there probably wasn't 
an awful lot they could've done. Whereas now, the schools that they're trying to create 
now have got more vocational opportunities as well, so that would have been more suited 
to me but at the time that wasn't the structure of the school. [ ... ] Ijust got the impression 
that theyjust wanted the ones, were really bothered or really interested in the kids that 
keep their heads down and do well, which I suppose is what you should do when you're at 
school but not everybody does. (emphasis added) 
In other words, Hannah resented the focussed attention on those who 'kept their 
heads down and did well' - i. e. those with the instilled disposition towards self- 
disciplined study in harmony with the pedagogic practice of a schooling system 
hinged on the inculcation and nurturance of cultural capital - and vaunted the 
vocational, the practical, that which 
involves a skilled mastery divorced from the 
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symbolism and abstraction from which she had been excluded. This is, however, a 
valuation laced with internalised symbolic domination: on the one hand she is 
pleased that vocational training is being rolled out in schools, thereby unknowingly 
legitimating a sort of educational apartheid that seals the fate of children by 
channelling trajectories from a young age and perpetuating inequality, whilst on the 
other the dictates of symbolic violence - of seeing her own practice from the point 
of view of the dominant - means she immediately counters this with a hesitant 
recognition that self-disciplined study, the cultivation of capital, is what one 
'should do' at school, even if not everybody, including herself, manages to do this. 
Similarly, having been questionably diagnosed with dyslexia after 
difficulties with reading and writing, 66 assigned to a raucous special needs class 
and labelled 'lazy and thick' and a 'failure' by teachers, Joe quickly turned away 
from and lost all interest in 'academic' matters at school andl like others of the 
sample in a similar position (particularly Gary and Phil), instead turned to sport, in 
particular running, which, coupled with his ability to 'look after himself, became 
his real source of 'self-motivation and pride' and 'respect within the school'; in 
short, school for him was 'not about learning, it [was] about survival' (emphasis 
added). The cultivation of the mind and engagement in academic abstraction, 
presupposing the possession of forms of knowledge he did not have as a product of 
his structured lifeworld, was thus supplanted with the cultivation of bodily aptitude 
and the investment of self-worth in the 'fighting strength' which Bourdieu (1984: 
479) recognised as central to the system of values of (the male members of) the 
dominated class, the problem being that these do not accrue the resources 
translatable into symbolic capital, the keys capable of opening the doors of society. 
Post-Sixteen Transitions: Doing 'the Natural Thing' 
The Dominant 
Having assimilated the cultural capital inhering in their surrounds and 
developed the dispositions endorsed and rewarded by the education system, nearly 
66 Joe believes he has now 'grown out of his dyslexia insofar as the problems he had with reading 
and writing have now been completely overcome. Given that 
dyslexia is not actually a condition 
t) sdiagn is people 'grow out of, this raises the question of whether 
his diagnosis was in fact a mi os of 
an acute lack of cultural capital, and 
hence a naturalisation of educational inequality, in a way 
similar to Yvonne's experience of nearly 
being misdiagnosed with learning difficulties. I 
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all of the dominant interviewees notched up multiple top marks in their 0 levels or 
GCSEs. Thus possessing the formal requirements to enrol in post-compulsory 
academic study, all but one 67 did just that. But whilst this institutionalised cultural 
capital may have opened the door to post-compulsory academic education, it 
remains to be answered why the interviewees opted to go through it. If we look at 
the rationalisations of this transition and responses to an attempt to probe the range 
of options considered the solution becomes clear quickly enough. When asked if 
they had considered not doing A levels and ceasing their schooling after GCSEs, 
all promptly answered in the negative, affirming that they were 'always gonna do 
A levels' (Karen) and that the prospect of dropping out was never broached in the 
familial environment or, especially for those at private school, amongst peers, 
teachers or careers advisors. Jackie, a 38-year-old, well-paid (forty-thousand 
pounds per annum) public-sector project manager who has only recently moved to 
Bristol from London, gives an exemplary account. Having been sent to a private 
primary school in her native Essex by her father, a skilled engineer turned manager 
in the automobile industry, she attended a 'lovely' grammar school and, when 
asked whether she had ever considered any route other than A levels, declared the 
following: 
Jackie: No, never considered it. Very few people didn't [do A levels]. People went to 
different places, some people went to sixth form college, or to technical college. One or 
two girls left, one girl left without doing any 0 levels, which everybody was just really 
shocked by. She left at sixteen, she said 'I'm not coming anymore, I don't have to go to 
school'. I couldn't believe her parents let her, I just couldn't believe it! 
WA: What do you think your parents would have done? 
Jackie: I think there'd have been a bit of a scene actually. I think there'd have been a 
horrible, horrible scene. It's difficult isn't it? I mean you can't force somebody of sixteen 
to go to school. I don't know what they'd have done. It was never - it just wouldn't have 
happened. So most, most people stayed on, and the employers in Southend, if you left 
school at sixteen looking for a job, were people like Access. So there were one or two 
people who did go, went into places like Access or Barclaycard, whatever it is now, and I 
think they did okay. I think they joined like school-leaver training programmes and worked 
their way up. But the majority of people stayed, and I think with a grammar school the 
majority of people stay. It's kind of expected you will, so you're not given a raft of options 
about what to do, it's kind of just assumed almost, that you'l I stay. 
67 This exception is Oliver, an operations manager of a large company who left school at sixteen and 
took up an apprenticeship as an electrician, attaining his current occupation through multiple 
promotions, despite having teachers for parents. Unfortunately there is not the space to consider 
Oliver's interesting case in its full intricacy and make the case for the importance of class in it, but 
his acrimonious relationship with his father, his self-declared disenchantment with school and other 
idiosyncratic experiences characteristic of his lifeworld (e. g. his small-town environs, work 
experience with an electrician) are likely to have played their part 
in forming his deviant trajectory 
rather than some new-found reflexivity. In the 
following discussion of trajectories his case has been 
bracketed. 
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She is, nevertheless, quick to add, 'I mean it's different, it's twenty-odd years ago': 
people are 'more aware of situations now', she claims, and 'move around a lot 
more% seemingly bearing testament to the awareness and consideration of 
alternative scenarios previously discounted central to Beck's version of 
individualization. However, since her account is mirrored by the younger 
interviewees as well -a part of a generation of advantaged students statistically 
more likely to study A levels than ever before (see Social Trends, 2006: 39; 
Furlong and Cartmel, 2007: 28-9) - any claim to generational differences, and 
support for the German theorist's thesis, weakens. Isabelle, for example, at just 
twenty-six, describes her own much more recent decision-making process in the 
transition from her private all-girls school to a mixed-sex sixth form at a different 
institution and captures in a sentence the underlying reality in all cases: 
WA: So did you consider not doing A levels? 
Isabelle: Not really I suppose, no. But I suppose it was just that pretty much everyone in 
my school was gonna go and do A levels and I also had the prospect of going to this school 
that I knew I was going to have a really good time. So itjust seemed like the natural thing, 
I don't think it really ever crossed my mind, although friends that I had out of school 
weren't all going to do A levels, but they were all going into some sort of further training 
or study or something so, yeah don't think it was ever really an issue. (emphasis added) 
In other words, the continuation of education (or 'training') was 'the natural thing' 
to do given the resources inhering in one's position and the expectations and 
exhortations filtering into a lifeworld rich with cultural capital. In stark contrast to 
Beck's thesis, there was little 'reflexivity' here at all, for no other options ever 
'crossed her mind', i. e. they were excluded a priori from consciousness as 
unthinkable given the field of possible trajectories open and the dispositions toward 
academic study instilled. This is brought home all the more by Jackie's shock and 
incredulity, seen above, at the contemporary who rebuffed schooling and left at 
sixteen - the exception, so to speak, that proves the rule or, more accurately, the 
habitus. 
Vitally, the self same process saw each and every dominant interviewee 
(bar Oliver) proceed on after A levels (or their equivalent in different national 
contexts) through the increasingly central sanctifier of social division: higher 
education (cf. Reay et al., 2005). The same language abounds, with respondents 
reporting that they 'never' considered anything other than university and that 
entering directly into the world of work 'wasn't an option' 
(Rebecca); that they 
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were 4always going to go to university' and that, in words analogous to Isabelle's 
on A levels, 'it was kind of natural progression to' (Mark, computer programmer 
and son of a university professor and teacher); that it was something they simply 
4assumed' they would do (Jackie) and that they even 'filled in the application form 
without thinking of alternatives' (Nigel). The interviewees' own proffered 
explanations for this suite of assumptions hinge upon the prevalent expectations of 
the 'normal' amongst family, peers and the private school - 4everyone in my 
family had gone' or 'everyone at my school went' were frequent refrains - all of 
which, they were keen to point out in response to probing, were never explicity I 
stated but encrypted in the discursive and practical parameters of their lifeworlds: 
Claire: [university] was always [my parents'] plan, so. it was never put to me as in 'you're 
going' [ ... ] It was also sort of 'well when you're at university... ' things like that so, it was kind of like that but no it wasn't 'you're going'. 
Nigel: It's funny, I don't ever remember having a discussion about that [whether I would 
go to university or not]. Any discussion of that type would probably have been more along 
'what do you think you'll do at university' or 'I'm thinking of doing this at university, 
what do you thinkT, you know. So it sounds as if it was pretty hardwired in there. 
Abby: No, no one ever said to me 'you will go to university and that's that'. [ ... ]I mean I think I got some good advice from school, it wasn't like 'academic and earn a lot of 
money', it was like 'you enjoy languages so maybe you'd like to do a degree in languages'. 
Wasn't kind of 'and that will give you this and this job', it was more based on your 
enjoyment in a subject and what was fulfilling to you. 
From the very start these interviewees were, in other words, surrounded by the 
expectation - furtively manifest in the sayings and doings of daily life and enabled 
only by the possession of capital - that higher education, the means of securing 
reproduction, was not just within the bounds of the probable, but was the norm, a 
'commonplace destiny' and 'natural' future (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979: 3-4), 
thus unreflexively fixing it within their own perceptions of the time to come and 
their conscious projects even if, as Abby's statement conveys, this is often garbed 
in the Beckian discourse of self-realisation. Cultural capital is key, of course, in 
setting the subjective perceptions of the possible and typical - being seen and 
seeing themselves as cacademic', i. e. in possession of symbolic mastery, the 
environs and intellectual challenges of university-level education 'felt right' (Jackie) 
- but the undoubted role of other 
forms of capital must never be forgotten. There 
was, after all, enough economic capital in each case to allow the distance from 
exigency necessary for the suspension of paid employment and even, in several 
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cases (where parents or other family members were especially affluent), enough to 
cover living expenses and pull university even further in to the realm of feasibility. 
The Dominated 
In contrast, none of the interviewees from the dominated section of social 
space completed post-compulsory education. Instead, and in line with national 
statistical patterns (see Social Trends, 2006: 39-42), apprenticeships and full-time 
employment, after some false starts and initial periods of claiming unemployment 
benefits, were their destinations 68 and, once again unfavourably to those heralding 
the spread of classless reflexivity, the journey there was undertaken along classed 
tracks. Sometimes, for example, there was an explicit perception of the capital 
constraints inscribed in their position. Thus many of the interviewees, when 
queried whether they had considered staying on at school or college or even 
pursuing higher education, simply said they were 'not brainy enough' for A levels 
(Tina), that it was 'never an option' because they didn't have the 'top marks' that 
were perceived to be necessary (Trisha) or that university was 'beyond them' as 
4only clever people' went there (Gary). Then again, even if they had possessed the 
cultural capital and the attendant grades to Proceed on to post-compulsory 
education, the restrictions of economic capital would have blocked their paths. Phil, 
for example, though declaring that he wasn't 'bright enough' to pursue higher 
education, states that he 'couldn't afford not to work' anyway, whilst Trisha, a 
rural-born trans-gendered technician whose father was an industrious electrician 
and whose mother worked as a cleaner, claimed her parents simply 'couldn't 
afford' university and that 
the only reason I stayed on [at college] to get an ONC was through my work, and even then 
I had to pay for it by staying on very low wages for three years - or two years extra than 
what the normal was. And that was the only way I was able to pay for that. 
68 In parallel to Oliver's deviant tra ectory, there was one interviewee amongst the dominated j 
respondents who had treaded a different path: Dave, who has been a lorry driver for most of his 
working life, with short periods of managerial work, studied A levels and attended university. 
Regrettably, again, there is not the space to dissect this fully, but suffice to say the influence of class 
nevertheless looms large: Dave's mother possessed more credentials than any other dominated 
interviewee's parent, and his attendance of grammar school inculcated the kind of expectations seen 
amongst the dominated. However, at university 
Dave came up against the limits of his capital and 
dropped out in the face of poor grades, inability to succeed and money problems. 
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Such recognised constraints, as an articulated sense of limits, are not, 
however, the prime mechanisms in the negotiation of school-work transitions, as if 
the interviewees had reflexively considered all options and acknowledged the 
restrictions of their situation, even for those who mention them. Instead, the 
movement into work was guided by the pre-reflexive expectations, orientations and 
valuations of the habitus, which is to say the constraints and limits of capital 
internalised as a product of recurrent experiences in the materially and culturally 
structured lifeworld. Such experiences emanate from two interweaving sources: on 
the one hand, the expectations amongst the consociates and institutions of the 
lifeworld that permeate everyday life, themselves grounded in the largely tacit 
assessment of what is reasonable given the levels and composition of capital etched 
into the situation,, and on the other hand the anti-educational attitudes, described 
above, which were produced by the individual's educational performance and 
trajectory given their limits of capital (which Bourdieu would term amorfati - an 
induced 'love' of one's fate). 
In its most basic guise, the expectations, interactions and experiences 
characteristic of the lifeworld as structured by its relational position in social space 
impact upon trajectories through the medium of parental advice or directives 
articulated to a greater or lesser degree (but certainly absorbed by the interviewees), 
and based on their own experience and assessment of the sensible, the achievable, 
the practical and the 'normal' given their positions and trajectories in social space, 
to 'get a trade' (Joe) or 'go into an apprenticeship' (Phil). Sometimes, however, 
this also shades over from parental expectations to the broader doxic features of the 
lifeworld: 
Yvonne: [my parents' attitude was] I was to finish school and become a secretary cos 
that's what girls did 
WA: You got that impression? 
Yvonne: Absolutely. That's what my sister was told to do and that's what I was 
(emphasis added) 
Trisha: You either went to college or you went into work. Well I was just expected to go 
into work. 
WA: By your parents? 
Trisha: By my parents and by society really. It was just one of the natural things that 
everybody else did (emphasis added) 
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The additions 'that's what girls did', 'by society really' and - mirroring the 
scenario witnessed amongst the privileged - 'it was just one of the natural things 
that everybody else did' all reveal a perception, brought to the level of discourse 
only by probing, of the structures of normality furnished by the experiential milieu 
in which they lived their lives. Secretarial work was not what all girls did, but what 
all girls within Yvonne's parents' orbit of experience, that is, girls with a certain 
level of cultural and economic capital, did ; 69 it was not 'society', in the sense of a 
national ethos, that expected Trisha, who was from an economically and culturally 
homogeneous rural area, to enter work, and it was not what everyone, i. e. the whole 
population, did, but it was what 'society' as she perceived it within a particular 
materially- articulated Umwelt expected and what people within her experiential 
reach - i. e. people of a similar position - did. 
In most cases, such lifeworld experiences operate to feed, supplement, 
complement and consolidate the negative valuation of the utility, difficulty and 
displeasure of education brought forward from the experiences of schooling. This 
orientation, ingrained into the habitus, is manifest in Joe's assessment of education 
as being not only uninteresting (particularly compared to his enthusiasm for 
running) but a 'waste of time' in his account of the fact that he had attempted to 
stay on at his school's sixth form purely in order to prolong the support he received 
for his running but 
realised within two weeks that it wasn't gonna work for me. I thought 'no, let's chip off and 
get a job' [ ... ]I thought 'no, I'm just going to waste two years here putting energies into 
stuff I'm not really interested in, so let's get out there and do something'. (emphasis added) 
Similarly, Tina, having been far from enamoured with school, voiced her 
assessment of continuing education: 
I don't warma learn, I can't be bothered. I don't see the point in spending a long time doing 
something you're not going to do ever again, which is what ninety-nine percent of people 
do. Yeah, it's a waste of time. 
In a vivid display of facets of the dominated habitus, she articulates the negative 
perception of learning as a chore given the difficulties inherent in a position and 
familial life marked by minimal cultural capital and as unpractical ('a waste of 
time') given its distance from the realities of working life, i. e. from necessity - 
69 There are obvious intersections with the effects of gender 
here as well: Yvonne was expected to 
be a secretary rather than, say, a 
bricklayer, because 'that's what girls did'. 
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there is no 'love of leaming' as there was amongst those distant from the demands 
of economic necessity. 
Interestingly, most of these classed trajectories occurred under either 
Conservative or New Labour governments and, hence, have been contextualised by 
an education system oriented by political discourses of choice, marketisation, 
personal responsibility and 'negotiated individual learning plans' (see Gewirtz et 
al. . 1995; Hatcher, 1998: 20; Ball et al., 2000; Ball, 2008) - exactly the kind of 
political context that Beck would argue individualizes school-work transitions. 
This does not mean that such policy measures have had no social consequences, 
however, or even that these consequences do not resemble processes identified by 
Beck. Indeed, Tina's transition into an apprenticeship in painting and decorating, 
extensively recalled because it occurred so recently and remains fresh in her 
memory, appears to exhibit the hallmarks of institutionally- aided reflexivity 
consonant with the theses of both Beck and Giddens: 
Tina: I went through a stage where I liked drawing, so I thought 'well what about 
painting? ' I like drawing, and being creative, I thought I'd do that and then I can move on 
and perhaps be an interior designer or sommat like that. I ain't now, but that was the plan. 
That kinda went out the window. 
WA: So was this something you thought much about? 
Tina: I thought about it for about a month. 
WA: Did you look at lots of information? 
Tina: Yeah, mmm, mmm, mmm, mmm [indicating looking through all the options]. I 
thought 'yeah this seems quite good'. Then I found out about the apprenticeship. How did I 
find out about the apprenticeship? I've no idea, but I found out about the apprenticeship. 
Oh I did it through school, through their Connexions person. 
WA: So the school had a lot of information? 
Tina: Yeah, they had a sort of, basically set it all up. Set me up with an interview over 
there, and all that lot. 
There is, in this passage, evidence of Tina selecting her occupational trajectory on 
the basis of an interest (what would, in other words, be 'best for her' and aid some 
sense of self-realisation) rather than any obvious exhortation, expectation or 
aspiration to follow family traditions, of an emergence of a consciously-conceived 
plan for the future (interior design) which has had to be revised, of a diversity of 
options and information supplied by organisations specifically instituted for the 
purpose of broadening (and demanding) 
individual 'choice' (Connexions) and of a 
141 
concentrated and elaborated deliberation of these options until the final decision 
was taken. 
It is, however, as edifying to consider the occupations she did examine in 
her deliberations as those she did not - she contemplated being a builder, a 
plasterer, a bricklayer and (her first love given first-hand experience) a butcher, 
working through each option and discounting it on the basis of implicit and explicit, 
embodied and symbolic constraints of gender (she was 'not strong enough' for the 
jobs or could not do them because she was 'a girl'), at all stages overtly rejecting 
what were constructed to be 'what everybody else did', that is, what girls like her, 
with stocks of capital like her, were perceived to do: 'office work' or 'shop work'. 
But for precisely the class-based 'because motives' already described she never 
considered university and she never considered a profession: they were excluded 
ftom consciousness and simply did not enter her deliberations or her (swiftly 
crushed) life plans - which are both merely a demonstration of mundane 
consciousness and projection exactly as described in Chapter 4, even if 
contextualised by a milieu of amplified information - as realistic possibilities. Her 
choice, in other words, was ýreflexive' in Beck's sense only up to a point: she did 
seek to do something 'interesting', 'different' and 'creative' - but only within the 
limits carved out by the pre-reflexive assumptions of her capital-structured habitus. 
Other interviewees conveyed similar realities: the precise occupation or 
trade taken up, following the decline of extractive and manufacturing industries, 
were not obviously steered by local or family tradition, as in hackneyed (but not 
untrue) images of sons following fathers down mines in earlier times, but worked 
out on a more contingent basis, with interviewees often saying they were 'unsure', 
balancing options (such as work as a bank clerk or as a skilled tradesman for Phil) 
or doing what they 'wanted' to do given the inclinations generated by idiosyncratic 
lifeworld experiences - yet pursuing work or an apprenticeship was still the 
'natural thing' to do. So there may be a new context, more options, more 
information and a discourse of individual choice pervading the policies and 
practices of schools such that occupational futures have become 'clouds of 
possibilities to be thought about and negotiated' as 'the deep layer of foreclosed 
decisions is being forced up into the level of decision making' (Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim, 2002: 6), but the information considered, the possibilities perceived 
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and the individual decisions enacted remain grounded in the orientations furnished 
by capital, that is to say, by class (cf Ball et al. 5 2000; Lehmenn, 2007). 
Social Inertia in Social Space 
Thus far the interviewees have disclosed life courses somewhat at odds with 
Beck's (1992: 93) thesis that education involves simply 'choosing and planning 
oneýs own educational life course' and, whilst recognising social change, confirm 
the theoretical statement advanced in Chapter 3 that this hallowed institution, 
which the German social theorist describes as a critical device in the genesis of 
individualized agents, is in fact a pivotal instrument in the reproduction of class 
inequality. But what of life after education? Is it possible that, notwithstanding 
their classed paths through their school days and post-sixteen options, social 
conditions conducive to individualization - such as heightened workplace 
insecurity - have intervened in the interviewees' subsequent trajectories in social 
space, prompted widespread reflexivity and reduced the effects of accumulated 
capital to nought? 
The Dominant 
Amongst the dominant interviewees, there is much that, at first, lends 
credence to the declarations of Beck and Giddens. Most of them, for example, have 
experienced considerable geographically mobility through the course of their post- 
education years, continuing a tendency set in motion by the initial spatial relocation 
to university and, moreover, for many of them this has burst the bounds of the 
British Isles' watery borders and carried them across the globe - Abby has taught 
in both Italy and France; Rebecca, of Canadian origin, worked in Japan and 
travelled South Asia before arriving in the UK ten years ago; Claire has travelled 
South America extensively; and so on. In this respect it would appear that these 
individuals have indeed been 'disembedded' and distanced from their original 
experiential milieu, as Beck claims to be the case, and, taking advantage of the 
augmented po I itico -economic and transportation linkages between nations said to 
characterise globalisation, exposed to a multiplicity of forms of life, their 
lifeworlds thus becoming marked by the kind of 'contextual discontinuity', as 
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Margaret Archer calls it, that supposedly weakens the hold of early experiences and 
instils a classless reflexivity. 
To add further weight to the case for individualization, there are, in some 
cases, instances where the opportunities afforded in the occupational sphere by 
accumulated capital are foregone in favour of attempts to subordinate paid 
employment to or conflate it with lifestyle pursuits - in Claire's case, for example, 
the reliance on spurts of temporary work after university solely to fund travelling, 
and for Mark, willingness to take voluntary and low-pay conservation or holiday 
camp work despite his possession of a degree in geography in a bid to immerse 
himself in his interest in 'the outdoors'. Moreover,, some interviewees' 
occupational histories have been marred by endemic insecurity, punctuated by 
redundancies of the ilk claimed to prompt reflexive self-awareness and scramble 
classed patterns of life chances or disjointed by active job shifts in search of 
contentment, with some seizing on opportunities to retrain through workplace or 
'lifelong learning' schemes which presuppose and encourage a flexible and 
reflexive workforce (cf. Edwards et al., 2002). 
Take, for example, Jackie, who after her undergraduate and postgraduate 
degrees in music, her real 'passion', worked for a music publishers and the Tate 
gallery before then embarking on an MBA and shifting careers into personal 
assistance and 'knowledge management' in the private and public sector -a 
trajectory in social space that veered from the left over to the right - until that was 
cut short by redundancy. Similarly, after her degree in languages and several years 
of travelling and temporary work Claire retrained in accountancy and worked 
through promotions to become a senior manager at a business services firm; whilst 
Abby, having spent several years as a secondary level teacher and working up to 
department head, is considering retraining into a new profession under the 
understanding that teaching is not, as it was for her mother a generation earlier, a 
'job for life' given the constant perceived threat of redundancy, and indeed that 
career shifts are 'almost expected' nowadays as 'people are willing to take more 
risks'. 
These facts alone are not enough to corroborate individualization and 
increased reflexivity: what is needed is insight into the principle of action 
underlying these various moves and trajectories and whether, more specifically, 
reflexivity as Beck or Giddens 
describe it is evident. The initial outlook is, 
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ostensibly, favourable to the two detractors of class: deliberation, planning and 
negotiation, all in the quest for what is best 'for me', seem rife. To give just three 
prominent examples: Jackie claims that she and her partner had 'thought about', 
4plotted' and 'talked about' moving to Bristol from London 'for years', primarily 
on the basis of its perceived 'lifestyle' benefits - i. e. its reduced demand for 
commuting and hence greater opportunity for leisure time, as well as its classical 
and chamber music facilities (groups, orchestras, etc. ) - and that it was her 
redundancy that prompted the move by presenting an 'opportunity'; Rebecca's 
decisions to move first to Japan, which meant ceasing her degree studies at that 
time, and then to London instead of staying in Canada both involved extended 
deliberation and negotiation of alternatives (she was 'torn', 'stressed' and 
'confused') in a bid to determine what was best for her; and Karen's decisions to 
take up medicine rather than teaching after graduating in psychology and to 
become a GP in particular in order to balance her career with her desire for a family 
were carefully considered and planned - after all, she 'always thinks a lot about 
everything' - in an effort to pursue what she 'enjoys' and 'loves', namely 'looking 
after people'. 
All these findings, then, would seem favourable to the theses of Beck and 
Giddens on reflexivity, life-planning and lifestyle adoption. Unfortunately for these 
two thinkers, however, things are not so simple. The fact of the matter is, behind 
each and every biographical event in the dominants' life courses lurks the 
continuing effects of structures of class difference in the guise of the pre-reflexive 
dispositions of the dominant habitus adapted to the enablements of capital. To 
begin with the instances of national and international mobility - which, it must be 
stressed, is almost completely lacking amongst the dominated interviewees 70 _ 
whilst it is true, to give Beck and Giddens their due, that this involves the seizing 
of opportunities opened up by a new social context, such moves are ultimately 
enabled only by the possession of convertible capital and, hence, the perception 
that such moves are within the realms of the possible. Abby, for example, could not 
have taken her teaching positions in France and Italy if she was not conversant in 
the host languages and in possession of enough economic capital to move (air fares, 
etc. ) and subsist (her affluent father paid 
her living expenses through Italy), and 
70 The only trips abroad for them, mentioned by very 
few, were in the form of infrequent and 
inexpensive holidays. 
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likewise Rebecca needed considerable cultural and economic capital to take up her 
teaching post in Japan. At the same time, furthermore, it would seem as if the 
dominants' mobility, or 'disembedding', is also guided by an extant disposition 
toward contextual discontinuity. Rebecca provides an extreme but clear example: 
her early experience, enabled by a capital-rich lifeworld, of transnational travel - 
being born in England whilst her father studied for a Phl), moving to Canada at a 
young age, having a set of grandparents in Barbados and another from Scandinavia 
- instilled a disposition reflexively grasped and discursively articulated as an 
'interest in other cultures and countries', a sense of never being 'grounded' (or 
4embedded' in a spatial locale) and a desire to travel. However, amongst less 
travelled interviewees it is still likely that an expectation of or openness to mobility, 
so much less evident amongst the dominated, has been produced by not only the 
initial relocation to university, which would have sedimented (variably) into the 
habitus as a protention that 'I can do it again', as Husserl and Schutz would say, 
but, given the fact that attending university was, as seen above, written into the 
orienting expectations of their lifeworlds, an early milieu that effectively prepared 
them for, i. e. induced in the temporal structures of the habitus, the prospect of 
disembedding ftom the very start. Disembedding, contextual discontinuity and 
spatial mobility were, in other words, lodged within the natural attitude as 
expectable, likely, typical and normal alongside higher education, raising difficult 
questions for Beck as to the extent to which disembedding, far from being a 
removal from class structures and patterns of practice, is itself a highly classed 
phenomenon. 
The occupational beginnings of Claire and Mark - which, it should be 
pointed out, only occupied a relatively brief period in their trajectories, were 
eventually supplanted by commitments to conventional professional careers and 
were unusual compared to the immediate post-university devotion to well-paid 
professional occupations amongst the majority of the dominant - can also be seen 
in a similar light: rather than being a foregoing of the opportunities furnished by 
capital, their attempts to subordinate or conflate their employment with leisure 
pursuits were in fact made possible only by the distance ftom necessity they 
enjoyed. Mark, for example, states that 
my parents have never been short of money. Always say, they've always been there to help 
out with the university and, when in Bristol [doing low-pay jobs] they've always been there 
as afall back. (emphasis added) 
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Furthermore, whilst the perceived insecurities at work are real enough (though not 
generalisable beyond the interviewees) the redundancies and endeavours at 
retraining, and the decisions that underlie them, only make full sense when set 
against the capital context in which they occurred. Jackie's move to Bristol, for 
instance, was only possible given the 'generous' payout from her redundancy, and 
the occasions of retraining are contextualised by the possession of enough 
economic capital and cultural capital to ensure, once again, the 'I-can-do-it-again' 
perception - Abby could 'perhaps' afford the substantial costs of doing another 
degree, but 'certainly another year' of training and, implied in her consideration of 
it as a realistic possibility, perceives herself as able to cultivate further cultural 
capital. 
All this points to the most important conclusion of all: the 'reflexivity' 
displayed by the dominant - the weighing up of options and the search for self- 
actualisation - is no more than the mundane consciousness of those distant from 
the exigencies of material necessity in a new social context. Yes, as Beck and the 
others would no doubt argue, the expansion of lifelong learning initiatives, the 
increased dominance of erratic market forces in a neo-liberal climate and the 
augmentation of global politico -economic and techno -communication linkages 
inevitably shape the situations faced, the options open and deliberated and that 
which is perceived as achievable. But, at the same time, the situations, options and 
perceived possibles within this social landscape remain differentiated by position in 
social space. In a nutshell, the substance of dominant class practices may have 
altered (increased transnational travel, retraining etc), but the relational 
circumstances supplying their conditions of possibility (capital, habitus) remain 
unchanged. 
The Dominated 
In order to validate this argument fully, however, comparison must be 
drawn with the dominated, for if an unfettered reflexivity detached from their 
relational conditions of existence floods their lives then the 
diminished significance 
of class could still be declared. On first sight, traces of the themes 
described by 
both Beck and Giddens can be discerned in the dominated interviewees' accounts 
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of their occupational history. Most of them, like the dominant, discussed occasions 
of active, deliberated choice and change regarding their present and future 
trajectories and, what is more, some of these even bore the hallmarks of 
4reflexivity' in the Beckian sense of taking oneself as the focal point of life 
decisions. So Phil tells of his relocation from Plymouth, the city that played host to 
his childhood and adolescence, after acquiring new employment there, repeatedly 
using language indicative of the quest for self-realisation (what T want) and self- 
determination (T decided) at the heart of individualization (Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim, 2002: 26): 
within six months I knew it weren't right for me, it was like I don't wanna be doing this, it's just pipe-fitting, things like that. SO I've had a big experience with that, which is quite 
good, you know. I thought 'no, I don't want this'. I was married at the time, I had one kiddie and one was on the way, and I had a mother-in-law who was most interfering and I decided the only real way to sort this out was to move away from Plymouth and reduce the influence of mother-in-law on my wife. (all emphases added) 
Similarly, Gary's venture into self-employed driver instructing, abandoning the 
franchise under whose auspices he had been operating for several years, was 
prompted by him 'looking at his options' and 'deciding the time was right', with 
his current practice guided by the maxim, a prosaic articulation of the notion of 
reflexivity, that 
you have to come out of yourself every now and again to see where you're going and what 
you can do to improve [ ... ] 
In some cases, the social root from which such reflexive episodes stem seem to 
have been the variety of 'personal trouble' such as divorce or redundancy that, 
according to Beck, have proliferated and spread across all sectors of society in 
reflexive modernity. For Joe, after his divorce and the subsequent collapse of his 
employment in the emotional fallout, he 
just thought 'right, okay, I'd better search for what I want, get on a path and hope to find 
something'. And I made a decision I wanted to get into building maintenance, and then 
started searching for roles like that. 
For others,, it was redundancy that struck and, in Gary's and Dave's cases and 
favourable to Beck's and Bauman's thoughts on the new volatility of social 
hierarchies given the caprices of global capitalism, dislodged them from the 
managerial positions they had managed to acquire, and hence the routines and 
experiential hubs they had established, and prompted them to turn back on 
themselves in order to actively create new ones: 
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Dave: So for the first time in my life I found myself actually without a job, and course I still had my [HGV] license so I just did a bit of agency work for a while. You can always get agency work, just like that, pick up the phone and got offers coming in. And then I thought 'well know what, I'll try a bit of foreign continental work' - always fancied that you know, like going overseas. So did that for a couple of years, went all over Europe - Spain, France, Italy, even went down to Kosovo, supplied the British army down there. 
Gary: In an ideal world I probably would [still] be a manager of an ice rink now and on good money, very good money, and bonus and all the rest of it. But because the path was cut off at that point [because of redundancy], then I was on the [metaphorical] road again, 'where do I go now? Where do I go now? Where do I go now? Come to the roundabout, I've got A, B, C or D, or exit one, two, three, four - which one do I take? Right, let's try 
one and let's go on and see what happens'. 
In short, Dave, Gary, Joe and the others give the impression that, in Bauman's 
terminology, they have been forced to remould themselves and maintain flexibility 
in the face of fluid social structures and transient bonds,, and it is, Beck would no 
doubt claim, the individual T, not what local or familial tradition or significant 
others dictate, that takes centre stage, assesses the options and enacts decisions in 
all cases. 
As with the dominant, however, this is not the whole story, for these 
apparently pro -individualization findings can be countered and qualified, and the 
importance of class reasserted, by observation of the twin sources of social inertia: 
capital objectified and capital embodied (Bourdieu, 1984: 110). On the one hand a 
whole host of consciously experienced constraints of objectified capital - money, 
goods, credentials - barring movement within social space can be paraded, such as 
Joe's inability to afford a college course on air conditioning and refrigeration given 
the low economic capital marking out his position, setting his projected goals 
evermore distant in the future, Hannah's resignation to a routine administrative job 
demanding less creativity and imagination than she would like because she needs 
to 'pay the bills', or Andy's exclusion from a desired occupation (housing officer) 
on the basis of his dearth of qualifications (institutionalised cultural capital). On the 
other hand, and much more importantly, there is the underlying principle of action 
in the first place, including the principle of those 'reflexive' actions examined 
above. For actions, choices and trajectories are not forged by decontextualised and 
cantecedentless' agents (cf. Bourdieu, 1990a: 42-51), even if, to give Beck his due, 
it appears agents are forced by contemporary social conditions, such as the increase 
in divorce rates and proliferation of family forms and the decline of lifelong 
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employment, 71 to formulate more explicit 'choices' throughout their trajectories 
than before. Instead, contrary to Bauman's (2002: 193) facetious claims that 
individual skills and 'habits' (or dispositions) melt away with the vagaries of 
flexible employment contracts and that agents are somehow extricated from 'the 
legacy of their past' (2004: 116), the underlying principle of choice and decision is 
the individual's habitus, as an accumulated personal experiential history lived 
through a social context determined by position in social space, such that whilst 
there may be deliberation or the need for explicit decision-making in any given 
biographical situation, this is, in all cases, founded on a pre-reflexive assessment of 
the practicable given the capital resources, skills and experience sedimented in the 
various levels of knowledge over the course of a life. As with Tina's contemplation 
of her future career, in other words, present thought on future possibles - induced 
by some specific conjunction of experience, be it accreted dissatisfaction or rapid 
redundancy or divorce - is conducted within limits as the options that enter 
mundane consciousness and the weights attached to them are circumscribed by the 
classed past. Furthermore, unlike Tina, whose subjectively projected field of 
possibles was filled with an array of more or less homologous options given the 
discourse of choice present in the school context, for older interviewees the 
horizons of this field are narrowed in accordance with the particular range of skills 
already accumulated. 
So, for example, Dave and Joe, prompted by the unforeseen disintegration 
of their employment, opted for occupational roles - long-haul lorry driving and 
building maintenance respectively - for which they already had declarative and 
procedural knowledge and even credentials because of the classed trajectories they 
had travelled since school. They may have been forced to rethink their situation, 
but that thought process and its outcome, and hence their future social positions, 
were bounded by the tacit sense of the achievable and 'sensible' given not just the 
broad resources inhering in their position in social space but their specific cognitive 
and corporeal possessions. Likewise, when Phil left his pipe-fitting job - it was 
71 Whilst the statistics are unequivocally supportive of the thesis that divorce, remarriage and hence 
family forms mushroomed in the UK in the latter part of the twentieth century (see e. g. Social 
Trends, 2007: chap. 2), due in good measure to the Divorce Reform Act 1969, there is much more 
dissension over the supposed decline of 'jobs for life' because of the over-exaggeration of either the 
prevalence of lifelong jobs in the past 
for the dominated or their current decline amongst all sectors. 
In any case, as already noted in Chapter 3, redundancy remains a 
fate disproportionately faced by 
the less advantaged. 
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ýnot for him', incidentally, only given the fact that the 'technical capital' (Bourdieu. 
2005) he had accrued on his apprenticeship in plant engineering had fostered 
higher expectations from his work (it was 'just' pipe-fitting) - he took up similar 
work to that which he had been trained for before eventually moving, like his father 
before him, to supervisory level. Other examples include Gary's current 
consideration of a move away from driver instructing, which he sees as an 
inherently unstable occupation, to driver examining where the same constellation of 
skills are deployed; Andy's moves from graphic designer to cartoonist, DJ, screen 
printer and studio manager, often prompted by the insecurities characteristic of the 
kind of work open to those in the lower reaches of social space, which have all 
been underpinned by a commitment to and knowledge of specific popular (and 
hence dominated) musical forms (e. g. punk, hip-hop, dance); and Frank's 
surrendering of his self-employment as a central heating fitter in the face of rising 
customer expectations (he 'thought stuff it') to become a technician at the local 
hospital which involved a transferral of skills already accrued. 
Even where a more disjunctive shift of occupation occurs, not only does it 
remain locked within the same area of social space but objectified and embodied 
capital continue to exert their conjoined force. A case in point is Gary who, when 
he was displaced from his managerial position and propelled into the job centre, 
was 'strapped' for options in owing to constraints of cultural capital: 
I was strapped for -I didn't know what to do. The problem is I left school not very 
articulate, and I didn't do many exams, I didn't enjoy school so therefore I suffered on 
exams, and I regret that because obviously it's made life harder for me. But yeah it was just 
a case of 'yeah right let's go down the job centre, let's see what's on advert. ' And I didn't 
warma work in a shop, I didn't wanna work in a, mechanically or engineering cos I didn't 
have the qualifications for that anyway, so it really limited what I was able to do anyway. 
However, having vaunted his 'communication skills' throughout the interview, 
explicitly and implicitly indicating them to be a product largely of his experiences 
dealing with all manner of people in his various managerial and non-managerial 
roles at the ice rink at which he had spent a large portion of his working life, Gary 
tried his hand at occupations within his restricted field of possibles consonant with 
this perceived ability - first as a police officer, but then when that fell through on 
account of colour-blindness, as a driving instructor. His own summation of this 
latter move, pithily condensing the intersection of his stock of capital, his self- 
identified dispositional possessions (communication, patience) and the composition 
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of the national (and local) job market - driving instruction being one of those 
service sector jobs that has proliferated in recent years - was that 
the reason why I became a driving instructor was, if you like, that was all that I couldfit into at that particular moment in time. I'm not so sure there's much else I could do now 
unless I went back to what I was doing before that. (emphasis added) 
Though he did not transfer specific occupational skills like those mentioned above, 
therefore, he still drew on a broad set of transposable dispositions acquired from 
his occupational experiences and selected a vocation which, given his sedimented 
past experience and range of realistic possibles, he could 'fit in to'. Hence he may 
indeed have been 'on the road again' and at the 'roundabout' of choice, to use the 
terms in which he conveyed his redundancy earlier, but the available exits from the 
roundabout were clearly circumscribed by his position and trajectory in social 
space from the start. 
Social Space Travellers: the Upwardly Mobile 
Amongst the dominant and dominated alike, then, it appears that, 
inauspiciously for the individualization theorists, the relational effects of class and 
the social reproduction and stasis they bring persist within the social context of the 
new millennium. Yet such reproduction is not total, for amongst the interviewees 
there exists a small but not insignificant collection of individuals who, despite 
beginning life in the dominated sector of social space, ascended into more 
privileged positions through the course of their educational and occupational 
trajectories. This is not, as cruder critics of Bourdieu-inspired analyses imply (e. g. 
Goldthorpe, 2007c), somehow antithetical to the late thinker's perspective on class 
or, consequently, the phenomenologically fine-tuned version of it employed here. 
Indeed, as is amply demonstrated by his various Passages on the changing locations 
of agents within the social space through individual investment and conversion of 
capital and the shifting preponderance and reward of particular occupational groups, 
and his factoring in of trajectory as the third dimension of social space to capture 
all of this,, mobility is not only allowed for but built into the very definition of class. 
Of course the extent of social mobility is always an empirical question, and 
statistically the prevailing finding would seem to be that whilst attendance and 
performance in post-16 education and higher education, the chief channels of 
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upward mobility, has moderately increased in absolute terms amongst even the 
lowest sections of social space in the last thirty years or so to match the expansion 
of the education system, the relative rates of participation, that is, the differential 
odds of attendance between positions in social space, have remained largely 
unchanged (see Archer et al., 2003; Furlong and Cartmel, 2007: 27-3 0). 72 
Nevertheless, a crucial curiosity is posed: what makes the upwardly mobile so 
different from the rest of those hailing from dominated positions? How do they 
manage to escape the common fate of their initial social neighbours and, 
importantly, do the kind of conditions described by Beck, Bauman and Giddens 
play any part by, for example, prompting some form of constraint- surmounting 
reflexivity? 
Initially, it would seem as if there is little if anything to separate the early 
conditions of life of the upwardly mobile and those who remain in the dominated 
sections of social space, with residential milieus described using much the same 
vocabulary: if not red-brick railway terraces, post-war council houses or 1930s 
semis in 'depressed', 'poor' or 'grey' city areas pock-marked by lewd graffiti and 
populated by manual workers of varying standing, the unemployed or even drug 
addicts (Lisa, Paul, Samuel, Zack), then poor rural life (Bernadette, Tessa). Their 
childhoods were perceived to be framed by a relative paucity of economic means - 
money was 'tight' (Lisa, Tessa, Zack), they had 'much less' money than their peers 
(Bernadette), were thus 'aware of money' as children and had to modify their 
behaviour (e. g. which shops they frequented) accordingly (Samuel), and 
recreational goods enjoyed by other children, such as the celebrated Rubix cube, 
had to be foregone (Lisa) - and none of their parents had attended university or 
offered any notable help with homework - with, for example, Tessa, a junior 
doctor and daughter to a lorry driver and disabled mother, noticing that because her 
parents were 'not academic' they offered less assistance with schoolwork than 
those of members of her cohort with more capital. Yet all proceeded through A 
levels, with this path being considered not only possible or achievable, but in some 
cases, much like the dominant, as almost aforegone conclusion. As Tessa puts it, 
she was 4always going to do' A levels, 'there was no question about it' for Samuel, 
72 Though there is not the space to pursue it fully here, Goldthorpe (2007c) is wrong to clam that 
Bourdieu's perspective is unable to handle relative rates of mobility instead of absolute rates - 
though perhaps at odds with the causal model underlying the statistical procedure, Bourdieu's 
relational definition of class fits with the study of relative rates quite well. 
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a doctor whose father worked as a prison officer and whose mother was a 
housewife, whilst Zack -a software engineer whose mother claimed disability 
benefit and whose step-father was an unsuccessful self-employed water-filler seller 
- claims it was 'expected' that he would continue education after GSCE level. 
Not only that, but, for all but one (Paul) 73 of the upwardly mobile, 
university was always within their range of possibles too, presented to them as a 
realisable goal which, with advice from the school, in competition with other 
options and driven by what would be 'best for them' (In Zack's words, searching 
for what 'I wanted to do' and what 'took my fancy'), they either took for granted 
within the natural attitude or mulled in mundane consciousness. For Samuel, for 
example, there was again 'no question about it', and both he and Tessa considered 
a variety of options - such as teacher, scientist, occupational therapist - that 
assumed university education, even if the specific courses pursued were subject to 
balanced pragmatic considerations of job prospects, perceived aptitudes and what 
they found 'interesting' before the guidance of the school intervened and turned 
them on to medicine. Similarly, Zack, though he had at least entertained the 
prospect of gaining work after school and feared it, reassured his anxious mother 
that 'yeah, course I'm going to uni', though this decision is rationalised in terms of 
his 'academic' A levels failing to 'point' to any practical application in a job and 
finding the prospect of employment 'unappealing'. And of course, as Beck would 
be quick to point out, all those who went to university were, like the dominant, 
'disembedded' from their locale as a corollary, distanced socially and 
geographically from their early lifeworlds and subject to new experiences and 
conditionings, breaking the continuity with their classed pasts and sometimes 
leading to an experienced sense of disjuncture and unease with consociates from 
that period (see the next chapter for more detail). As Zack put it: 
it's bizarre going back home and talking to people you knew and just seeing how much of 
a divide's in place even though it shouldn't be [ ... ] it's like having done A levels distances 
you from a lot of the people you knew at school, because at that point a lot of people have 
diverted and gone for like vocational courses and kind of - well I say vocational, most of 
them were business studies which doesn't end up being too vocational I think, in practice. 
73 Paul was perhaps closest to the immobile dominated in his trajectory and attitudes: having been 
forced to do A levels by his parents, he balked at the idea of higher education and certainly 
perceived it as beyond reach, instead taking a 
job as a clerk for an oil company. From there he 
gained vocational qualifications, which were seen as 
'practical' and possessing real benefits 
compared to schooling, and worked up the promotional 
ladder before being made redundant, trying 
his hand at self-employment and then landing his current 
job as a software engineer through an 
agency. His case is discussed below 
in relation to his employment history. 
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But they've gone more that way than A levels say, and you differentiate at that point, 
people have different things to talk about and start to have different attitudes I think. (emphasis added). 
In all cases the protentive sense that university - the key breaking point in 
their trajectories - was within the realm of the possible, likely and desirable, and 
the attendant projects conceived and considered in consciousness, would appear to 
be rooted in two interacting factors: in line with Beck and Giddens, the expanded 
higher education sector and its consequences for school careers guidance and 
implicit and explicit familial expectations - there is no doubt that university has 
become an option suggested to and considered by growing amounts of school 
pupils who would have struggled to compete for places in its more exclusive days - 
and the interviewees' perceived ability - they described themselves as 'smart' 
(Zack), 'hard working' (Tessa) or a combination of the two (Samuel), sometimes 
explained with reference to IQ and genetic inheritance, and thus saw it as almost 
self-evident that they would pursue academic studies. However, underlying the 
latter and contributing to the surrounding expectations and guidance is the real 
explanatory nub of the upwardly mobiles' divergent trajectories: parental 
strategies - those multifaceted actions stemming from the complexes of 
dispositions manifest in a desire for offspring to attain symbolic recognition and (as 
part of that) material well-being which, in Britain and other Western societies, 
hinges on success within the educational system - engendered, it would seem, not 
as a universal feature of humanity, as Bourdieu sometimes implies, but by the 
slightly different positions, trajectories and attitudes of the parents in question 
compared to the those of the rest of the (immobile) dominated. 
These strategies are evidenced by a number of intermeshed actions, 
behaviours and attitudes that set the parents apart, starting perhaps most 
fundamentally of all with the fact that they all, unlike the parents of the remainder 
of the dominated, seemed to place a high value upon educational success and 
encouraged it amongst their children. Lisa, whose mother had migrated from 
Ireland to Birmingham to work in a factory and whose father, 'born in a council 
house', was a draughtsman, provides a typical example when she states that her 
parents saw education as 'really, really, really important' such that 'doing well at 
school was the only thing that mattered'. They may not 
have been able to assist 
with schoolwork and impart cultural capital themselves, given their own 
low 
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holdings, but the message was clear: 'we were told that you had to do well at 
school or else! ' Consequently, she reports that she 'worked hard' at school, and 
indeed attained entry to the nearby grammar school 'off the back' of her older 
siblings (the eleven plus system had recently been abolished), and was thus subject 
to all the expectations and pedagogical modes of capital inculcation such 
institutions brought. Indeed, it was these expectations and the work ethic of the 
school, which 'reinforced [her] parents' values and vice-versa', that led her to do A 
levels and, eventually, follow all her older siblings on to university: 
had I have not gone to the school that I went to I don't think I would've gone to university 
at all, and I think with the expectation that I did go to university, if that wasn't there either I 
do honestly think I'd still be working in [supermarket chain where she worked as a 
teenager], or have about eight kids with god knows how many fathers. And I'm not saying 
that from a snobby point of view, but I know people who grew up on my road who've 
ended up in that sort of situation really. 
Expanding on this last point, Lisa clearly recognised that her parents' attitudes and 
behaviours, which so evidently structured her everyday experience, were out of 
step with those of the parents of consociates in close geographical proximity: 
I think other parents were a lot more laid back really. [They said] 'oh yeah, no it's fine to 
go to the local comp'. There wasn't that pressure there at all to be different or to do well. I 
remember from, well ever since I can remember, like from being that big [indicates a short 
height with hands] that you had to do well at school, because the eldest in my family, the 
brother, is thirteen years older than me and he was at grammar school at the time. It was 
always there, always, always, always. 
This account is paralleled by those provided by Tessa, Zack and Samuel - all their 
parents were perceivably encouraging of success at school even if unable to help 
once beyond a certain level, and all as a result reported working hard, to greater 
and lesser degrees, at school - but, additionally, as part of their parents' strategies 
they were sent to distant schools or colleges with higher expectations and 
standards than local alternatives with 'bad reputations' (a common refrain), 
primarily because of the more affluent areas they served, sometimes accompanied 
by a residential relocation to 'better quality' or 'reasonably nice' housing, itself a 
testimony to the parents' strategies for themselves to progress (for analysis of the 
parents-eye-view of school choice, see Gewirtz et al., 1995). 
Precisely why the parents of the upwardly mobile held such different views 
and conducted such different actions from the rest of the dominated, that is to say, 
pursued strategies of advancement, 
is not easy to ascertain given the low numbers 
of participants, but it is perhaps 
instructive to note that many of the parents actually 
occupied relatively high positions within the 
dominated section of the social space. 
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Lisa's father, for example, was very much a skilled, less manual breed of worker as 
a draughtsman; Samuel's father was obviously senior enough within the prison 
service to afford to move to a 'middle class' area whilst Zack's mother, though 
unable to work due to disability, was 'very bright indeed' and would have gone on 
to university had she not have been accused of cheating in an exam. Perhaps this 
accords well with the discourse of self betterment that accompanied many of the 
interviewees' understandings of their families' actions and wove through their life 
narratives - their parents populating that region of social space, so close to the 
petite bourgeoisie to the extent of shading into them and like them generally 
upwardly mobile into their positions, historically constructed as 'respectable 
working class', they may display the disposition toward 'getting on', of 
perpetuating their past social movement into the future by continuing their familial 
tra ectory through whatever means are appropriate, that forms a part of the greater 
internalisation of bourgeois values long-said to have characterised this class 
fraction (cf. Bourdieu, 1984: 331ff, Roberts, 2001: 83 0 f . 
74 Thus Lisa, for example, 
in explaining her parents motives, stated that 'it was the only way to get out of the 
life that you were in really, to be educated' and, a little later in the interview, that 
'the only way to get on was through education really, and through hard work', 
whilst Samuel notes that his parents 
were always supportive and always really keen that we stayed at school cos they saw it as a 
means to a better end and the opportunities they hadn't had [ ... ] They valued it and thought it was important cos they saw it as a way for us to better ourselves and that we had 
opportunities they didn't have. 
Furthermore, in at least one case there were clear, if at first hidden, advantages: 
Zack's grandmother, an office worker of forgotten rank with who he had frequent 
contact, was not only depicted as 'quite smart' and 'clever with words' and 'always 
relatively concerned with how I was doing', but because of her disposition toward 
self-betterment through education (she 'put quite a lot of stock in academic 
achievement', and this was 'instilled in her by her own mother' as 'how we better 
ourselves'), two of her children - i. e. Zack's aunts - had attended university and 
become professionals (a teacher and an accountant) with considerable cultural 
capital. Having such people within his lifeworld who could not only inculcate 
74 This is, then, a long-standing class-based disposition that, instead of prImarIly encouragIng saving 
and fertility strategies, as for Bourdieu's petite 
bourgeoisie (which included draughtsmen, like 
Lisa's father), realises itself through the expanded education system and promotion. 
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certain forms of cultural capital but provide knowledge of and expectations toward 
higher education, as Bourdieu and Passeron (1979: 26) noted long ago, 
distinguished him from the other members of the dominated and no doubt 
increased his objective chances, and subjective perceptions, of progression through 
the education system. This did not go unnoticed by Zack himself, who 
acknowledged that 'they, I think, would probably have been inclined to hurry me 
towards A levels' and joked that 'they were probably there trying to teach me to 
read and stuff - "what's this word? Onomatopoeia - now spell that"'. 
In sum, them, these individuals have seized upon the burgeoning higher 
education system and not only considered but pursued trajectories that, in a 
previous time, would have been closed to them, yet the answer to the question 
'why themT appears to remain, contrary to the ideas of Beck and the others, 
grounded in the relative advantages they possessed over their social neighbours and 
the strategies that issued therefrom. Having said this, however, the class origins of 
the upwardly mobile marked their entire trajectories and set them apart from the 
socially-static dominant individuals they encountered through their educational 
careers and occupations as well. Because of their parents' inability to directly 
transmit cultural capital through focussed or everyday learning, for example, their 
educational achievements were 'a conquest paid for in effort', as Bourdieu and 
Passeron (1979: 24) put it, that is, accomplished without the advantages, the ease, 
the lack of struggle and the assurance (in both senses of the word) which came with 
parents holding cultural capital (with the partial exception of Zack, who saw 
himself as intellectually able but mischievous, for the reasons discussed above). 
Bernadette, for instance, a farmer's daughter who was born, raised and schooled in 
rural France, received encouragement from her parents but did not consider herself 
'bright' at school and, once at university studying languages, 'completely failed' 
and dropped out, only completing higher education some years later at a post- 1992 
university in Britain. Her self-accumulated cultural capital, compounded by a 
penchant for 'partying', which capital-rich students no doubt incorporate but 
coupled with an ease and confidence in the seminar room and assessed work that 
allows them to succeed, could only take her so far. Likewise, Tessa describes how, 
because her parents were unable to help with schoolwork, she had to 'get on with 
it' by herself - displaying the 'defence' 
(or disposition) toward quiet determination 
with minimal 'fuss' noted amongst similarly placed 
individuals by Walkerdine et al. 
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(1999: 145-6), also evident in her resolve to temper the anguish her wayward 
brothers brought to her parents. Again, however, her whole trajectory, reliant on 
the self- accumulation of capital, was characterised by struggle: first of all, her 
hard-won A level grades were insufficient for direct entry into medicine, 
necessitating a year out of education - which she spent working and saving rather 
than travelling (an increasingly valued sign of 'broad horizons' and 'Initiative' 
amongst employers) - before reapplication; following this, she had to undertake a 
pre-medical foundation course, setting her further behind those riding their 
inherited cultural capital to a seamless transition; and, when finally at a red-brick 
university, she had difficulty keeping up with the work, compounded by the 
economic necessity (itself exacerbated by the fact that, because she had to take a 
year out, she missed the final year of grants) compelling her to pursue part-time 
work throughout her degree course in factories, shops and the like, and eventually 
graduated without honours. All in all, it was, she said, 'hard work', and though she 
'couldn't really say for sure' whether it effected her work (despite admitting that 
'maybe I could have done a bit better academically if I hadn't been working'), she 
was nonetheless jealous of those around her who did not have to work, and hence 
the bearer of deep-seated emotional impulses instilled by class difference, even if 
this was evidently mitigated by her disposition toward quiet determination and 
rationalisation: 
Well, I guess [I was] jealous sometimes, 'cos who wouldn't be, I mean I would have 
preferred to be in a position where I didn't have to work and that I wasn't getting into debt, 
definitely. I think lots of my close friends actually didn't have to work at all and it was 
difficult sometimes. But that's just the way it was, and you know, I got on. On the plus side 
of it, I got a lot out of doing jobs and working, I know now that I picked up a lot of skills 
by working than people who go through university and they - certainly medicine - and 
they're quite isolated as to what it's like to actually work and work as a part of a team and 
all the rest of it. (emphasis added) 
Further to this, Lisa captures another peculiarity of the upwardly mobile 
when asked about her parents' encouragement of Particular career options: 
Lisa: I suppose it was just whatever you felt you were good at, or could do, but then had I 
have wanted to do something like drama or something, or art -I was never good at art, but 
just for example - then that wouldn't have been acceptable because that wouldn't get you a 
proper j ob. You know, had to be something that was, could get you aj ob, you know, that it 
was something quite sensible really, rather than something outlandish. And I think it was 
always that -I know it sounds contradictory - you've gotta do something that's good, but 
not that good. So we wouldn't have been encouraged say, to do something like medicine, 
because that was out of your league, you know. It was in a sort of set area of acceptable 
sort of professions or routes that you would take. I know that sounds a bit weird, but yeah. 
WA: Was that something that they kind of said or that you could sense? 
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Lisa: A bit of both basically, I think it was sort of implied but also through things that were said to my siblings. So for example my, when my brother did [ ... ] my brother did the eleven plus and did really, really well and was sort of earmarked to o to Cambridge, I 9 
mean he didn't in the end but it was like 'oh we can't do that, you can't go to Cambridge, that's far too, that's far too high up'. Do you know what I mean? It was sort of, you go to a red-brick or a polytechnic and do something really sort of middle of the road but you can't be exceptional basically. I mean maybe none of us were, but it was never the idea of that 
you can do whatever you want, whereas I know there's some sort of like liberal 
upbringings you're taught to sort of be whatever you want and do what you want to do and 
you're really great at everything kind of thing. 
Expressed here, in a nutshell, are the limits of the conceivable range of possibles, 
the 'sensible', the 'set area of acceptable professions' held by Lisa's parents - 
illuminating in consciousness, like the beam from a torch, only a circumscribed arc 
of social space and leaving the rest in the unknown, unthinkable darkness - and 
conveyed to her explicitly and implicitly, based, in the end, on the limits of capital 
inhering in their structural location. The disposition toward self-betterment is 
underpinned by realism and, betraying their class roots, a commitment to the 
practical or vocational: on the one hand,, the resources available and accrued can 
only go so far in reality (as we have seen) and, as such, set the bounds of 
perception, protention and projection, whilst on the other, the outcome must be a 
4proper job', respectfully but not overly rewarded economically and symbolically, 
rather than personal fulfilment - i. e. individualization's 'self-realisation' - as is 
more the case with those distant from necessity. Samuel and Tessa displayed the 
same sense of realisable goals: remember both had considered a variety of mid- 
level, vocational courses (with Samuel explicitly vaunting the vocational) such as 
teaching and occupational therapy; it was only the schools they attended, at their 
parents' behest, which intervened and set them on a different path in accordance 
with their institutionalised expectations. 
All are now in full time work, two as doctors, one as a HR officer and the 
rest as 'wired workers'. Most are at the outset of their careers and,, moreover, are in 
occupations that afford relative stability, but those that are not have experienced the 
insecurities and options said by Beck and others to plague the world of work today. 
Lisa, after several low-skill, low-pay jobs following graduation and a 'practical' 
decision to do a PGCE, embarked upon a career in teaching only for 
disenchantment, and an assault by a pupil, to lead her to change careers and, with 
research, cogitation and advice from consociates, move into human relations work, 
retraining in the process. Teaching was not a job for life for her, reflecting Abby's 
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sentiments above, and she utilised the opportunities for 'reskilling' that mark the 
educational landscape, but of course by this time she, like the dominant, had 
acquired enough capital - cultural, economic and social (not only through the 
capital of her partner, a web developer, but through contacts securing her first HR 
work) - to facilitate what was essentially a short-distance horizontal, and hence 
hardly erratic, shift in social space. 
Similarly, Paul, the son of a builder and secretary who detested school and 
is, thus, the only upwardly mobile interviewee not to have attended university, 
attained work-based qualifications and promotions to secure managerial work, only 
to be made redundant in the face of a 'down-scaling'. Unlike Lisa, however, he did 
not have the same capital stocks to draw on and instead fell back on self-employed 
painting and decorating, the manual, Practical work he had first experienced with 
his grandfather, a builder and property renovator, only to then take up his present 
work through an employment agency. He himself was adamant that that idea of 
having a 'job for life' 'doesn't exist anymore', that 'people get fed up, people need 
a change, people grow out of what they're doing I guess' - certainly, he does not 
4really want to do the same thing all the time', and, echoing the sentiments of 
others already witnessed above and sitting comfortably within Beck's theory, used 
his redundancy as an opportunity to 'think about what I wanted to do'. Still, as with 
the others, the pull of his class past upon his current position is significant - he 
intends only to stay in his present work for a few more years before eventually 
moving into property development, a lucrative application of his renovation skills - 
even if he will need the economic capital he is accumulating now, as a well-paid 
software developer with a well-paid human relations manageress for a wife and no 
children, to achieve this. The present and the future remain anchored in the past, 
even where, on the surface, there has been a break from it. 
Conclusion: Persistence through Change 
Perhaps the upwardly mobile demonstrate most starkly of all the theme 
running throughout the interviews as a whole: the persistence of relational class 
processes, but in modified form as the conditions in which they operate shift with 
the perpetual march of social change. The education system has, as Beck and 
Giddens in particular claim, expanded and engulfed adolescents from tracts of 
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social space where previously university was as distant in subjective aspirations as 
it was in objective probability, but on the other hand, amongst those studied here at 
least, still recruits only those already geared toward social ascendance and oriented 
toward the arduous labour and struggle of capital accumulation necessary to 
counteract the inertial drag of social origins. There is even some evidence of an 
institutionally- induced and aided cogitation of post-school options (or 'reflexivity! ) 
amongst all sections, a task of mundane consciousness that was perhaps less 
prevalent when 'traditional' manual work was plentiful and schools less inclined to 
intervene in occupational choice, but this occurs only within the confines of a 
perceived field of possibles and dispositions (including likes and dislikes) produced 
by the structural mediation of biography. The world of work for many of these 
interviewees, finally, has been afflicted by insecurity and transience whilst also 
incorporating extensive global travel, yet the prospects of international mobility, 
the handling of transience and the plans constructed out of any 'fateful moment' 
are always shaped by the capital stocks, the dispositions and the future orientations 
granted by the past. 
So individualization is not a complete fallacy, for elements of Beck and the 
others' arguments do indeed find some support. Yet the claims that class has been 
or is being washed away by the tide of change, like a fragile sandcastle at the edge 
of the sea, are revealed for the erroneous exaggerations they are. The examination 
of objective life courses would instead seem to confirm, but add substantial and 
much-needed flesh to, the well-founded suspicions of class researchers that we are 
witnessing not the vanishing of class, but its transformation (e. g. Walkerdine et al., 
1999; Savage, 2000). More specifically, I would add, we are witnessing an 
alteration of the substance of class - discrete practices, occupations and 
educational experiences attached to any particular position - but the system of 
relations and clusters in social space that, in the end, define class and underpin 
practices and experiences, remains largely unchanged. 
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Class Practices, Class Sense, Class Discourse 
The idea that class has ceased to structure objective life courses was always 
the more controversial and contentious component of the individualization thesis. 
Much more credible, so commentators admit, are the claims that class collectivism, 
lifestyles, explicit identities and politics have waned to the point of extinction and 
been supplanted by atomisation, personal responsibilisation, subcultural or other 
affiliations and post-materialist politics. Indeed, few wholeheartedly contend that 
class collectivism and mobilisation are as prominent now as ever, save a few 
staunch Marxists (e. g. Callinicos, 1999). There are others, however - and I am 
referring particularly to those within the cultural strand of class analysis such as 
Savage (2000) - who, as we saw earlier, take a more reconciliatory line. Class 
collectivism, they argue, is not so salient, but then this was never as extensive or 
important to the theorisation of class outside of a Marxist framework as Beck and 
the others make out anyway. What matters are the multiple modes through which 
people distinguish themselves relationallyftom others - either concrete individuals 
or specific constructed 'groups' - within the social space, display a keen sense of 
difference and similarity in expressing their individuality and convey this in 
whatever register they have available - all of which, following Bourdieu, would 
coincide roughly with the objective divisions of capital. 'Class' as such need never 
be uttered, especially not as a rallying cry for collective solidarity or mobilisation, 
but if people do articulate their sense of place with the explicit language of class 
then it is, contrary to Beck and Bauman's assertions, testament to the enduring 
relevance of this discourse for perceiving difference despite the socio-political 
changes of the last thirty years believed to have destroyed it. 
The findings reported herein largely concur with the general thread of this 
argument. There was little in the way of collectivism, unionism or solidarity, 
consumption patterns have shifted and, as Beck and Bauman would expect, 
personalised understandings of the setbacks and springboards of life were not 
uncommon, yet, through all this, symbolic and perceptual differentiation was 
pervasive. This can be demonstrated through the examination of three levels of 
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practice, starting with the unarticulated symbolic differentiation of lifestyle patterns, 
or class practices, through the fuzzy and confused, but nevertheless endemic, stark 
and often self-depreciating sense of difference and similarity, even amongst self- 
proclaimed doubters of class sense, to the explicit discourse of 'class', its prompted 
and unprompted appearances in the interviews and its place within the typification 
schemes and political propensities of the interviewees. 
Class Practices 
Classed lifestyle pursuits and practices were at the core of Distinction, and 
so if the claim of the individualization theorists that lifestyles are no longer 
expressions of class location but subject to reflexive negotiation and choice, with a 
resulting decline of symbolic similarities in the flux, were found to be true then this 
would strike at the very heart of contemporary class analysis. The interviews 
indicate, however, that such a death blow is not forthcoming. Economic and socio- 
cultural change have had an impact, to be sure: some consumption patterns once 
linkable to divisions of capital, such as ownership of televisions or mobile phones, 
have become less prominent as technological advances have cheapened these 
products - all of the dominated thus owned such goods, including large wide- 
screen televisions - old markers of class communities,, such as the Working Men's 
club of Dennis et al. 's (1969) coalminers, have dwindled and new pursuits and 
activities are frequently invented or appropriated from other cultures - to the extent 
that someone like Hannah, for example, with few economic and cultural means, 
was prone to feed her children sushi. But beyond this, individualization receives 
little support. Far from being unconstrained, unpatterned and reflexively adopted, 
symbolic practices and tastes were, by and large, clearly divided by the 
dominant/dominated fissure and their uptake fully explicable with the theory of 
class outlined in chapter 4. This can be illustrated by a snapshot of the musical 
tastes and leisure pursuits prevailing on either side of the central social partition. 
Focussing for the moment on preferences in music, admittedly it initially 
appears that the heterogeneous and 'popular' tastes mentioned across the board 
dash any clear appeal to classed practices in the sense described by Bourdieu: rock, 
grunge, punk, new wave, jazz, dance. electronic, 
hip hop and downbeat - musical 
styles with diverse origins and apparently 
irreducible to the principle of greater or 
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lesser 'distance from necessity' - all found themselves cited as genres of choice, 
sometimes jostling alongside each other within one interviewee's cluster of tastes. 
Amongst the dominant, Isabelle, for instance, declared that she liked 'all sorts 
really', 'a bit of everything' from dance and downbeat (Groove Armada, Massive 
Attack) to jazz and thus 'wouldn't put [herself] in any particular pigeon hole', 
whilst Jackie claimed to have thoroughly 'eclectic' preferences. The dominated, 
too, often claimed to like, in Tina's words, a 'scoop of everything', with various 
popular styles even being supplemented by an appreciation of classical music. All 
this would seem to point toward a widespread 'omnivorousness' of musical taste of 
the kind that has recently been so extensively documented and has framed so many 
debates in studies of cultural consumption, though without the customary counter 
that those with fewer cultural and economic resources remain univores and hence 
symbolically differentiated and denigrated. Could it be that the proliferation of 
cultural forms brought by individualising conditions of existence -a globalised and 
heterogeneous music industry, cultural coexistence and hybridity, affluence and 
such like - have broken down even this last barrier of class difference and, as 
Giddens and the others postulate, demanded reflexivity from all? 
Though the interviews do not allow assertions on national patterns of 
consumption, when we begin to sift through and break down the interviewees' 
answers in a little more detail, a rather different scenario, throwing into question 
not only individualization but the usually class-friendly thesis of oninivorousness 
as well, transpires: the tastes of the dominant and dominated remain, on the whole, 
very similar to those described by Bourdieu. Yes, classical music was cited 
amongst the dominated, but only, to be precise, by two individuals. For the 
majority, a 'scoop of everything' actually meant a variety of sub-genres of popular 
music, whether R'n'B, indie or pop, with classical music representing a terra 
incognita, conspicuous by its absence or, when explicitly raised, quickly rejected: 
Tina: I like some R'n'B, but not all of it. But I like sort of erm, I dunno, like Fratellis and 
Keiser Chiefs, that kind of thing. Indie I think it's classed as, I don't know. But I do like a 
general scoop of anything -I mean I like Take That, I'm sad. 
WA: What about classical? 
Tina: No, don't like that too much. 
Even amongst those who do mention classical music, it is clear that the surface 
4omnivorousness' is spurious: 
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Trisha: Yeah, I've got some classical. Rimsky-Korsakov, Flight of the Bumble Bee, that kind of type of thing, that's really invigorating. Vanessa Mae, I think she's fantastic, has a very much upbeat, modem style classical. Ifind opera very difficult. Couple of bits and pieces. I like musicals as well sometimes, some of the very Andrew Lloyd Webber's type thing. (emphasis added) 
Flight of the Bumblebee - an upbeat composition so pervasive in popular culture 
(television shows, cartoons, etc. ) as to diminish its symbolic value - and Vanessa 
Mae -a well-known violinist who often synthesises popularised classical pieces 
with dance music - coupled with the acknowledgement of the limits of one's ability 
to consume consecrated art forms demark not the tastes of an early oblate with the 
ingrained appreciation for the demanding qualities of classical music but, at best, 
the consumption of accessible legitimate culture that Bourdieu held to be a 
hallmark of the petite bourgeoisie (which Trisha, as a skilled technician, 
approaches in social space). 
This spurious omnivorousness 'from below' can be compared with the 
tastes of dominant which, though often including reference to popular styles of 
music, represent a spurious ornnivorousness 'from above'. In opposition to the 
dominated, for example, the vast majority of privileged interviewees, including 
those in their younger years, actually reported a strong tastefor classical music and 
opera - the symbolic markers of cultural capital par excellence - with Mozart and 
Beethoven appearing as favoured composers but with less well-known (and thus 
symbolically more prominent) figures such as Brahms, Chopin and Mahler also 
being named. In most cases, furthermore, this was linked to a proficiency, 
completely absent amongst the dominated, in playing classical music on 'noble' 
instruments, whether piano (Rebecca, Elizabeth), cello (Elizabeth), percussion 
(Karen) or viola (Jackie), usually started in early life with the encouragement or 
even exhortation of parents eager to invest capital and strengthened through 
frequent contact with the paraphernalia of music (cf. Bourdieu, 1984: 75). An 
obvious case of this is Rebecca, whose mother was a music teacher and encouraged 
her and her two siblings to all play an instrument and sing, with music, instruments 
and practice thus being a routine feature of everyday life, but just as interesting are 
those accounts peppered with more indirect indications. Jackie's comments, for 
example, encapsulate in a particularly lucid way the experiences of the others. 
Intent on ascribing her musicality to her own unconditioned propensities, she 
nevertheless alluded to very particular conditions of possibility: 
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WA: So where did the interest in music come from? 
Jackie: Mostly from me actually. It wasn't -I mean my father's tone deaf, if you've ever heard him sing somewhere it's really quite extraordinary. My mother does have musical 
ability, she sings in a WI choir now where they live, and she did learn the pianofor a bit. But it was me, we used to go to ftiends houses who hadpianos and I used to beg them to 
please to be allowed to play the piano and to try and pick out tunes, not just like thump it. And eventually, I think my parents wanted to have a piano anyway, so we got a piano, 
which was very exciting. And after about two years my piano teacher said you know, 
would I like to learn another instrument because they had lots of like Saturday music 
schools -I don't know if they have them round here or where you grew up - where you go on a Saturday morning and you have various sort of instrumental lessons in groups. And I 
chose the viola, I wanted to play the cello but the cello was rather big and my mother thought well my dad worked Saturday mornings and she was like you had to take it on the bus because, so could you get something a bit smaller. So we negotiated and negotiated to 
the viola which is like the middle instrument of the string group set. So that's what I learrit. 
WA: So your parents were quite encouraging? 
Jackie: They were very encouraging, oh yes. Yes, but not pushy, they never really made me do it. I think we did have discussions about practice - I'm sure I remember one or two - but on the whole it was me and I think if I'd turned around and said I don't want to do this 
anymore, I don't think they'd have made me. I mean you can't, you can try, you can lock a 
child in a room with an instrument, you can't make them practice with it can you really? 
So no they were very encouraging of that, and they encouraged me to study [it] at 
university. (all emphasis added) 
A mother who possessed some embodied cultural capital, school consociates with 
enough capital to own pianos as a facet of lifeworld experience, enough parental 
economic capital (and the disposition) to acquire a piano and hire a piano teacher, 
enough of a knowledge and investment to negotiate types of instruments, plentiful 
encouragement and directives on practice - all this signals that Jackie's musical 
proclivities were not innate, ex nihilo or the product of reflexive deliberation but 
instigated and nurtured by the propitious lifeworld experiences granted by the 
control of ample capital. 
Furthermore, it is not just that the dominant have a penchant for classical 
music alongside the plethora of popular genres cited above; rather, when more 
popular artists or genres were mentioned they were often obliquely articulated as 
subordinate to, or at least defined in relation to, classical. Popular music, for 
instance, was often portrayed as a largely undifferentiated 'other' to its classical 
counterpart, most succinctly captured in Elizabeth and Rebecca's claim to listen to 
and play 'both' forms of music when asked - 'classical and pop'. Such a 
juxtaposition, and such a homogenisation of non-classical music, did not appear 
amongst the dominated, for whom classical was a negligible genre of less relevance 
than the various sub-genres of popular music. When particular artists were named 
from the popular camp, furthermore, they were often older performers with 
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biographical significance, such as The Ramones or David Bowie, or marginal 
groups who make frequent references to literary and other highbrow forms of 
culture and harmonise with the cultured habitus for exactly this reason, such as The 
Divine Comedy. Contemporary popular music was sometimes little known: 
Jackie: I don't ever listen really to sort of Radio One. We tried for a party once buying a CD of current hits, and we didn't know any of them, it was really embarrassing! I was 
sitting there sort of picking through some next tracks and I think there was one that we knew, haven't got a clue what it was. 
This was less the case, admittedly, for the younger members of the dominant such 
as Isabelle, Abby and Karen, who engaged significantly with popular forms of 
music alongside classical and hence displayed a more genuinely omnivorous 
disposition. 75 Whether this denotes a nascent change in the listening patterns of the 
dominant toward ornnivorousness, as many would argue, or simply a life cycle 
effect,, is impossible to tell, but Rebecca, who at thirty is making the transition out 
of young adulthood, is certainly suggestive of the latter: 
WA: What about music? What kind of music do you listen to? 
Rebecca: Oh gosh, it really depends. I love - if I'm just cooking dinner or something I like 
to put jazz on, and I like classical music. But if I'm in the car, I'll often listen to Radio One, 
I'll swap between Radio One and Radio Four, which sounds really hard but [laughter]. So I 
don't like a lot of like new pop bands or anything. I'm not someone who always has to 
have music on at all -I don't jog to music, I don't rely on it I think, as a lot of other people 
do. 
WA: Have you been more into music at other points of your life? 
Rebecca: Yeah, when I was in high school definitely. I was really in to music. 
WA: What kind? 
Rebecca: ACDC, Aerosmith, Guns 'n' Roses, the Stones, CSNY, Pink Floyd -I loved Pink 
Floyd in high school. 
WA: Do you still listen to that? 
Rebecca: Do I still listen to it? 
WA: Yeah. 
Rebecca: Well not really. (all emphasis added) 
Unsurprisingly, the upwardly mobile amongst the dominant also displayed a mix of 
musical tastes. Classical was certainly not absent, and was often rooted in their 
parents , investment strategies for their upward mobility, as documented in the 
75 For a statistical demonstration and interpretation of this finding, see Gayo-Cal et al. (2005). 
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previous chapter - for example, Tessa was encouraged to play classical music on 
the piano and comet and was dutifully supported by her parents: 
WA: Did your parents pay for the lessons and the piano? 
Tessa: Yeah, my mum used to pay for them, and I think to be honest I think she paid for lots of the stuff through her disability allowance, 'cos she used to get lots of sort of disability living allowance and things like that. So I think, from what I can remember, my 
mum used to pay for lots of things. And I used to have a piano teacher that I went to, also taught me the clarinet and because like we'd known her for such a long time, they were friends, I don't think they paid huge amounts for lessons. We probably paid a lot less than 
you would now, so I think that was probably a bit easier because of that. 
WA: So were your parents encouraging of your music? 
Tessa: My mum was, yeah, my mum was. My dad used to work lots, loads of hours, and 
was far less sort of involved in that. But my mum was, yeah. I mean she used to sort of drive me to rehearsals and you know, all over the place. Yeah she was really good, very 
encouraging. 
Similarly, though he did not play an instrument, Zack's grandmother - the same 
one who featured so prominently in his ascent - would ply him with classical 
music CDs. However, where classical was mentioned it was always with some 
ambivalence. Lisa, for example, stated that 'as a rule I don't listen to classical 
music' because she finds it 'quite boring' but may, like the petite bourgeoisie in 
Distinction equipped with cultural goodwill, 'hear the odd tune, I couldn't tell you 
what it was but [I'd say] "oh that's nice", whilst Tessa - who also played her 
cornet in a miners' brass band, the archetypal musical manifestation of the British 
industrial proletariat - declares that 
I listen to classical music occasionally but not really. I used to listen to it a bit when I was 
revising 'cos I used to find it quite good as sort of background music. But not really. I 
mean I used to listen to it more when I used to play classical music, and if I play the piano 
now that's what I'll play but I would say it's quite rare that I listen to classical music. 
Instead the upwardly mobile, including the rest who rejected classical music 
altogether, preferred the genres they had brought with them from their youth lived 
in the lower regions of social space, such as house or electronic music (Lisa, Zack), 
eighties pop (Samuel) or punk (Paul), testifying to the significance of the classed 
past, even if made more ambiguous by the intersection of trajectory and present 
position, on consumption tastes. 
Beyond the realm of music, broader lifestyle practices also tend to conform 
to symbolic demarcations of class: tennis, reading 'classics', competitive rowing, 
walking, badminton, golf, theatre, drama, museums, foreign cinema, Interest in art 
and creative writing - all practices associated with the upper regions of social space 
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in Distinction or (especially something like rowing) historically in British culture - 
were prevalent amongst the dominant, whilst the dominated, who listed fewer 
pastimes in general on account of not having 'much spare time' and certainly not 
'the time or the money for anything expensive' (Dave), named such activities as 
boxercise (Phil), 'tinkering' with motorbikes (Dave) and 'making things' (Tina) - 
all activities centred more or less on practical, functional endeavours entailing 
76 bodily craft and skill - as their hobbies . Crucially, the activities do not appear to 
be the outcome of antecedentless, reflexive decisions, as Giddens would have it, 
but -just as with the playing of musical instruments detailed above - usually stem 
from particular capital-mediated childhood experiences, classed dispositions or 
parental input. For example, Dave's penchant for 'tinkering' with motorbikes - 
which he admits has waned now he is older - is contextualised by the early 
lifeworld experiences granted by a father who had worked as a mechanic and 
whose work spilled over into his spare time: 
Dave: My dad was very much like you know, he was very keen on vehicles and stuff like 
that in general and we kind of grew up you know tinkering around with cars and what have 
you and I suppose its where it comes from really, no doubt about it. 
WA: So what kinds of things was he into with his cars? 
Dave: He'd just, you know, take the engines apart, repair them, you know whatever, 
always mucking about with them in one way or another you know. Yeah, and you know 
when I used to have motorbikes I used to do that as well, used to take 'em apart and mend 
cem you know, put 'em back together again. (emphasis added) 
Similarly, though on the other side of the social divide, Rebecca's voracious 
reading - from classics such as Anna Karenina to modern fiction - must be 
contextualised by the fact that her father 'reads a lot' to the extent that he has 'got a 
library in his house'. Other examples are less directly tied to such lifeworld 
experiences, but nevertheless issue from the broad classed dispositions established 
early in life. For example, Phil's attendance at boxercise classes - populated 
76 There were some practices shared by the dominant and dominated - for example, both Rebecca 
and Tina practiced gymnastics in their childhood and both Rebecca and Joe enjoy running. Whether 
these particular practices are shared more generally would require statistical analysis of a larger 
sample, but of course not all pastimes are going to be clearly differentiated along class lines in terms 
of sheer prevalence. However, it could still be that the meaning attributed to and the possible 
outcomes of the practices are differentiated. Running, for example, may have very different 
meanings for Rebecca and Joe - for Rebecca, a means of keeping fit in line with the ascetic health 
ethic of some of those with ample capital (see Savage et al., 1992), where the body is an end in 
itself, for Joe a cultivation of prowess using the body in an instrumental fashion (cf. Bourdieu, 
1993a: 129ff) - and it is not hard to 
imagine the contrasting possibilities and outcomes of Rebecca 
and Tina's gymnastics granted by their 
differing capital resources. The same could be said for other 
supposedly shared practices, such as watching 
football or going to public houses (Savage and 
Warde, 2008), and raises interesting questions for the mapping of symbolic space. 
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overwhelmingly, he says, by manual workers and first brought to his attention by a 
colleague at work - is a product of his disposition toward bodily performance and 
sport developed as a child with little interest in academic activities at school. 
All in all, the image constructed by Beck, Giddens and Bauman of transient 
and unconstrained lifestyle practices bears little resemblance to the interviewees, 
accounts. On the contrary, the leisure pursuits surveyed here - including those, 
such as boxercise, of recent invention - remain tightly structured around the 
objective divisions of social space and guided by the structural ly- situated habitus. 
Consequently, we can draw this section to a close by observing that even where 
lifestyles have, as Giddens in particular claims, moved centre stage in some 
people's decision-making processes, the fact remains that these are still decisions 
flowing from classed lifestyles and, thus, class positions. Hence we have Jackie and 
Elizabeth - actually the only two respondents resembling the Giddensian late- 
modern agent in this regard, likely because their privileges afford such prominence 
- whose residences and significant others were chosen on the basis of their 
respective proclivities for two foremost signposts of symbolic dominance: 
orchestral music and rowing. 
Class Sense 
Lifestyle practices may be objectively patterned in accord with the fissures 
of capital, but are they perceived as such? Does the homology between social space 
and symbolic space, in other words, give rise to a widespread and pernicious 'class 
senseý as symbolic goods and practices are read, decoded and judged by socially 
induced schemes of perception or has it, as Beck and the others would claim, been 
drowned by a deluge of individualist discourse? The solution offered by the 
interviewees' accounts is somewhat unfavourable to the individualization thesis: 
the sense of relational difference and similarity induced by the reading of practices 
and behaviours was pervasive in life narratives and provoked a plethora of moral 
judgements and emotional responses, and even where there were some doubters of 
class sense such disavowals still surreptitiously summoned perceived differences in 
order to question them. 
Relational differentiation and the perceived homologies upon which it rests 
were signalled most frequently in the pejorative 
description of typified incumbents 
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of positions encountered in the course of life. An exemplary instance is Lisa's 
recollection of her university days: 
Lisa: [ ... ] for a polytechnic, there were an awful lot of really posh sort of, public school 
people who you know, I'm not saying just cos you went to public school you're necessarily 
posh, but that sort of - there were quite a lot of Sloanes, you know, who are really like [imitates voice] 'oh yah, marvellous darling', you know and driving around in sort of posh 
cars, and at the time had car phones and all this. 
WA: What's a Sloane? 
Lisa: Oh right, erm okay. It's someone who's - I'm trying to think of an equivalent - so I guess Prince William and Harry would be typical Sloanes. I mean I know they're royalty but they're very sort of, very upper crust, not just necessarily wealthy or public school 
education but very you know, into sort of horses and polo and - trying to think what else. You know that - does that make sense? Maybe they don't exist anymore, I don't know. But 
at the time it was a definite term, Sloane rangers, that kind of thing, and they would really 
sort of look down on anyone who wasn't posh -a very social set I guess. 
WA: Did you have much contact with them? 
Lisa: No, not at all. I think I was quite antagonistic towards them really. 
WA: Were they the majority or the minority? 
Lisa: In reality at [the poly] they were probably the minority I guess, but they felt like the 
majority cos they tended to be quite loud and go round in big groups and make their 
presence known I guess. 
In an almost parallel fashion, Zack makes reference to the prevalence of 'rahs' 
when describing the affluent area of Bristol in which he used to dwell: 
WA: What do you mean by 'rah'? 
Zack: Oh right, just erm, yeah it's Sloanes you know? Basically yeah, posh kids, rich kids, 
anyone who's got that intrinsic arrogance, I think is probably the sort of general description. 
You can usually spot them, which is quite funny. 
WA: How? 
Zack: There's a tendency for rugby shirts amongst men, that'll be pink. There'll be 
pashminas and things you know. Basically mini Paris Hiltons is what you can imagine for 
the girls, you know. It's a horrendous stereotype, but in a lot of ways it's true. My first year 
in halls I lived in one of the more expensive halls, so it did actually attract quite a lot of - 
well me and one other person were the only people on our floor to have not gone to private 
schools, you know, and kind of over time you built up a mental image that's quite difficult 
to explain, but it almost functions on the street where you go like [indicates pointing 
someone out in the street] 'there's one'. Yeah, I dunno how justified it is, but there you go. 
It's like racial profiling, but not. 
Both accounts demonstrate the prepredicative, 'difficult to explain' pairing of 
affluence and private schooling (i. e. a certain neighbourhood of social space) with 
specific symbolic practices (polo, rugby shirts) constructed from experience, both 
appeal to celebrity figures as model representatives of the classification in order to 
facilitate communication of the typification bundle (or 'mental image'), both 
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mobilise extant linguistic descriptors produced and disseminated as part of the 
hi storico -symbolic struggle as epithets for the constructed category (rah, Sloane. 
posh), and in both cases the construction prompts an affective-moral response 
insofar as they patently recall with resentment the perceived arrogance, brashness 
and condescension - in other words, the brazen practice of symbolic violence - 
trussed to the typified individuals. Both narratives are no doubt so pellucid and 
elaborate because they are delivered from the mouths of upwardly mobile 
interviewees and refer to the disjunctive, 'disembedding' experience granted by the 
entering of worlds - the university, the affluent suburb - populated with agents 
from sectors of social space distant from their origins, yet, when pushedJust about 
all respondents reported making 'snap judgements' (Samuel) or 'instant 
perceptions' (Claire) based on appearance and articulation: 77 
Andy: [ ... ] to see a student in Clifton [an affluent area of Bristol] who's eighteen and then 
see a girl in Whitchurch [a poor area in Bristol] who's eighteen and see the complete 
difference between the two. You know there's a world of difference you know. 
WA: What kind of things then ... you say you can tell from the way they dress ... what kind of things really stick out? 
Andy: Well it's just the way you know you can tell what one [inaudible] just by looking at 
them, just by the size of their gold earrings or the size of their pashmina, you know 
basically that's - that and their hairstyle, you know have they got all their hair scraped 
back, have they got a lot of highlights, have they just got blonde hair. You know it's quite 
easy to tell the difference without anyone opening their mouth what class they're from, 
even to what sort of job they maybe might be doing, you know. And with blokes it's the 
same you know it's very much dress, you know you can tell, instantly tell what class 
someone's vaguely, roughly from by the way they dress sort of thing. 
Isabelle: I think a lot of it's [class] in the way people dress and the way people talk. Erm, I 
think a lot of store is put by voice and accent and stuff, which is maybe getting less so now 
but I don't know, there's always like the posh kids in school, and I think there's almost as 
much stigma attached to that as there is to being the other end of the stick. So yeah I 
suppose that's it mostly. Perhaps again where you live, people are gonna make a 
judgement about that, but yeah. 
WA: You say the way people dress, what kind of things? 
Isabelle: Yeah, erm, there are always seen to be kind of fashions which are seen in certain 
groups of people. I don't know, like the classic Bristol shellsuit, lots of gold, and baseball 
cap or whatever - you know you would never expect to see that on somebody who's sort of 
high class. [ ... 
I And if they're well-spoken you're gonna think you know, they're upper 
class or whatever. Having designer labels and stuff with [inaudible], depends what labels 
you choose and whether they're genuine I guess. But yeah I think, I think everybody does 
77 In most cases this was unprompted, but sometimes 
it flowed forth when querying the interviewees 
directly about class, as they were asked whether they thought 
it had anything to do with clothes, 
speech etc. and whether they thought they could perceive class on sight or sound. 
Where explicit 
class labels are used this has to 
be bome in mind. 
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judge from these sort of basics, it's not necessarily a good thing, but I don't think it's 
gonna change. 
Abby: I don't know, I look at the kids I teach and there's a certain - you look at Vicky Pollard on Little Britain, I think that that idea hasn't come from nowhere, it's the kind of 
tracksuits with the stripes down here [on the arms], and the Argos jewellery, the big 
medallion style rings and ultra-necklaces and kind of piercings with gold jewellery. I 
suppose that is what you would look at, you'd be walking through Broadmead [the central 
shopping area of Bristol] and think - you wouldn't think that person was middle class 
would you I suppose, honestly speaking? 
WA: Do you think you can tell someone's class from looking at them or talking to them? 
Tina: Mmhm. Usually by their clothes, and if they've got great big Paris Hilton sunglasses 
on. Those things are so cheap. Most of 'em you can tell are all dressed prim and proper, 
average people just tend to dress average. 
WA: What do you mean by prim and proper? 
Tina: Well prim and proper, you've usually got the little skirts and there little things there 
and their little shoes and everything's all perfect and pretty. And you're like average like 
me, you've got a pair of jeans on, pair of boots and a t-shirt. [ ... ]I don't actually like it 'cos to me it's a completely different sort of image. It's like I don't know, too fancy-pancy. I 
get too'dirty to sort of dress like that. Most expensive thing I've ever bought is my coat, 
and that's fifty quid. God it was expensive! Burnt a hole in my pocket that did. 
Whether dominant or dominated, whether picking out signature tastes or linguistic 
dispositions as markers of the typical habitus attached to certain sections of social 
space, whether distinguishing oneself from those perceived to be above (the 'fancy 
pancy' or 'posh kids') or below (the wearers of tracksuits and gold jewellery), and 
whether addressing greater or lesser distances in social space (in some cases 
representing the small, 'last difference' that, as Bourdieu [1990: 137] pointed out, 
can make all the difference in establishing self-worth) - all these examples, 
crammed with salient themes and by no means exhaustive, demonstrate in stark 
fashion the persistence and pervasiveness of relational differentiation based on the 
homology of social and symbolic space and cast doubt over the claim of 
individualization that class lifestyles and habitualisations, and the self- 
identification or self-understanding that they produce, have vanished. 
Class sense is not always clear-cut, readily embraced or induced by the 
perception of apparel, but even where fuzziness and 
doubt surface symbolic 
differences still inform schemes of vision. Some interviewees, for example, 
highlighted the obfuscatory role of strategies of self presentation or 'semantic 
jamming', as Bourdieu (1987: 11) called it, but furtively implied that such 
strategies were not only limited deviations 
from established patterns but founded 
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on a practical mastery of those patterns. Jackie, for instance, commented that class 
has nothing to do with clothing or image because 'people project the image they 
wish to', yet later demonstrated the principle of homophily by distancing herself 
from those who socialise in public houses (perceived to be below her) and those 
who are members of the local Lawn Tennis Association and collect classic cars 
(who are perceived to be above her), in other words, those whose practices are 
removed in the symbolic space from her own pastimes and interests (see below). 
Similarly, Joe claims that 
You can change your demeanour and the way you communicate and the way you act to the 
people you're around. I do it all the time, you change your behaviour to your environment. 
[ ... ] People can wear what they want can't they? I mean sometimes the way I dress people look at me and go 'you batty boy', cos I look gay. And I'm like 'whaff. I think clothing - 
you can change your look, you can change your clothes. I've got gear in the wardrobe and 
I'd dress up and people would think I'm a biker, and I can change my appearance and 
people think I'm a chav. Clothes are as changeable as the weather. 
Supposedly versed in strategies of self presentation - and it could also be the case 
that his response in the interview, and Jackie's too, is itself a strategy for evading 
explicit placement in the social space - Joe still names, and thereby sanctifies as 
extant, 'ready-made' categorisations (e. g. 'chavs') which he and the others he 
interacts with clearly perceive to be identifiable with certain symbols, including 
attire, and indeed his modus operandi is enabled only by the assumed existence of 
such a category. 
This kind of specious uncertainty was, however, generally uncommon. 
Vastly more frequent, in contrast, was the coagulation of class sense into a 
description of oneself and others removed in social space as living in separate 
'worlds' or crealities', though this was also tied to perceived differences of 
behaviour, attitude and orientation as well as consumption or leisure patterns, and 
to reveal moments of life characterised by discomfort, disjuncture and crushed self- 
esteem. Lisa, for example, describes how the lack of money and material 
possessions vis-a-vis more affluent contemporaries when she was young impacted 
upon her sense of self-worth: 
I suppose you just felt not as good as other people really. Yeah, that you weren't as good as 
them and that somehow you were a bit different and a bit, as if you were from a slightly 
different world really I suppose, not quite part of the modem world, if that makes sense. 
An even starker picture is drawn by Tina when she 
discusses working as a member 
of the maintenance team for an organisation employing capital-rich professionals. 
After mentioning that she is regularly ignored by the professionals, who she 
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describes as 'snotty', or subject to their peremptory orders, and that this is the case 
for the maintenance staff as a whole, she is asked whether a division exists between 
the maintenance workers and the professionals: 
Tina: Yeah. There's a strict line - we're scum, they're not. That's how it feels anyway. Not 
all of them are the same, I mean you do get some nice people. They're really sort of 
genuine, they make you a cup of tea, they sort of move out the way and hold doors. A lot 
of them they're just sort of, 'you're scum, I'm not looking at you'. 
WA: How does that make you feel? 
Tina: Shit. You get used to it though. It's kind of funny after a while, you just - 'you're so 
pathetic'. But they wouldn't be anywhere without us anyway - if they didn't have anyone to keep the rooms that they work in, the buildings up together, decorate them, kept them 
looking good, then they wouldn't have a job. They forget that bit. Oh well. 
A few pithy words express the invidious 'class contempt' (Reay, 1998a) on behalf 
of the privileged professionals, that is, the (mis)translation of class differences, via 
socially-produced and situated schemes of interpretation, into perceived differences 
of worth or value which prompt behaviours, such as the 'tendency not to see or 
hear others as people' mentioned by Andrew Sayer (2005: 163), which make their 
targets feel 'shit' -a terse term that succinctly encompasses a vast montage of 
negative sentiments and self-evaluations - and, because of their powerlessness, 'get 
used to it'. Such class contempt is, however, 'felt up as well as down', as Sayer 
(2005: 163) rightly notes and Karen's narration of her schooling demonstrates: 
Karen: I suppose I didn't always have that many mates and you know, there weren't 
actually that many kids of professional, liberal parents in my school, if you know, like very, 
very few really. I think probably the only Guardian readers in a fifteen mile radius 
[laughter]. It felt like that anyway. So I think it sometimes was a bit of a defence really. 
WA: What was it that made you not get on with them? 
Karen: I don't know, I suppose we just didn't -I did get on with them I suppose I just 
didn't fit in really, always. I did have friends at different times, but I think I was quite 
different really. 
WA: So what did the parents do of the kids that you knew? 
Karen: Erm, I don't know really. A lot of, you know there weren't many kids of teachers 
around, there weren't many kids of you know, social workers, lawyers, that sort of thing, 
doctors. I think they probably went to private schools. And it just, it just felt like I was 
different, bit different. But at the same time I wasn't miserable all the time, and I did quite 
enjoy it as well. And I had some really good fun things that I did. But it was just sometimes 
quite hard work, and I did get bullied a bit sometimes. [ ... ]I think like I said, 
having 
Guardian-reader parents probably disadvantaged me a bit at school because everyone else 
came from quite, most other people came from such a 
different world, and it was quite 
hard to understand where they were coming from for me. 
Yet whilst such upwards class contempt, produced 
in this case by the 
disarticulation between the dispositions generated in the familial domain of the 
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lifeworld and those of the majority of Karen's school consociates, evidently has 
serious ramifications for emotional experience and sense of self, it is tempered by 
the fact that, however scorned by her schoolmates, it was Karen and not them who 
possessed the capital and dispositions valued by the institutions she passed through 
and allowing her to succeed in the education system and attain an economically and 
symbolically rewarded position as a doctor. 
Class Discourse 
The distances and differences of social space and symbolic space, then, 
continue to shape subjectivities and pervade relations with others. Class is, pace 
Beck, still experienced and, consequently, on this front individualization has been 
refuted. Yet some precision is necessary here: theoretical classes or classes on 
paper, the objective clusters in social space which map into symbolic space and 
shape perception, have been shown to still mediate experience and subjectivity, but 
the salience of constructed classes - the explicit discourse of 'class' as a means of 
grasping and articulating the differences of the spaces and fabricating social and 
political collectives which Beck and the others often have in mind when 
announcing the decline of class - has not been properly demonstrated hitherto. This 
is, in a sense, not strictly necessary: the core facets of class according to the 
Bourdieusian scheme have all been confirmed; the fate of class discourse is 
essentially tangential. Yet if Beck and the others are to be assessed fairly - the 
absence of constructed classes might lend at least some credibility to their claims - 
and if we are to attain a grip on any contemporary trans-lifeworld doxa supporting 
division then this must be assessed. This last section, therefore, will examine the 
use of class labels as descriptors and typification bundles and - sure gauges of 
ýclass consciousness' in the Marxist tradition, but here an indication of the 
importance of an established principle of perception - their linkage with life's 
obstacles and opportunities and political proclivities. The argument 
is perhaps more 
favourable to the individualization theorists than has been the case so far, but, as 
will be shown, only a naYve sociological theory would see 
in the processes 
unmasked an absence of class - indeed, the opposite 
is true. 
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A simple method of demonstrating the significance of 'class' as a 
perceptual and linguistic construct is to examine the prevalence of unprompted use 
of associated terms in the narration of biography: 
Tessa: [ ... ]I wouldn't want to live in Clifton, it's too white, middle class to be honest. I'm 
a bit of an inverse snob really. [ ... ] 
WA: What do you mean by inverse snob? 
Tessa: Well I think I just, I guess, I don't know what I mean. I guess I just wouldn't want to live in a middle class white place, cos I guess I'm a bit snobby when it comes to places like 
that. Yeah, dunno. I think it's people with lots of money, I don't necessarily want to live in 
that sort of an environment. [ ... ]I don't really have any, wouldn't really say I have any friends from working class families, that I've met in Bristol. I mean it's not like they're 
really loaded, but you know, none of them are from sort of working class backgrounds. 
Whereas at school, that was, most of my friends were. [ ... ] [at the university I went to] I think, the numbers, the demographic is quite I'd say, there's a minority of working class 
students. I mean of course I'm not in a working class profession now, which is a bit strange, 
but I still do consider myself to be a working class person. I don't know whether that's 
right or wrong, depends how you classify I suppose. But yeah, I think there's definitely a 
minority of working class sort of people at [the university]. 
Andy: I imagine out of, I'd say out of everyone in the fifth year I'd say about forty percent 
of those people stayed on to sixth form and I'd say out of everyone who fifth year maybe 
only ten percent were people who eventually went on to university. People just didn't go to 
university. It would have been the more middle-class kids who went to university and they 
would tend to be the ones who stayed on in sixth form. [ ... ] now for most kids from a 
middle-class background you go to university 'end of you know, there's no sort of college 
or go and get a job at eighteen everyone goes to university whereas only a minority of 
middle class kids would have gone to university when I was still at school it was that [ ... ] 
So I think a lot of you know, not all but quite a lot of [the people living in the area I grew 
up in] would have been sort of from that, you know form sort of working-class to lower- 
middle class, as opposed to middle-middle class or upper-middle class - which now is 
much more middle-middle class to upper-middle, but it was a lot more mixed. 
Paul: Erm, well [the area I grew up in is] just like a suburban estate, primary school, '30s 
built type place. Yeah, kind of working-class area, yeah. 
WA: And then you moved to [another area]? 
Paul: Yeah. 
WA: When was that? 
Paul: When I was about ten or eleven. And that's similar, just like a working-class area 
with professional people and manual workers. All kinds of people. 
WA: Is there anything else that you do [outside of work]? 
Jackie: Hobbies. Gardening, very middle aged and rather middle class I suppose [ ... ] 
[politically] I think we need a bit of a change, and all this nannying about - what is it now? 
Middle-class drinkers, yes, apparently we're middle-class alcoholics. Have you read all 
this stufP 
WA: No I haven't heard about that. 
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Jackie: Oh they've started on - because some people binge drink, they've decided to pick 
on middle England to say that we all drink too much. Which I'm sure we all do, but I think 
we're perfectly capable of making that decision ourselves, I'm not sure we need the 
government. 
All these snippets, sometimes taken from more than one place in each interview, 
demonstrate some of the more and less elaborate ways in which class labels still 
serve as practical linguistic vehicles for communicating portrayals of distinct types 
of areas and people characterised by specific symbols and behaviours homologous 
with the distributions of capital, sometimes including self-understandings and, in 
Jackie's case, interpellations in the loose sense of recognising oneself ('that means 
me') in the words and deeds of abstract others, on the assumption that such terms 
have wider comprehension and purchase and, therefore, utility and relevance in 
everyday life. Dominant and dominated, young and old, male and female: the 
deployment of class descriptors, assimilated as ready-made typification bundles 
and judged functional, show no attachment to any particular demographic - the 
discourse of class is, historically, a nationwide one - though there was an over- 
representation amongst the upwardly mobile, like Tessa above, perhaps as they 
groped for concepts to make sense of their disjunctive experiences. 
On the other hand, just under half of the interviewees did not use class 
labels until prompted, even if they clearly displayed a sense of difference and 
similarity clothed in a different vocabulary (such as, for example, Tina's above- 
witnessed sense of distance from the professionals at her workplace). This is not 
necessarily a novel situation - even when 'class' was supposedly more prevalent in 
national discourse its explicit terms were often absent amongst lay people and 
replaced by such expressions as 'our betters', 'the lower sort' or 'us and them' (as 
in Hoggart, 1957). In any case, when pressed, 78 all the interviewees readily 
recognised the discourse of social class and forwarded various perceptual 
categorisations such as 'working' or 'lower class', 'middle class' and 'upper class', 
sometimes even going so far as to distinguish finely-graded sub-classes ('upper- 
middle', etc. ): 
Mark: Erm, well you've got your working class, middle class and your upper class, people 
who can group into those categories. I don't know, is kind of a category you group people 
in to. 
78 The respondents were asked toward the end of the interview the following question: 'when I say 
social class, what does that mean to you/make you think off. 
A series of follow-up questions were 
then pursued. 
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Gary: Well I'd say upper class, middle class, lower class, you know. I think there's three 
categories if you look at it from that point of view. 
Abby: Working class, middle class, upper class. Upper-middle class I suppose for the in- 
betweeners. Yeah, that's what it would mean to me. 
The precise content of these categorisations - that is, what practices, behaviours, 
symbols and judgements they were paired and typified with and what the 
interviewees used them to denote - varied significantly, with perceived differences 
in aspirations, opportunities, occupations, possessions, housing, money, education 
and 'moral standards' (Yvonne) all being frequently forwarded. But this semantic 
elasticity does not detract from the fact that, contrary to what Beck would have us 
believe, the concept of 'class', far from being abandoned wholesale as a defunct 
classification with the withering of older symbols of class position, is still deployed 
as a useful tool for capturing the various elements of experience dictated by the 
homology of the spaces. Even the small minority of interviewees who claimed that, 
with expanded education, the democratisation of consumption and the proliferation 
of affluent celebrities from the lower sections of social space (e. g. reality television 
contestants), the class system had become more 'fluid' and that it was now harder 
to distinguish classes according to some criteria, continued to identify classes on 
the basis of other markers. Furthermore, these typification bundles were often tied 
up with a subtle distinguishing agenda in which the symbols or behaviours of a 
particular 'class' - whether constructed as higher or lower - were valued vis-a-vis 
one's own (as unpleasant, distasteful or immoral). This could be a judgement of 
actions of the dominated in their quest for economic and symbolic worth and their 
relation to the body, read through a dominant aesthetic and orientation in which 
diligence (shorn of its supporting cultural capital), respectability and presentability 
are valued: 
Nigel: I mean in Ireland there really was an emphasis on education, that this was the way 
to get ahead, and here it's get on Big Brother. What the hell is going on? Or win the lotto, 
you know. Why not go to school instead? [ ... ]I mean the tattoos and the earrings and all 
that sort of stuff, I mean that's a dead give away. Again I just look in horror, women who 
allow their children to deface their bodies and thereby 
limit their opportunities in later life. 
What for? 
It could be attached to the geographical correlates of social and symbolic 
distance 
(cf. Southerton, 2002), as residential areas are measured against the expectations 
and standards of a capital-rich habitus 
focussed on cleanliness and grandeur rather 
than, for example, community or diversity: 
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Jackie: [ ... II think class is a bit muddled. But you know, you drive round bits of Bristol 
and they're like a bit yucky. If you drive round other bits and you think 'gosh this is nice, 
couldn't possibly afford to live here' so, you know, bits at the top of the hill in [the affluent 
area in which I live] you know we admire before we walk down the hill to our house. You know but we're not sort of living in Lawrence Hill or something, which I don't think is 
terribly nice. 
In some instances, it could even congeal in to a comparison of value systems in 
which the experienced is valorised and the non-experienced, even if objectively 
better able to secure the legitimised rewards on offer, is discredited in a bid to resist 
domination (cf. Sayer, 2005). Tina, for example, criticised 'stuck up snobs' who 
say 'daddy, daddy, buy me this, daddy, daddy, buy me that', stating that 
I think the way we grew up, like not having loads, is done well. I couldn't go, I couldn't say 
'buy me this, buy me that', 'cos my mum used to say 'sod off! I can't afford it'. So you 
have to work for your stuff, you get things for treats, whereas you get some that say 'buy 
me this, buy me that' like my mate used to live round the comer. She said 'buy me this, 
buy me that', 'okay then, okay then, okay then', and she's just a spoilt little brat and she 
used to sulk when she didn't get her own way. I mean her mum took her out of school one 
day to take her shopping. There you go. 
WA: So they don't learn 
Tina: You don't respect nothing do you? If you've got everything you respect nothing. 
(emphasis added) 
Likewise, but from a French perspective (showing the transnational parallels of 
relational class processes), Bernadette, who has traversed an upwards trajectory 
through the French and latterly British social space from her poor rural origins, 
relayed the following in relation to her own schooling: 
[ ... ] when you're a 
kid and you come from, just a poorer, not poor but you know like less 
wealthy background than people you end up being at school with, it creates the differences 
of class, I don't know, I say it's kind of you don't have as much money as they have and it 
creates a difference, differences of behaviour between people who have different, their 
parents have different things on their mind like you know, you don't spend more than you 
need to, you're careful and you end up, to me you end up having a much more real 
approach to life rather than having people who are brought up in an environment where 
they kind of never really have to think about it and they always have nice clothes and can 
do what they want and can go skiing and whatever, and you never do and you feel inferior 
by it. But I think growing up in that is, makes you more, just more ready I thinkfor life in 
general, because it's not like suddenly you know you really nested or you kind of 
brought 
up really cocooned and suddenly you're dropped in life with nothing else, it's probably 
quite a hard awakening. I don't know it's maybe my judgement from being on that side of 
it. So I don't think it's ... it's probably an advantage when you're a 
kid, I think it's quite 
good for you just normal thing. And I suppose it doesn't even, or me doesn't make me 
pursue wanting money or living for that, you know it just makes me, I appreciate what 
I've 
got, just not working for money but working for what you like and, yeah just that really. 
(emphasis added) 
The semantic elasticity of 'class' amongst the interviewees may not be 
worrisome, given that each typification bundle 
is bound to vary according to 
e perience whilst still addressing objective 
homologies, but its perceived lack of 
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coherence - signalled above by Jackie claiming class to be 'muddled' and Karen 
claiming it to be 'difficult to define' - and the confusion prompted by elaboration 
of the notion could, in extreme cases, result in a doubt-inducing questioning of 
4class' amongst several of the interviewees: 
Bernadette: But, but yeah it's a very, it's a very weird thing cos I don't even really know how to class people, I don't even know who's middle class, who's one ... it's really weird. I don't know [a work colleague] was saying something quite interesting last time saying, like for example a builder who's got a lot of money, who makes as much money as a, like an IT 
manager, IT director something like that, they seem to have a different class but they don't 
you know they have the same amount of money but they're in a different class range and 
... ] Yeah so that was, so yeah, yeah it's quite an important thing, it's just it's something 
quite hard to understand well, where the limits are and what it really means. But I think it's 
something quite important, I think it's to do as well with how you grow up and how you, 
just which, where you come from really - if you come from somewhere really like popular 
or more middle class or which school you went to, how you speak, express yourself, and it 
kind of, it shows ... and sometimes, so it's not really to do with money sometimes really to do with where you come from. I don't really know what is it behind all that it's, quite an 
important thing that how people relate to each other and how they, who they are. I don't 
think it's to do with money I don't think it's just to do with where you're coming from or, 
if you come from a very bourgeois thing or not you know you can be, that state of mind I 
don't know. [ ... ] 
WA: So would you put yourself in class? 
Bernadette: But, so what is it? How would you classify it? Would you really say there's 
like a ... would you classify it at all and how would you 
do it? 
Dave: Now 1, it depends what you mean by class you know, I don't have a rigorous 
definition of it myself but I think it's you know to talk about the working class as people 
do, I don't really know what that means. I don't know if I'm in it, if I've always been in it, 
if I've ever been out of it or what because it's a grossly over-simplified term to me, it 
doesn't actually tell me anything about somebody if you say they're working class. [ ... ]I 
am what I am, I do what I do you know, lot of people would class me as working class 
because I'm a truck driver, and a lot of people would class me as middle class because I 
went to a grammar school, it just underlines my point I think - it doesn't tell you anything 
aboutanybody. 
Others talked of class being a 'woolly thing' (Paul) or a 'cipher' for whatever the 
user of the term wanted to it to apply to (Zack). Again, however, this is not an 
indubitable sign of the decline or irrelevance of class discourse to these individuals, 
some of whom had elsewhere used class appellations as descriptive devices. 
Instead it is an altogether expectable reminder that 'class' is first and foremost a 
practical classification used to convey in a parsimonious manner aspects of 
perceived reality in daily life. As Bourdieu put it, echoing Schutz 
(1962: 93ff) on 
the incoherence of the practical ly-oriented stock of knowledge: 
The representations which agents produce to meet the exigencies of their day-to-day 
existence, and particularly the names of groups and all the vocabulary available to name 
and think the social, owe their specific, strictly practical, logic to the fact that they are often 
polemical and invariably oriented by practical considerations. It follows that practical 
classifications are never totally coherent or logical in the sense of logic; they necessarily 
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involve a degree of loose-fitting, in owing to the fact that they must remain 'practical' or 
convenient. Because an operation of classification depends on the practical function it 
fulfils, it can be based on different criteria, depending on the situation, and it can yield 
highly variable taxonomies. (Bourdieu, 1987: 10) 
The uncertainty and misgiving thus stems more from the interview situation, in 
which the participants were, at this stage, forced to become quasi- sociologists, 
where the incoherence of practical classification is translated into a stated 
incoherence of the concept per se. Almost scholastic reflection on mundane reality 
is not, as Phil demonstrates, a familiar or effortless task: 
Phil: But it's [class] quite difficult to define - I'm quite blunt as I said, so that is quite bluntly how I'd describe it, but I'm sure there's way, way more in-depth stuff than I could 
ever envisage to understand. There are things I know quite well, like my trade, there are 
things I don't very well at all, and that is social class. I wouldn't really have an 
understanding for it. I think it's one of those things that if you don't study it, like I don't, 
you see it but because you've seen it all your life you just accept it without really 
understanding it. 
So, contrary to what might have seemed the more plausible claims of the 
proponents of individualization the discourse of social classes remains a prominent 
scheme of typifications through which not only the social world but one's place 
within it, i. e. one's social identity, is thought and described. All very well, but what 
of the real nub of individualization, namely the extent to which the interviewees 
relate 'class' directly to their own lives and the injustices andprivileges they have 
experienced? They may recognise class as a social phenomenon, but do they 
acknowledge it as a barrier or boost for themselves and perhaps even a politically 
significant issue, as Devine's (1992) affluent workers did, or do they instead, as 
Beck and Bauman assert is ever more the case, shift the burden of responsibility for 
structurally allotted trajectories on to their own, individual shoulders? Starting first 
of all with the foremost advantages and disadvantages the interviewees themselves 
felt they had possessed in the course of their biography, are structural features 
dissolved into individual motivations, attributes, shortcomings, personalities and 
will or grasped as socially or 4extemally' 
imposed and linked to collective 
conditions of existence? In fact, alongside slogans of 
individualization to the effect 
that 'you pave your own way in life' (Gary) and 'make your own opportunities' 
(Hannah), purely individualised traits were commonly offered amongst both the 
dominant and dominated, with lack of motivation 
(Dave), lack of attention 
(Rebecca), shyness (Bernadette, Elizabeth) and even 
height (Tina) being cited as 
setbacks whilst stubbornness and 
independence (Joe), sociability (Oliver, Tina), 
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adaptability (Rebecca) and hard work (Paul) were forwarded as chief driving forces, 
even if in reality the trajectories in question were, as shown in the last chapter, 
channelled by capital possession. Yet far more frequent, including amongst these 
same interviewees, were appeals to the two sources of class power in contemporary 
society: economic capital (or simply 'money') and cultural capital (in the guise of 
'education'). Regarding economic capital, the dominant recognised that it had been 
a key resource and 'fall back' throughout their lives, allowing them to pursue 
practices that would otherwise have been off bounds, such as Mark's university 
studies and post-graduation voluntary work or Nigel's employment-free university 
life, whereas the dominated, as well as the upwardly mobile, noted the pernicious 
effect of relative penury in preventing them from following ambitions, achieving 
their potential or leading a fulfilling existence, whether that be a case of prohibitive 
course fees indefinitely deferring a projected reskilling (Joe), proximity to 
necessity compelling time and energy-sapping employment at university (Tessa), a 
lack of means scotching a past-time of racing cars (Trisha) or whatever. As to 
cultural capital, many of the dominant openly chalked much of their success down 
to the education they received - its content but also ethos, discipline and 
expectations - from their various schooling institutions, i. e. an 'external' factor, 
rather than their own individualised ability, which only Zack, who persevered 
through a comprehensive school low in the field of education, professed in the 
form of his 'brightness': 
Elizabeth: [ ... ] my schooling put me at an advantage, cos as 
I say you don't have any 
choice about working when you're at private school, so you get more likely to achieve 
grades in exams [ ... ]. 
Isabelle: Erm, I suppose what I feel I ought to say, although I don't know, is that I think my 
parents sacrificed an awful lot to put me and my brothers eventually through private school. 
They -, I don't know about my younger 
brother, but us other two were definitely on 
scholarships, so you know it wasn't such a sacrifice as it might have been, but they 
definitely, you know we didn't have family holidays or didn't have new stuff all the time, 
we lived in a little house and everything. And at the time we would probably as children 
have said we'd rather have all the stuff and not the schooling, but they really thought that 
was the best thing they could do for us at the time and 
for the long term, and that was their 
decision to use their money in that way. So I'm pretty sure you know, we wouldn't have all 
ended up with perhaps the big qualifications and stuff that we've got it 
if hadn't been for 
that. 
Jackie: I think I had an advantage at eleven when I went to the grammar school. I think that 
was a very big advantage, very big. It just gave me access to all these opportunities, a 
world of opportunities really. And expectations, suddenly expectations were there about 
what would happen, rather than question marks. 
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Amongst the dominated, however, there is more variation, ambivalence and what 
might even be described as an individualization of class. Trisha and Andy. for 
example, both noted how their lack of education - or more precisely. lack of 
educational qualifications - has prevented them for getting jobs they had applied 
for and felt they had the experience to carry out adequately, which seems more of 
an 'external' feature, especially as both rationalise their post-education choices in 
terms of prevalent expectations rather than their own failures, yet both Paul and 
Tina individualise their class-based constraints: Tina in terms of seeing one of her 
key disadvantages as being 'thick', Paul in terms of wishing he had 'done better at 
school'I 'had a better attitude' about it and 'knuckled down and taken it a bit more 
seriously' without realising that his orientation at the time was fuelled by the 
capital stocks available. This scenario - recognition of social advantage amongst 
the dominant yet an individualization of structural features amongst the dominated 
- runs counter to the received wisdom of class theory that the privileged tend to 
adopt a more individualistic outlook whilst the lower sections of social space 
remain more collectivist in orientation and socially aware. Yet, rather than being a 
disposition induced by changed social conditions, it is infactperfectly in line with 
Bourdieu's long-established notion of sociodicy, in which the view that success is a 
matter of innate talents or hard work - propagated by the dominant but questioned 
by some of their more cultural/liberal- left members with an extended symbolic 
mastery of social affairs, who are over-represented here - is disproportionately 
internalised as doxic by the dominated: 
When you ask a sample of individuals what are the main factors of achievement at school, 
the further you go down the social scale the more they believe in natural talent or gifts - 
the more they believe that those who are successful are naturally endowed with intellectual 
capacities. And the more they accept their own exclusion, the more they believe they are 
stupid, the more they say 'Yes, I was no good at English, I was no good at French, I was no 
good at mathematics. ' Now that is a fact - in my view it is an appalling fact - one that 
intellectuals don't like to accept, but which they must accept. It doesn't mean that the 
dominated individuals tolerate everything; but they assent to much more than we believe 
and much more than they know. (Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992: 114) 
The words of the dominated are, therefore, less a new phenomenon than in 
full accord with the realities of class first exposed in the sixties and seventies when 
education was beginning to expand in European states 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 
1977,1979; Bourdieu, 1996). In fact, not even the aforementioned individualist 
slogans and traits, which could otherwise still 
be considered proof of 
individualization at work, even if in a rather diminished way, are necessarily 
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products of recent social conditions alone: the doctrine of personal autonomy (and 
its underside, self-blame), as an integral part of individualist philosophies, has 
circulated in and out of general doxic intuition (in the West at least) for centuries 
with the development and propagation of philosophical and political 
Weltanschauungen and forms merely one component of the practical mastery of 
self-understanding that nestles incoherently - such is the nature of practical 
mastery - alongside recognition of social setbacks to greater or lesser degrees 
depending on historical and structural context (see Lukes, 2006). If anything, the 
individualism promoted by contemporary neo-liberalism will only have reinforced 
existing tendencies of self-perception. 
Still, even if the dominant did tend to recognise their class-based social 
advantages, at this stage the explicit idiom of class remained absent. So what if 
4class' is brought overtly in to the frame and suggested as a possible source of 
constraint or enablement? Do the interviewees deny or embrace it, or tie it to 
politics in any way? The answer might, at first, offer Beck and the others some 
consolation insofar as a significant contingent (about a quarter) of the interviewees 
- old and young, dominant and dominated - denied class had played any role in 
their own lives. To give just a few examples: 
Claire: I don't think it's really been anything to do with me. 
Dave: No, it never played a big part in my life, never played any part in my life really [ ]. 
WA: Do you think it's [class] ever played a role in your life? 
Mark: Not that I can think of I don't think so. 
This is despite some of the same individuals mobilising class labels at earlier points 
of the interview and recognising the benefits or blockades provided by their 
economic and cultural capital. Now erasing the consolation for individualization 
theory, however, it can only be surmised that this is less likely a simple by-product 
of transforming social circumstances and a concomitant slipping of 'class' from 
stocks of knowledge so much as a broken link between the 
discourse of class and 
perceived advantages or disadvantages largely 
because, as Claire's elaboration 
exemplifies, these individuals construct class as purely a classification system - 
and a confused and invidious one at that - rather than a 
discrete set of fiscal, 
educational or other constraints and enablements: 
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Claire: I suppose it is still an issue in that people still put themselves in classes and it's 
kinda, it seems to have been used as a derogatory way really, in both ways. I mean people 
say 'oh they're working class' or 'they're middle class' it's, I don't think it's very helpful, 
I don't think it's a helpful system but it still exists. 
WA: Right okay, do you think it's ever played a role in your life at all? 
Claire: Erm, I don't think so, no. I suppose I've had the odd, some people think that I'm a bit posh because I went to a private school, but then when - well I don't know that's 
people I know they think that initially and then think 'no, she's not'! [laughter]. But I don't 
know what people who don't really know me think, I don't know if it's an issue for them, I 
mean it's never been an issue for me, you know wherever people put themselves in the 
class hierarchy, but it might be for other people. 
That it is not the product of a decline of class discourse is further bolstered by the 
fact that just about everyone identified themselves with a class (either middle or 
working), even if hesitantly and ambivalently, on the criteria already established 
when elaborating what the perceptual-linguistic categorisations of 'class' denoted 
to them, 79 and, more importantly, that far more of the interviewees did recognise 
class as Playing some kind of role in their lives. This took two forms, neither of 
which, incidentally, evoked any real notion of 'collectivism' or 'solidarity' in the 
sense of an empathy with the sufferings of socially proximate others and 
articulation of collective goals and interests. On the one hand, several of the 
interviewees interpreted the (dis)advantages of capital recounted above in terms of 
class or else forwarded new, related ones, showing a close articulation between the 
construction of class and economic and educational means and the orientations 
these furnish. Trisha, for instance, saw her exclusion from a job on the basis of 
credentials and her lack of funds for car racing in class terms, whilst Elizabeth and 
Jackie anchored their educational advantages, and much more, in their perceived 
class backgrounds: 
Elizabeth: Other than, because my parents were, my father definitely was very middle class, 
middle yeah, middle class and my mum was probably -I think her mum was, well must 
have been middle class if she went to university, cos there's no way she would have done 
otherwise, but her dad wasn't, and that was an issue, very much an issue then, that they 
were different. [ ... 
] So in the sense that it influenced me in the fact that I expected to do 
some kind of training, not necessarily university but some kind of training rather than leave 
school at sixteen. You know I knew I wasn't leaving school at sixteen and 
I knew that from 
a very early age, it never, never occurred to me that 
leaving school at sixteen was an option, 
even though that I knew theoretically it was, 
if that makes sense. So in that sense it would 
have, it did affect me yes, but I wouldn't say I was aware of it, if you know what I mean. 
79 Only four refused to identify with a class: Dave, 
because of the confusion over the concept he had 
displayed earlier; Oliver, who preferred to be seen as a 
'resident of the United Kingdom' and whose 
broken traj. ectory must be taken into account here; Frank, who saw 
himself as 'untypical' and falling 
outside his constructed criteria of classes on account 
of having changing economic fortunes through 
his life; and Tina who, echoing the respondents in 
Savage's (2000) study, preferred to describe 
herself as 'averagel. 
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Jackie: I grew up in a nice neighbourhood, I had a father that worked and a mother that didn't. Went to a nice school, went to a private school for the first part of my life, but I think more out of necessity than particular sort of 'oh yes we must send Jackie to the 
school'. Erm, had all the aspiration, you know had music lessons, didn't do pony riding, lots of my friends did. Erm, went to a good school with an assumption I'd do 0 levels, A 
levels, university. I think that all ties in, sadly, to being screamingly middle class. 
On the other hand, a large proportion of the interviewees perceived the effects of 
class mainly on the level of interaction, including difficulties of interpersonal 
relations, homophily and even discrimination. Oliver, for example, indicated he 
had difficulty 'dealing with individuals which are deemed to be upper class', whilst 
Rebecca admitted that it shaped 
my interests and the people that I choose to be friends with -a lot of that has to do with, a lot of my friends have a similar social background as I do, as my husband as well does. 
In a similar vein, but from the perspective of someone thrown into existence in the 
lower regions of social space, Lisa noted that 
[ ... ] to an extent, it used to dictate the sort of friends I would have. So when I was younger I wouldn't sort of hang out with what I saw as posh people, you know had a chip on my 
shoulder basically, whereas now it just doesn't, you know, I don't care, it doesn't bother 
me at all. 
Elaborating on this from the dominant position, Abby states that she 'hasn't really 
mingled with those, with a broad cross-section of society cos of the kind of school 
I've gone to and the kind of university I've gone to. That is just simple fact. ' She 
continues on to say that 
I think people have a certain view of my ability to be professional based on my appearance, 
my accent, my schooling I suppose. So I suppose as I've walked into ajob people have had 
preconceived ideas about me just on how I've walked in, and that - my own school hold 
me up as being the ultra-professional person ever. I don't think I am, and I think that's 
based a lot upon simply how I carry myself and how I project myself I'm not particularly 
professional at all, I'm no more professional than the next person. I genuinely believe it's 
because I don't have a particularly strong Bristolian accent and I suppose I do things in 
quite a methodical way as I've been trained to do through the school I went to, perhaps. I 
don't think class has particularly affected me other than that. I don't really know. 
WA: Do you think it could be seen as an advantage or disadvantage for other people? 
Abby: What my class? 
WA: No, their class. 
Abby: Advantage or disadvantage? I think people get quite cliquey. Certainly if I'm honest 
with myself, I mean there are certain working men's clubs that 
I wouldn't want to walk in 
to. I mean I look at my mum's family who are a kind of - we go back to Cheshire where 
my grandparents originate from and my mum originates 
from, when I meet my family, my 
mum's family, her cousins and things, I almost don't know quite 
how to have a chat about 
stuff, cos they've all had kids very young, they do things 
like they're butchers or they work 
in a supermarket or things like that. I can honestly say, hand on my heart, and it's not cos 
they're not nice, they're lovely people, I just don't really know what to have a chat about. 
188 
Don't really know what to say cos they all do different stuff and their lives -I can't really talk about work or reading or some of the stuff I'm doing, or buying a house or doing stuff, boring stuff that I talk about I suppose, cos they're talking about a whole different 
spectrum of a different reality to me. And so I suppose there is, I almost feel like there's a little club going on based on their reality. They'd probably find the same if they came and 
sat and had dinner with me and a load of teachers, they'd be sat there thinkina there's a little clique going on here. So I suppose there's little groups and I don't know that it's an 
advantage or a disadvantage, it's just the way it is. 
Finally, in answer to whether class has ever played a role in his life, Joe is 
forthright: 
Yes. Yes, it put a stop to my athletics career because I was coached by a guy who was just 
a welder, and I wasn't coached by a nationally recognised coach although I was ranked 
third in England at one point. I wasn't invited to the England squad trainers' sessions, and I 
was one of the best athletes there was at that time. I think it played a part on me not getting 
sports scholarships, when there were people -I was aware of a young gentleman who was, 
I think he was ranked third or fourth in Wales, but in the British rankings was way, way 
below me. He got a scholarship to the United States or Canada, and there was me, one of 
the top athletes at the time, and there didn't seem to be any avenue for me. And I was 
pretty sure at that time that that had something to do with class. A few years later it was 
confirmed to me. 
WA: In what way? 
Joe: There was a telephone conversation which was, 'there were reasons why you weren't 
invited to the England squad training session, and reasons why there were certain race 
events that were invitation events and people way below your ranking were invited to them 
and you weren't'. One race my parents had to phone up and say, 'why isn't Joe invited to 
race when these other athletes areT after a few phone calls and a few hot discussions I 
eventually got invited. So yeah, class and politics played a negative role, but you know, 
that's not the system, that's individuals. So you can't knock the system for the narrow 
bands of individuals. 
WA: So was that like discrimination? 
Joe: Of a sorts. I mean look at Peter Elliott, the guy, the chippie, the carpenter, with the 
fiasco with Steve Ovett and what have you back then, and the way he was treated. The 
BBC had to pick him up from the airport, you know. I think, I'm not too sure what 
happened behind the scenes, but I'm sure whoever was the team captain was not best 
pleased about that, and I'm sure words would have been said. [ ... ] It's just - okay you've 
got people who are racist, and people are fearful of other people coming from other 
countries. Well it's pretty much the same mental attitude with classes and snobbery to a 
degree. It's not a dissimilar mental pattern. 
All these examples - the elective affinity with those close in social space, the 
struggle with or distaste for interaction with others removed 
in it, even if now left 
behind by Lisa as a product of her social trajectory (cf. Savage, 2000: 115), and the 
judgement and treatment by others (sometimes advantageous, as 
for Abby, 
sometimes a deleterious 'class racism', as 
in Joe's case) on the basis of their 
perception of oneself - are species of the same phenomenon: 
the sense of social 
distance granted by perception of the symbols and deportment signifying objective 
social distance. It is this that 'class', as a practical classification 
constituted through 
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symbolic struggle, primarily refers to for the interviewees, not the academic 
concern with constraints or advantages, and so it is this that is evoked when the 
notion is overtly broached. Indeed, even the above witnessed resistance of Claire 
and others could be seen in this light: Claire's statement clearly reveals that she 
understands class to be a classification system of social distance which she notes 
others have used in a derogatory and insulting way - one of the key practical uses 
of perceptual-linguistic classifications - including in reference to her own 
'poshness', but does not view this as particularly disadvantageous for herself. And, 
since her lifelong experience has been of privilege and limited interaction with 
distant others in social space, why would she? 
Perhaps it is partly for this reason that class barely figured in political 
proclivities. Very few ventured that it or even kindred issues of inequality were 
issues of political significance, one of those only on the grounds that it was key to 
'misunderstandings' between people (Bernadette), all of whom were in the 
dominant section of social space where symbolic mastery of social affairs is rife 
rather than, as might be expected in traditional class theory, the dominated regions 
and none of whom, given this fact, expressed this in terms of collective interests 
and objectives. The remainder of the interviewees focussed on an assortment of 
matters - the Iraq war, the NHS, immigration, law and order, the environment (this 
last topic being the archetype of 'life politics' according to Giddens) - and 
frequently accepted the existence of class as inevitable when raised ('you're always 
going to have classes' was a regular refrain). It could be, then, that with the slow 
removal of class from the symbolic struggle of political discourse, first with the 
1979-1997 Conservative government which disavowed the term (witness 
Thatcher's 'class is a communist concept' epigram) and enfeebled the trade unions, 
the paramount propagators of class discourse as representatives of 'the working 
class', 80 then with the implosion of the Soviet 
Bloc and its construal as 
corroboration of communism's bankruptcy, and 
finally the reinvention of the 
Labour party with its rhetoric of 'no more bosses versus workers', 
'class' has been 
largely stripped of the social justice dimension it 
had historically acquired leaving 
only a seemingly apolitical system of classification 
for rendering the sense of social 
80 The interviewees had, at best, ambivalent attitudes toward trade unions. Amongst the dominated, 
for example, Phil saw them as useful in battling an individual grievance with 
his immediate superior 
but nothing else, and was glad of Thatcher's moves against them, whilst 
Tina described them as a 
, waste of time'. 
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difference. Yet, when any attachment to the notion of 'class consciousness' is 
abandoned along with the Marxist scheme, it becomes apparent that this is not the 
real measure of the import of class for politics anyway; instead, this is assumed by 
the correlation (or more precisely the homology) between the views articulated on 
any political concerns, as expressions of class habitus, and position and trajectorý, 
in social space. In this regard, individualization becomes unstuck. Amongst the 
upwardly mobile and the cultural faction of the dominant, who are over- 
represented in the sample, there is a tendency for liberal -leftism, with the other 
dominant individuals displaying more Conservative tendencies and the one right- 
leaning social space traveller (Samuel), who incidentally saw class as an important 
political issue, bringing forth the authoritarian and self-described 'xenophobic' 
views of his prison-officer father that suffused his lifeworld as a child. The 
dominated, on the other hand, were more mixed, with left-leaning Labourites (e. g. 
Phil), right-wing authoritarians (e. g. Gary) and apolitical cynics (e. g. Tina) within 
their midst. All the orientations in this admittedly compressed report are fully 
consistent with a modified Bourdieusian framework, attested by a glance at 
Bourdieu's diagrammatic representation of voting tendencies which shows the 
cultural faction of the dominant (on account of their domination within the field of 
power, but also, perhaps, because of some symbolic mastery of social matters given 
their educational paths) to be more left-wing along with the majority of the 
dominated, though with allowances for the lower petite-bourgeoisie (like Gary) to 
be on the right (Bourdieu, 1998b: 5), and his recognition of the refusal of politics 
amongst those without the cultural capital to engage with it or feel that their view is 
worthwhile (Bourdieu, 1984: chap. 8). 
Conclusion 
Theoretical classes and constructed classes are both, in their different yet 
connected ways, inscribed into the minds of these interviewees and, 
it might be 
reasonable to suggest, into the minds of others like them, 
just as the relational 
possession of capital that defines theoretical classes 
is inscribed into their 
biographical situations. This is not to say there have been no alterations in the 
social fabric since the immediate post-war period, or even within 
the last thirty 
years, as technological advances and awareness and appropriation of other cultural 
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forms have altered the substance of consumption and the symbolic struggle over 
'classes' abated with the discourse of the leaders of the field of power. But this 
chapter has shown that Beck, Giddens and Bauman have misinterpreted, or at least 
considerably overstated, the effects of this for class, no doubt in large measure due 
to the substantialist and collectivist understanding of that concept they themselves 
presuppose. Instead of ephemeral and reflexive lifestyle pursuits, there are classed 
practices manifesting deep-seated dispositions. Rather that class sense disappearing 
in the atomising flux of consumer individualism, there is a continued awareness 
and articulation of social proximity and distance based on relational properties. In 
place of class discourse being effaced from collective consciousness save a few 
isolated and out-of-date pockets, class-based descriptors continue to convey the 
pernicious sense of difference and similarity across a spectrum of ages and social 
positions. Rather than outright individualised responsibility for the course of one's 
trajectory, there is an ambivalent fusion of personal liability - by no means a new 
phenomenon - with recognition of 'external' constraints. And as opposed to class's 
removal from the political register, classed viewpoints on topics old and new 
continue to structure the field of opinion. The correct diagnosis of the state of 
contemporary consciousness would not seem to be individualization, but, as in the 
last chapter, the persistence of class - and 'class' - in a changed social environment. 
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8. Conclusion 
"[T]he results of our enquiry", concluded Goldthorpe and his colleagues 
(1969: 157) in the closing pages of their final volume, "are not at all what might 
have been expected had the thesis of embo urge o isement been a generally valid 
one. " Four decades later this succinct statement can be echoed, with some 
confidence, regarding the thesis of individualization. Absent was the hypothesised 
reflexive individual liberated from classed conditions of existence and dispositions, 
and little sign was seen of the alleged decline of classed tastes, practices and 
discourse. On the contrary, whatever the age, no matter the occupational position, 
and whether witnessed in the tales of childhood, education, work histories, lifestyle 
practices, social identity or linguistic typifications, the firm clutch of class over 
biographies and perceptual schemes has been shown to remain unbroken in 
contemporary Britain. Through theoretical scrutiny and empirical investigation, 
individualization and its Giddensian counterpart have, therefore, been exposed as 
exaggerated and ungrounded accounts of human action in the current era. This does 
not, as has been repeated throughout the analysis, necessitate a denial of the broad 
mutations in economy and society addressed by Beck, Bauman and Giddens or, 
accordingly, an assertion that the consequences of class are identical to those of 
yesteryear. But even if we admit that elements of the substance of class, its 
manifestations - i. e. the actual symbols and practices attached to positions, whether 
forms. of foreign travel, educational pathways, new lifestyle practices or even 
occupations - have altered with the social context, the system of relations which 
generates them, and ultimately defines class, remains unchanged. The theories of 
individualization and reflexivity on the other hand, being exemplars of what 
Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1991: 20ff) called 'spontaneous sociology', 
that is, of sociological knowledge 
locked within the erroneous substantialist 
worldview and hence tantamount to erudite and elaborate prenotions, confuse 
the 
shifting signs for their enduring source and 
thus pronounce dead only what their 
epistemological short-sightedness prevents 
them from seeing. 
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Same Formula, Different Figures 
So the image of the classless, individualized worker may be an illusion, but 
the motif of significant social change is certainly not. Like an equation whose 
formula stays the same whatever values are assumed by its variables and output, 
class persists, yet in a new context - shifts in the struggles and balances of power in 
the economic, political and educational fields, amongst other things - leading it to 
produce new outcomes. The last two chapters have demonstrated this and, to pull 
the threads together, the various findings can be recapitulated here in summary 
form. 
1. The education system, the alleged central motor of both individualization 
and class reproduction, has undergone significant expansion and alteration within 
the last few decades. Neo-liberal government initiatives have sought to encourage 
post-sixteen and higher education in a post-industrial economy amongst growing 
numbers of young people, sanctioning new universities, funding initiatives and 
information campaigns that supposedly open out the terrain of choice. Furthermore, 
with the reduction of traditional manual occupations allowing easy transition from 
classroom to shop floor via familial or social contacts, even vocational options are 
framed in terms of a reflexive assessment of alternatives in search of some form of 
self-realisation. However, statistics reveal that paths still remain differentially 
distributed, and the present research goes some way to establishing why. Choices 
have not become equally reflexive for all, because success at school and, therefore, 
the valuation of school are not identical for all. Differences of parental capital - 
both economic, in paying for private education, and cultural, in providing the 
experiences conducive to educational achievement - continue to frame academic 
performance and subsequent orientations. For the dominant, the mastery of 
abstraction and symbolism inculcated from early years dovetails with a taste for it - 
a 'love of learning' in which the demands of the school system and self-realisation 
are one - whilst for the dominated, 
the school becomes an institution of exclusion 
against which they develop oppositional attitudes and prize 
the practical mastery 
and bodily ability they 
do possess. Consequently, willing and perceiving 
themselves capable, the dominant's projected and actual trajectory is one of 
straightforward transition through 
the academic route of A levels and higher 
education without conscious 
deliberation beyond the specific subject and university. 
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Older means of achieving social stasis - direct inheritance of property and family 
businesses - may have been overshadowed by the inheritance and nurturing of 
cultural capital, but if anything the reproduction of privilege is thus as stable as 
ever as the upper regions of social space become characterised by what have been 
called 'normal biographies', that is, linear, unwavering and anticipated life courses 
at odds with the chronic volatility hypothesised by Beck (Du Bois-Reymond, 1998; 
Reay et al., 2005: 33). The dominated, on the other hand, yearn to escape education, 
experiencing it through their schemes of perception as an alienating, unpractical 
and expensive waste of time of less utility than pursuing their practical mastery to 
economic reward, even if, as Tina demonstrated, the precise occupational 
destination is increasingly uncertain and subject to the reflections of mundane 
consciousness. In both cases, certain pathways in social space were barred from 
consideration as the subjective anticipation of likely futures attuned itself to the 
objective probabilities inscribed in their position and both, therefore, refute 
individualization. 
Yet there are some originating in the lower sections of social space, where 
in previous generations university was a distant and unfathomable prospect, who 
have seized upon the expansion programme and ascended in social space. However, 
rather than prove the weakening of class constraints in late modernity or justify the 
meritocratic ideal of letting 'talent' succeed, the relational reality of class was 
present here too. On the one hand, the upwardly mobile's trajectories were set in 
motion by experiential peculiarities and hidden advantages stemming from their 
parents' particular positioning in social space, demonstrating the power of 
relational differences to the last inch, but on the other, their upwards trajectories 
were hampered by the lack of capital vis-a-vis the more affluent counterparts they 
encountered in their social journey and were therefore 
disproportionately 
characterised by toil and struggle. 
2. Post-education life and, in particular, the sphere of work have also, like 
the education system, undergone considerable change since the mid-twentieth 
century. Geographical mobility - whether in the 
form of relocating residence or 
4consurning places' by fixing a 'tourist gaze' upon them, to use some of John 
Urry's phrases, and whether within Britain or across the globe - 
is not uncommon 
amongst the British population, and the 
interviewees bore this out. Occupational 
shifts, furthermore, along with conscious 
deliberation on mid-career options, were 
195 
commonplace amongst the interviewees, and, though it is hard to make any claims 
on a broad scale and there is a danger of caricaturing the past, it is possible that this 
could have intensified to some degree under recent economic policies demanding 
flexibility in a volatile environment. But even if there were more *contextual 
discontinuity' than in the past - at least in sheer geographical and occupational 
terms - the image of attendant disembedding from class cultures and induced 
reflexivity that could be inferred from these conjoined facts is misleading. Global 
travel of an extensive nature is, for the most part, a preserve of those distant from 
the demands of economic necessity who have, in any case, an existing disposition 
towards geographical movement bred by preparation for higher education, whilst 
the dominated remain bound to the regional locale save a limited number of 
inexpensive sojourns. Distance from the home milieu in physical space may act as 
a new symbolisation of position, but it does not translate into distance from the 
home milieu in social space. 
Movements within the topology of social space are not erratic, random or 
unpredictable either. Where job shifts and deliberation of options occurred, they 
were the product of nothing more than mundane consciousness -a general attribute 
of human existence - contextualised by the capital advantages and accumulated 
classed experiences and skills furnished by their relative position. There is not the 
constant 'refashioning of self and annulment of the past implied by the notion of 
reflexivity, including versions where reflexivity is stratified by class or, as for 
Sweetman (2003) a part of the habitus: in a capricious economic climate, some 
people are perhaps more open to the idea of changing occupation and are, on 
occasion, led to contemplate their options, but those changes and contemplations 
are limited by the possibilities inscribed in bodies and things and are, ultimately, 
far from habitual. They are guided by, but not part of, the habitus. 
3. This was even more the case with lifestyle practices. Older activities and 
symbols of position in social space had waned and, with technological 
developments, cultural shifts and the appropriation of distant ways of being, new 
products and practices had suffused lifeworlds, but, as quantitative research 
has 
supported (Bennett et al., forthcoming), sharp class cleavages remained and, 
crucially, the principle of uptake failed to 
fit the model laid down by Giddens, 
Beck or Bauman. This was demonstrated in detail through the specific exemplar of 
musical taste (which followed a broad classic al-versus-popular-music 
division) as 
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well as more generally for lifestyle practices, both of which were argued to be 
rooted in early experiences imparted by class position. Moreover, the homology 
between positions and practices, but also between positions and other behaviours, 
moral outlooks and apparel, was perceived and articulated as a keen sense of social 
distance that, entwined with symbolic dominance, often turned into a recognised 
source of diminished self-worth. The intuition of relational difference, of living in a 
different 'world' from others, is the cornerstone of social identity and, being hinged 
on the topography of class, refutes individualization's supposedly more plausible 
claims that 'identities' have lost their class character in late modernity. 
4. Of course the latter claim also applies to the specific use of class labels to 
describe self and others, and though this is only tangential to the Bourdieusian 
understanding of class it was investigated to fully exhaust the assessment of 
individualization's explanatory power. However, much to the imagined chagrin of 
Beck and the others,, not only did people use a variety of similar practical 
constructions to render the differences of social and symbolic space, but, even 
though half the interviewees did not forward class categorisations as typification 
bundles without prompting, it was clear that, when pressed, all recognised the 
discourse of social class and, even where there were hesitations and assertions of 
change, laid bare the range of facets the labels covered for them and used them as 
foils for distinction. Despite their semantic elasticity, and even if they also viewed 
them as pernicious and wished to distance themselves from them, the interviewees 
clearly saw class descriptors as relevant and practical classifications for making 
sense of experience and their own sense of self. Yet they did not, by and large, see 
them as politically significant. The late twentieth century national and international 
political mutations have operated to weaken the discourse of class 
in the symbolic 
struggle to establish the legitimate principle of vision and 
division and mobilise 
sections of social space against certain injustices. 
But in a theoretical model with 
no need for notions of 'class consciousness' this 
is not a plague of class analysis 
but merely an empirical trend, itself likely explicable 
in class terms - i. e. the 
symbolic dominance of Thatcher's petite 
bourgeois individualism and its adoption 
by New Labour for electoral credibility. What really matters 
for a demonstration of 
the salience of class for political viewpoints 
is a homology between positions and 
position-takings, and this was shown, albeit 
briefly, to be in full effect. 
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All in all, individualization, as an account of the interviewees' lives past and 
present and the fate of class within them, would seem to fall down on all fronts, 
even if some of the trends it spotlights do supply the new context for the continued 
operation of class. In line with the epistemological vision upon which the study is 
founded we can thus suggest that individualization has not been confirmed, but 
confuted by the evidence surveyed, and, furthermore, appeal to the rule of 
generalisation laid down in Chapter 5 to suggest that local confirmation of the 
operations of social space supports the logical inference that this national relational 
structure has consequences elsewhere, not just in Bristol but across the UK, albeit 
with specifications according to regional labour markets and policies and lifeworld 
idiosyncrasies. This is not to say, however, that the research needs no further 
backing. The 'moderatum' approach to generalisation also mentioned in Chapter 5 
encourages the exercise of caution in generalising all of what has been found, and 
indeed there is a sense in which some of the inductively-establi shed themes require 
fleshing out or refining through further investigation. A follow-up project aiming to 
do precisely this, doubling the number of interviewees to more satisfactorily 
csaturate' some of the specific findings, to use the apt phrase of Glaser and Strauss 
(1967), is currently underway and will be reported in due course. Even without 
foresight of the future research's elaborations, however, we can, in closing, 
consider the bearing of the present study on current policy debates. 
In Defence of 'Emancipation' 
Some of the changes identified have been brought by advancements in 
communications and transport capabilities, and some 
have been artefacts of the 
increasing interdependence of the global division of labour, but others have been 
the product of political visions and 
initiatives expressly designed to reduce 
inequality. It is significant, therefore, that the latter have failed to fulfil their stated 
purpose, but it is not difficult to see why. 
Take, for example, the shifts induced 
within the educational field 
by the Conservative governinent in the early nineties. 
Though in good measure motivated 
by the desire to subordinate education,, 
conceived as a factory of 
human capital, to the demands of the post-industrial 
economy - smuggled in proclamations 
that increased tertiary education would be 
'key to national success' - the abolition of the 'binary system' polarising 
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polytechnics and universities to increase degree-awarding capacities and 
manipulations of the school system were also ostensibly (and no doubt sincerely) 
designed to 'widen opportunities' and ensure that all children were 'free to choose4 
- one might even add 'reflexively' - their post-16 options. 81 But, without denying 
that increased numbers of dominated individuals have attained degrees, in reality 
its primary consequence was a re stratification of the field of higher education in 
much the same way as observed by Bourdieu and Passeron (1979) in 1960s France, 
with an extra trickle of dominated individuals pursuing mainly higher 
credentialisation of existing practical, and therefore devalued, knowledge within 
devalued institutions. Embracing the meritocratic principle that 'natural skills, 
talents, energy, thrift and inventiveness' must be 'released, not suppressed' 
(emphasis added), the Conservatives failed to address the guiding principle of the 
so-called 'free' choices and the social source of different skills and talents: the 
habitus, as expectations of the future and dispositions ultimately grounded in 
inequalities of capital. It is no surprise that class inequalities persisted, therefore, 
seeing as they were never actually addressed. 
The situation is not much better today. It could be argued that precisely 
what the Conservatives missed has been taken up by New Labour in a bid to ensure 
educational success 'for the many not the few', to use their foundational slogan. 
The Prime Minister, for instance, has recently foregrounded social mobility and 
fingered the low aspirations of disadvantaged individuals as a prime hindrance, 
whilst the flagship Sure Start programme would appear to be aimed at equalising 
cultural capital through such initiatives as, for example, information packs and 
leaflets for parents on supplementary home-learning techniques to improve their 
child's educational achievement. But if 
looked at closely, the same errors are 
present. The home-learning guidance of the 
Sure Start programme, for example, 
presupposes the parental ability, patience and 
time afforded by existing capital - 
both cultural and economic - beyond the 
levels afforded by the government's 
compensatory schemes (grants, credits, etc), as well 
as the kind of positive 
valuation of education (which 
logically assumes a devaluation of manual work), 
and therefore inclination to participate 
in children's education, witnessed only 
81 All quotations are taken from the 
Conservatives 1992 General Election Manifesto, archived 
online by the Political 
Sciences Resources service of Keele University at 
http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uký'ilian, 
'con92. htm#all. 
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amongst the capital-rich. It therefore not only hopelessly endeavours to 
miraculously conjure cultural capital out of a vacuum, in contrast to the early 
immersion in a 'cultured' lifeworld enabling steady accumulation amongst the 
dominant, but, in a model exhibition of symbolic violence, it presses dominant 
orientations upon those with alternative experiences of education whilst 
' responsibi li sing' parents such that educational failure can be explained via tropes 
of 'bad parenting'. The current discourse on social mobility that frames such 
policies fares no better. The key to raising aspirations, so the official rhetoric holds, 
lies in instilling within children from disadvantaged backgrounds not just the 'work 
ethic' - the realisation 'that there are jobs available if you make the effort' - but 
the 'learning ethic' - 'the idea that if you work hard and study at school there are 
great opportunities ahead and therefore you must take up learning'. 82 Again 
pushing the dominant's values, the products of privileged conditions of existence, 
upon the dominated, this statement aims to alter subjective aspirations without 
changing the objective probabilities inscribed in capital possession which generate 
realistic expectations of the future, with two likely consequences: a rejection of the 
'learning ethic' by those rejected by it, subsequently interpreted as personal failure 
on the parents' and children's behalf, or a mismatch of expectations and likelihoods 
as children are exhorted to build lofty hopes, dreams and expectations that must, in 
reality, be demolished by the actual structure of the labour market (cf. Bourdieu,, 
1984: 143ff). 
Labour's intention to foster the learning ethic amongst all children is, 
ultimately, contradicted by their commitment to the same flawed principle that 
undermined the Conservative's policies: meritocracy, often masquerading as 
6equality of opportunity'. Thus the Prime Minister speaks of creating 'a Britain 
where instead of talent wasted, effort unrewarded, enterprise stifled, potential 
unfulfilled, we see effort praised, ambition 
fulfilled, potential realised', 'a Britain 
where everyone, no matter what their 
background, should be able to rise as far as 
their talents can take them' and a Britain where social 
justice is 'expressed by 
social mobility, not compensating people 
for what they don't have, but helping 
people develop what they do 
have, their talents, their potential and their ability. 
82 All quotes are taken from a speech on social mobility 
delivered by the Prime Minister to 
educational professionals on 23 
rd June 2008, archived online by the Prime Minister's Office: 
http: //www. number 10. gov. uk/Page 1618 1. 
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The social conditions of 'talent' and 'effort' are never addressed,, and even if, 
unlike the Conservatives, Labour recognise that 'talents can take many forms and 
not just one - practical, creative, communication abilities, analytical intelligence as 
well', the fact that vastly contrasting social conditions produce 'practical' talents 
and 'analytical intelligence' is ignored. As long as this is the case, and considering L- 
these different 'talents' are differentially rewarded economically and symbolically, 
there cannot truly be 'equality of opportunity'. One is tempted, therefore, to 
suggest that only some form of redistribution of economic capital, and thus 
distance from necessity, alongside support mechanisms extending those of the Sure 
Start programme, could make a difference, with the additional effect that it might 
bite into the pernicious premise upon which meritocracy is founded: the existence 
of a hierarchy of worth, or symbolic capital, corresponding with differential 
remuneration as well as perceived 'talent'. 83 
None of this is to deny the significance of issues gathered under the label of 
'life politics', but it is to suggest that, in opposition to Giddens' influential 
argument over the last fifteen years or so, the supposedly old-fashioned and 
secondary goals of 'emancipatory politics' retain their centrality in the sphere of 
political debate and that, against the Third Way, a more progressive perspective 
may hold the key to a society in which one's life is no longer furtively tracked and 
judged from birth. In fact, in so far as stances on 'post-material' issues are 
themselves patterned according to material and cultural conditions of existence, it 
could be argued that the inequalities addressed by emancipatory politics take 
primacy over life politics, for if truly democratic solutions to the 
latter, where all 
have the inclination, ability and information to participate effectively, are to be 
attained, then the former must surely be confronted. 
Unfortunately, in a time when 
the economic interests of those who command the 
field of power structure the field 
of politics more than the lessons of autonomous empirical research, 
the frustrating 
certainty is that the dominant political agents are unlikely 
to spontaneously take up 
this imperative challenge. That being the case, the 
formidable but vital task of the 
engaged social scientist, in concert with 
those who speak for and with the 
dominated - including trade unions 
(whether or not they use the language of 
13 1 have focussed here on education and social mobility, 
but current employment policies are 
problematic too. Lifelong learning and reskilling could 
be positive facets of occupational life, for 
example, if only the range of options were not narrowed 
by economic or cultural barriers and, more 
importantly, forced upon individuals by the caprices of 
laissezfaire capitalism. 
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ýclass'), kindred organisations, associations, movements and intellectuals working 
collectively within and across nations - is to persistently and vociferously resist, 
'fire back' and make the scientifically-informed case for social justice in the belief 
that, if not given by the laws of history, as Marx supposed, a more equitable societv 
can nevertheless be achieved through reason, commitment and action. 
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